Is money targeting an option for Bank Indonesia?

In this paper, using the cash-in-advance model, we estimate Indonesia's money demand function for the period 1970–2005. We find the real M1 and real M2 are cointegrated with their determinants, namely real income, real exchange rate and short-term domestic and foreign interest rates. The long-run elasticities, except for the relationship between M2 and domestic interest rate, are plausible. Interestingly, we find a negative relationship between real exchange rate and real money demand, suggesting evidence of currency substitution. We test for causal relationships and find that in the short-run only the real exchange rate Granger causes real M1 and real M2. Finally, we find that Indonesia's money demand functions are unstable. We conclude that money targeting is not an option for Bank Indonesian and that currency substitution should be curbed in order to ensure macroeconomic sustainability.

MONEY AND EDUCATION: HOW ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION CORRESPONDS TO ACADEMIC SUCCESS

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Soft money : private foundations of party politics

In the area of campaign financing in federal elections, one of the most controversial issues is that of soft money. Soft money refers to those funds raised by the national party organizations for use on various grassroots and party-building activities. but which are not subject to the restraints of federal campaign finance law. Critics contend that these party-building activitie, such as generic television advertising, voter registration and get-out-the vote drives, provide ancillary benefits to federal candidates and should, therefore, be subject to federal contribution and expenditure limits. Critics further argue that because these funds are not subject to federal law and do benefit federal candidates, the national parties raise monies in amounts and from sources, such as corporations and unions, that are prohibited under federal law. Efforts to gain a better understanding of soft money have been hampered by a lack of data, as the national parties were not required to disclose their soft money receipts and transactions until 1991. The purpose of this study is to analyze data recently made available in an attempt to add the import of empirical evidence to the debate over soft money. The nature, size and timing of soft money contributions are investigated and national party soft money disbursements are examined. The findings suggest that any attempts to reform the soft money system must first consider its compensatory benefits. Most prominently, this includes the extent to which soft money has promoted the resurgence of the national party organizations in the context of election politics.

Show me the money

In the rush to become part of the e-business revolution many companies are tossing aside conventional thinking when it comes to analyzing the return on their investment. Too often, however, ignoring formal justification of any investment is a recipe for disaster. With this in mind, a study on the justification processes used by companies when investing in e-business was conducted. The research identified several benefits gained from investing in e-business. Participants highlighted several e-business benefits including: opening up new markets, improving access to management information and reducing operating costs. The justification methods used in organizations could be easily classified into 4 groups: 1. a strategic approach, 2. the integrated approach, 3. an analytical approach, and 4. a financial approach.

Estimating money demand functions for South Asian countries

In this paper, we estimate a money demand function for a panel of five South Asian countries. We find that the money demand and its determinants, namely real income, real exchange rate and short-term domestic and foreign interest rates are cointegrated both for individual countries as well as for the panel, and panel long-run elasticities provide robust evidence of statistically significant relationships between money demand and its determinants. Our test for panel Granger causality suggests short-run causality running from all variables, except foreign interest rate, to money demand, and we find evidence that except for Nepal money demand functions are stable.

Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism : some thoughts on the impact of customer due diligence measures on financial exclusion

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between anti-money laundering (“AML”) and combating of financing of terrorism (“CFT”) customer due diligence (“CDD”) measures in the financial services industry, and exclusion from financial services.
Design/methodology/approach – An introduction to the concept of financial exclusion is provided as well as an overview of international AML/CFT CDD standards. The paper highlights a softening of national CDD measures in South Africa and the UK to lessen the impact on financial exclusion.
Findings – Countries should consider the impact that CDD requirements may have on financial exclusion when they design their AML/CFT systems.
Research limitations/implications – Multi-discilinary research is required to improve the understanding of the broader interaction between AML/CFT objectives, financial exclusion and economic development, especially in countries with a large informal economy.
Practical implications – CDD requirements may unnecessarily exacerbate financial exclusion if they are not formulated with care to reflect the reality of the particular country setting.
Originality/value – The paper offers insights into the international standards resulting to the identification of clients and the experiences in the UK and South Africa regarding the implementation of these standards on financial exclusion.

Client identification and money laundering control : perspectives on the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001

The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA) compels certain persons and institutions (defined as "accountable institutions'') to identify and verify the identity of a new client before any transaction may be concluded or any business relationship is established.1 Accountable institutions are listed in schedule ¹ to FICA and include banks, brokers, financial advisers, insurance companies, attorneys and estate agents. This duty to identify new clients came into effect on 30 June 2003. However, FICA also requires a similar procedure to be followed in respect of all current clients. Current clients are those with whom an accountable institution had business relationships on 30 June 2003.² After 30 June 2004 an institution may not conclude a transaction in the course of its business relationship with an unidentified current client, until it has established and verified that client's identity as prescribed. An institution that concludes any transaction in contravention of this prohibition, commits an offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding R10 million or to imprisonment of up to 15 years.³

The majority of accountable institutions and their clients failed to meet the June 2004 current client identification deadline.4 This failure posed serious economic and legal risks. With a few days to spare, the minister of finance granted a partial and temporary exemption in respect of these requirements. This article explores the statutory scheme for identification and re-identification of clients and some of the practical problems that were encountered. The June 2004 exemptions from these requirements are also considered and proposals for law reform are made.

The discussion of the FICA identification scheme necessitates the following brief overview of the international and South African money laundering control framework.

1 s 21(1) of FICA.
2 s 21(2) of FICA. See also s 82(2)(b).
3 s 46(2) of FICA read with s 68(1) of FICA.