Il viaggio in Italia di Teodoro Hell [pseud.] sulle orme di Dante;

Appendici: 1. Del doversi scrivere e stampare costantemente Dante Allighieri con doppia elle e non altrimenti ... (signed: F. Scolari).--Compendio della cronologia scaligera (signed: G.M. [i.e. Giovanni Mazzocchi])--3. Delle memorie trivigiane che trovansi nella Divina commedia, lettera dell'abate d. Giuseppe Polanzani ...

Dissertation sur le caractère de la Satire de Perse.

In Histoire de l'Acad. Roy. des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres, 1793, xlv. 27-66.

Portraits littéraires /

--III. Théocrite. Virgile et Constantin le Grand, par m. J.-P. Rossignol. Francois Ier poëte. Le chevalier de Méré, ou De l'hommête homme au XVIIe siècle. Mademoiselle Aïssé. Benjamin Constant et madame de Charrière. Madame de Krüdner et ce qu'en aurait dit Saint-Évremond. M. de Rémusat. Charles Labitte. Réception de m. le comte Alfred de Vigny à lA̓cadémie française. M. Étienne. Réception de m. Vitet à lA̓cadeémie française. Lettres de Rancé. Mémoires de madame Staal-Delaunay. La̓bbé Prevost et les Bénédictins. M. Victor Cousin: Cours de lh̓istoire de la philosophie moderne. Sur lÉ̓cole françoise dA̓thènes. M. Rodolphe Topffer. Mort de m. Vinet. Études sur Pascal, par m. Vinet. Relation inédite de la dernière maladie de Louis XV. Pensées.

Voyage d'exploration sur le littoral de la France et de l'Italie /

Mode of access: Internet.

Introduction a une edition critique du roman d'Eneas.

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijks-Universiteit te Groningen.

Leçons sur l'homme, sa place dans la création et dans l'histoire de la terre,

Mode of access: Internet.

Entretiens sur l'état de la musique grecque, vers le milieu du quatrieme siecle, avant l'ere vulgaire.

Mode of access: Internet.

Un Parisien à Rome et à Naples en 1632. D'apres un manuscrit inédit de J.-J. Bouchard;

"Oeuvres de Bouchard": 1 p. following p. 181.

A neuro-mechanical model for interpersonal coordination

The present study investigates the coordination between two people oscillating handheld pendulums, with a special emphasis on the influence of the mechanical properties of the effector systems involved. The first part of the study is an experiment in which eight pairs of participants are asked to coordinate the oscillation of their pendulum with the other participant's in an in-phase or antiphase fashion. Two types of pendulums, A and B, having different resonance frequencies (Freq A=0.98 Hz and Freq B=0.64 Hz), were used in different experimental combinations. Results confirm that the preferred frequencies produced by participants while manipulating each pendulum individually were close to the resonance frequencies of the pendulums. In their attempt to synchronize with one another, participants met at common frequencies that were influenced by the mechanical properties of the two pendulums involved. In agreement with previous studies, both the variability of the behavior and the shift in the intended relative phase were found to depend on the task-effector asymmetry, i.e., the difference between the mechanical properties of the effector systems involved. In the second part of the study, we propose a model to account for these results. The model consists of two cross-coupled neuro-mechanical units, each composed of a neural oscillator driving a wrist-pendulum system. Taken individually, each unit reproduced the natural tendency of the participants to freely oscillate a pendulum close to its resonance frequency. When cross-coupled through the vision of the pendulum of the other unit, the two units entrain each other and meet at a common frequency influenced by the mechanical properties of the two pendulums involved. The ability of the proposed model to address the other effects observed as a function of the different conditions of the pendulum and intended mode of coordination is discussed.

Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

Stochastic bankruptcy games

We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games. We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core.

Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex.

Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferableutilitygame with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferableutilitygame. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.

A Note on The Weak Sequential Core of Dynamic TU Games

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

Cooperation under incomplete contracting

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities.