Committing to Economic Openness in Ireland: The Importance of Domestic Institutional Capabilities

This chapter sets out to explain the factors behind Ireland's exceptional period of economic growth from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s. It suggests that an unbending commitment to economic openness and an on-going effort to establish quality domestic institutions were the main drivers of the so-called ‘Celtic tiger’ phenomenon. The commitment to economic openness manifested itself in the relentless search for inward investment and a willingness to accept deep forms of European integration. Building domestic institutional capabilities involved adopting new-classical macroeconomic policies, creating a robust system of social partnership and reforming the educational system. The two factors positively interacted with each other to create dynamic effects.

The relationship between spatial planning and economic competitiveness: the ‘path to economic nirvana’ or a ‘dangerous obsession’?

This paper offers a contribution to contemporary studies of spatial planning. In particular, it problematises the relationship between neoliberal competitiveness and spatial planning. Neoliberal competitiveness is a hegemonic discourse in public policy as it (allegedly) provides the ‘path to economic nirvana’. However, commentators have critiqued its theoretical underpinnings and labelled it a ‘dangerous obsession’ for policy makers. Another set of literatures argues that spatial planning can be understood as a form of ‘neoliberal spatial governance’ and read in a ‘postpolitical’ framework that ‘privileges competitiveness’. Synthesising these debates this paper critically analyses the application and operationalisation of neoliberal competitiveness in Northern Ireland and Belfast. In focusing on this unique case study—a deeply divided society with a turbulent history—the paper takes the debate forward in arguing that rather than offering the ‘path to economic nirvana’ neoliberal competitiveness is a ‘postpolitical strategy’ and represents a ‘dangerous obsession’ for spatial planning.

Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome always be implemented in a Nash equilibrium and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under strong Nash implementation. The second property, weakly Pareto Nash implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG) and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet WPNI and individual
rationality. EG minimizes the price of stability across all individually rational mechanisms. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012