Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.

O controlo da tuberculose em Portugal : uma apreciação crítica epidemiológica gl

RESUMO - Com tanto ruído informativo e peças de informação incompletas e descontextualizadas, relativos ao controlo da tuberculose em Portugal, a chegarem ao cidadão e aos profissionais de saúde, não é fácil que eles disponham do conhecimento necessário ao desempenho dos respectivos papéis nesse controlo. O presente artigo pretende contribuir para um ganho real em conhecimento quanto (1) ao progresso no controlo da tuberculose em Portugal, enquadrado na evolução desse controlo noutras regiões pertinentes, e (2) aos aspectos do conhecimento disponível e da intervenção na população portuguesa que suscitem especial atenção, para melhoria no futuro imediato. Tem como estratégia integrar, e elevar ao nível de conhecimento, a informação disponibilizada nas fontes mais credíveis e pertinentes, valorizada no contexto da validade das mesmas fontes e da coerência dos diversos componentes. Relata o resultado de um exercício independente de apreciação crítica, com uma perspectiva epidemiológica. São observados: a situação actual, sobretudo a relativa aos anos de 2006 e 2007, e o desempenho do Programa Nacional de Controlo da Tuberculose (PNT), ambos relativizados à evolução recente e ao panorama internacional. O exercício de observação e revisão independentes baseia-se numa selecção de informação oficial e segue o mesmo método de abordagem que a O.M.S. faz nos seus relatórios anuais, à semelhança de outros exercícios já antes realizados. O controlo da tuberculose tem prosseguido a sua tímida, mas firme, evolução favorável, aproximando-se do nível já conseguido nos países seus vizinhos da Europa Ocidental. Em 2007, Portugal contribuiu para os 9 milhões de casos novos anuais, estimados no mundo, com 2916 casos notificados. A este número corresponde a taxa de incidência notificada de 25,7 por 100 000 habitantes e uma redução de 14% em relação ao ano anterior. Esta evolução afigura-se animadora, ainda que seja desejável um impacte mais acentuado do PNT, conforme é de esperar considerando o grau de desenvolvimento do País. A taxa de detecção de casos novos estimada é elevada e continua uma das melhores da Europa Ocidental — o que desfavorece artificialmente a imagem notificada do País, relativamente aos países com pior capacidade de detecção. A taxa de sucesso terapêutico melhorou de novo, situando- -se acima da meta de 85% preconizada pela O.M.S, para um bom controlo da tuberculose. Uma das consequências importantes é que se consegue um melhor aproveitamento da detecção habitualmente alcançada. O conhecimento no seu conjunto aponta para que o grau de controlo possa e deva realmente ser melhorado, sendo imperiosa a discriminação positiva das áreas geográficas e dos grupos populacionais em que tende a concentrar-se a emergência de maior número de casos e de resistências aos medicamentos. Deverão assim ser reforçados selectivamente tanto os meios de detecção e de intervenção clínica, como a qualidade da organização local da intervenção, para o cumprimento efectivo da estratégia DOTS. Enquanto programa vertical que atravessa os diversos níveis do sistema de cuidados de saúde, o desempenho do PNT sofre os efeitos das atribulações desses serviços, sobretudo os de cuidados primários, funcionando como uma «situação-marcadora» quanto ao desempenho do sistema de saúde. A evidência é de que é nesta primeira linha de cuidados que se decide o sucesso na detecção e no tratamento dos casos de tuberculose, reflectindo-se também aí o grau de desenvolvimento social e os comportamentos das populações, por sua vez determinantes do risco de doença e do sucesso terapêutico. ------------------- ABSTRACT - It is not easy that both the citizen and health professionals get enabled with the required knowledge, in order do play the corresponding roles in the control of tuberculosis, considering all the information noise and incomplete, out of context information pieces about the subject, that reach them. This paper is envisaging to contribute for a real gain in knowledge, regarding: (1) the progress in tuberculosis control in Portugal, framed by the evolution of such control in other pertinent regions and (2) the available knowledge and intervention aspects in the Portuguese population that require a special attention, for improvement. The article’s strategy is to integrate, and raise to a knowledge level, information provided by the most accredited and pertinent sources, interpreted as a function of the validity context of the same sources and of the coherence of the several components. Two aspects are observed: the current situation, in particular concerning years 2006 and 2007, and the performance of the National Programme for the Tuberculosis Control (PNT), both made relative to the recent evolution and to the international panorama. This independent observation and revision exercise is based on a selection of official information and follows the same approach that the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) uses in its annual reports, like other similar exercises previously undertaken. The control of tuberculosis is evolving in a shy, but firm, fashion, getting closer to the level already attained by the neighbor countries, in Western Europe. Portugal has contributed with 2916 new notified cases, to the 9 million annual cases estimated in the world, in 2007. This number corresponds to an incidence rate, for notified cases, of 25.7 per 100000 population, and to a reduction of 14% in one year. Such evolution seems encouraging, although a greater impact of PNT is desirable, as expected in relation to the degree of the Country development. Estimated new cases detection rate is high and keeps being one of the best in Western Europe — and this artificially disadvantages the notified image of the Country, as compared with other countries having a worst detection capacity. Treatment success rate has improved again and it is above the 85% target proposed by W.H.O., so that a good control of the disease is achieved. One of the important consequences is a better use of the attained detection. Altogether, knowledge suggests that the degree of control can and must be in fact better; and that a positive discrimination of geographic areas and population groups, in which a greater number of new cases and drug resistances tend to concentrate, is mandatory. Therefore, either clinical detection and intervention resources, or the quality of the local intervention organization have to be reinforced, if a total fulfillment of DOTS strategy is to be obtained. As a vertical programme that crosses the several levels of the health care system, PNT performance suffers the effects of services tribulations, mainly primary care, thus acting as a «markersituation » as to this system performance. Evidence shows that it is in this first line of care that success in both detection and treatment of tuberculosis cases is decided; and that this level also reveals the degree of social developmen

Response Time Analysis of Slotted WiDOM in Noisy Wireless Channels

International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA 2015), Industrial Communication Technologies and Systems, Luxembourg, Luxembourg.

Per-unit royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In the present paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results.

Two divergent ways to manage HR and to get to the top: an exploratory study in micro firms

Aim of the paper: The purpose of this paper is to examine human resources management practices (HRM practices) in small firms and to improve the understanding of the relationship between this kind of practices and business growth. This exploratory study is based on the resource-based view of the firm and empirical work carried out in two small firms by relating HRM practices with the firms’ results. Contribution to the literature: This is an in-depth study of HRM practices and its impact on performance growth in micro firms, isolating and controlling for most of the contextual and internal variables considered in the literature that relate HRM to growth. Firm growth analysis was broadened by the use of several dependent variables: employment growth and operational and financial performance growth. Some hypotheses for further research in identifying HRM practices in small business and its relation with firm growth are suggested. Methodology: Case study methodology was used to study two firms. The techniques used to collect data were semi-structured interviews to the owner and all the employees, unstructured observation at the firms’ facilities (during two days), entrepreneur profile definition (survey answer) and document data collection (on demographic characterization and performance results). Data was analyzed through content analysis methodology, and categories derived from the interviews’ protocols and literature. Results and implications: Results revealed that despite the firms’ organizational characteristics similarities, they differ significantly in owners’ motivation to grow, HRM practices and organizational performance and growth. Future studies should pay special attention to owner willingness to grow, to firms’ years of experience in business, to staff’s years of experience in their field of work and turnover. HRM practices in micro/small firms should be better defined and characterized. The external image of management posture relating to longitudinal financial results and growth should also be explored.

An immunofluorescence test for diagnosis of ophthalmic herpes in a mouse corneal model

Herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV-1) ophthalmic disease is the most common cause of corneal blindness in humans world-wide. Current culture techniques for HSV take several days and commercially available HSV laboratory based diagnostic techniques vary in sensitivity. Our study was conducted to evaluate the use of a quicker and simpler method to herpes ophthalmic diagnosis. Corneal smears were made by firm imprints of infected mouse eyes to glass slides, after smears were fixated with cold acetone, and an indirect immunofluorescence (IIF) method was performed using monoclonal antibodies in a murine model of ophthalmic herpes. Eye swabs from infected mice were inoculated in Vero cells for virus isolation. Cytology and histology of the eye were also performed, using hematoxylin-eosin routine. Mouse eyes were examined by slit-lamp biomicroscopy for evidence of herpetic disease at various times postinoculation. We made a comparative evaluation of sensitivity, specificity and speed of methods for laboratory detection of HSV. Our results indicate that this IIF method is quick, sensitive, specific and can be useful in the diagnosis of ophthalmic herpes as demonstrated in an animal model.

Separating sequential equilibrium in a Bayesian international duopoly

We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.

Stackelberg duopoly with demand uncertainty

We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.

Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information

We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms’ expected profits with the ex-post firms’ profits.

An economical model for dumping by dumping in a Cournot model

We consider an international trade economical model where two firms of different countries compete in quantities and can use three different strategies: (i) repeated collusion, (ii) deviation from the foreigner firm followed by punishment by the home country and then followed by repeated Cournot, or (iii) repeated deviation followed by punishment. In some cases (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted as dumping.We compute the profits of both firms for each strategy and we characterize the economical parameters where each strategy is adopted by the firms.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Uncertainty on a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation

The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Flexibility in Stackelberg leadership

We consider a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty, only for the first mover. We study the advantages of leadership and flexibility with the variation of the demand uncertainty. Liu proved for demand uncertainty parameter greater than three that the follower firm can have an advantage with respect to the leading firm for some realizations of the demand intercept. Here, we prove that for demand uncertainty parameter less than three the leading firm is always in advantage.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

International duopoly with unknown costs

We consider two firms, located in different countries, selling the same homogeneous good in both countries. In each country there is a non negative tariff on imports of the good produced in the other country. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms and also on the welfare of the governments.