Stars of the 1931 Golf Team" , John Lenfesty, Capt. J.R. Royston, John Howard, Coach Thomas Trueblood, UM Men's Gol

[l-r: John Lenfesty, Capt. J.R. Royston, John Howard, Coach Thomas Trueblood]

The naval history of the United States,

v. 1. pt. 1. Blue jackets of '76.--pt. 2. Blue jackets of 1812.--v. 2. pt. 2 [continued] Blue jackets of 1812.--pt. 3. Blue jackets of '61.--pt. 4. Blue jackets in time of peace.--pt. 5. The naval war with Spain.

A state of war: Florida from 1939 to 1945

World War II profoundly impacted Florida. The military geography of the State is essential to an understanding the war. The geostrategic concerns of place and space determined that Florida would become a statewide military base. Florida's attributes of place such as climate and topography determined its use as a military academy hosting over two million soldiers, nearly 15 percent of the GI Army, the largest force the US ever raised. One-in-eight Floridians went into uniform. Equally, Florida's space on the planet made it central for both defensive and offensive strategies. The Second World War was a war of movement, and Florida was a major jump off point for US force projection world-wide, especially of air power. Florida's demography facilitated its use as a base camp for the assembly and engagement of this military power. In 1940, less than two percent of the US population lived in Florida, a quiet, barely populated backwater of the United States. But owing to its critical place and space, over the next few years it became a 65,000 square mile training ground, supply dump, and embarkation site vital to the US war effort. Because of its place astride some of the most important sea lanes in the Atlantic World, Florida was the scene of one of the few Western Hemisphere battles of the war. The militarization of Florida began long before Pearl Harbor. The pre-war buildup conformed to the US strategy of the war. The strategy of theUS was then (and remains today) one of forward defense: harden the frontier, then take the battle to the enemy, rather than fight them in North America. The policy of "Europe First," focused the main US war effort on the defeat of Hitler's Germany, evaluated to be the most dangerous enemy. In Florida were established the military forces requiring the longest time to develop, and most needed to defeat the Axis. Those were a naval aviation force for sea-borne hostilities, a heavy bombing force for reducing enemy industrial states, and an aerial logistics train for overseas supply of expeditionary campaigns. The unique Florida coastline made possible the seaborne invasion training demanded for US victory. The civilian population was employed assembling mass-produced first-generation container ships, while Floridahosted casualties, Prisoners-of-War, and transient personnel moving between the Atlantic and Pacific. By the end of hostilities and the lifting of Unlimited Emergency, officially on December 31, 1946, Floridahad become a transportation nexus. Florida accommodated a return of demobilized soldiers, a migration of displaced persons, and evolved into a modern veterans' colonia. It was instrumental in fashioning the modern US military, while remaining a center of the active National Defense establishment. Those are the themes of this work.

L'état de nature dans le Léviathan de Thomas Hobbes et la controverse entourant son utilisation dans les analyses des relations internationales

L'état de nature de Thomas Hobbes repose sur une étude des limites de la connaissance de l'être humain. Ces limites sont considérables, si bien qu'il est selon Hobbes impossible pour le genre humain de naturellement instaurer un système de vérité commun à l'espèce. L'homme est à l'état de nature dans une situation que nous qualifions « d'anarchie épistémologique » ce qui se traduit dans le Léviathan de Hobbes comme étant une situation de guerre de chacun contre chacun. Ce n'est que par l'institution d'un souverain tout puissant que l'homme peut espérer dépasser la condition de misère qui caractérise sa situation à l'état de nature. Le projet philosophique et politique de Hobbes concerne donc essentiellement l'être humain dans sa situation politique domestique. Hobbes ne consacre effectivement rien de substantiel à l'analyse des relations internationales. Pourtant, le nom de Thomas Hobbes revient souvent à ce niveau d'analyse, particulièrement lorsqu'il s'agit de conceptualiser les rapports interétatiques comme étant analogues à ceux des hommes à l'état de nature. Cette transposition est à notre avis problématique plutôt que constructive puisqu'elle ne reflète en rien les analyses du philosophe. Nous proposons de démontrer ce point par le biais d'une étude exégétique de la pensée de Hobbes.

A State of War: Florida from 1939 to 1945

World War II profoundly impacted Florida. The military geography of the State is essential to an understanding the war. The geostrategic concerns of place and space determined that Florida would become a statewide military base. Florida’s attributes of place such as climate and topography determined its use as a military academy hosting over two million soldiers, nearly 15 percent of the GI Army, the largest force theUS ever raised. One-in-eight Floridians went into uniform. Equally,Florida’s space on the planet made it central for both defensive and offensive strategies. The Second World War was a war of movement, and Florida was a major jump off point forUSforce projection world-wide, especially of air power. Florida’s demography facilitated its use as a base camp for the assembly and engagement of this military power. In 1940, less than two percent of the US population lived in Florida, a quiet, barely populated backwater of the United States.[1] But owing to its critical place and space, over the next few years it became a 65,000 square mile training ground, supply dump, and embarkation site vital to the US war effort. Because of its place astride some of the most important sea lanes in the Atlantic World,Florida was the scene of one of the few Western Hemisphere battles of the war. The militarization ofFloridabegan long before Pearl Harbor. The pre-war buildup conformed to theUSstrategy of the war. The strategy of theUS was then (and remains today) one of forward defense: harden the frontier, then take the battle to the enemy, rather than fight them inNorth America. The policy of “Europe First,” focused the main US war effort on the defeat of Hitler’sGermany, evaluated to be the most dangerous enemy. In Florida were established the military forces requiring the longest time to develop, and most needed to defeat the Axis. Those were a naval aviation force for sea-borne hostilities, a heavy bombing force for reducing enemy industrial states, and an aerial logistics train for overseas supply of expeditionary campaigns. The unique Florida coastline made possible the seaborne invasion training demanded for USvictory. The civilian population was employed assembling mass-produced first-generation container ships, while Floridahosted casualties, Prisoners-of-War, and transient personnel moving between the Atlantic and Pacific. By the end of hostilities and the lifting of Unlimited Emergency, officially on December 31, 1946, Floridahad become a transportation nexus. Florida accommodated a return of demobilized soldiers, a migration of displaced persons, and evolved into a modern veterans’ colonia. It was instrumental in fashioning the modern US military, while remaining a center of the active National Defense establishment. Those are the themes of this work. [1] US Census of Florida 1940. Table 4 – Race, By Nativity and Sex, For the State. 14.

L'état de nature dans le Léviathan de Thomas Hobbes et la controverse entourant son utilisation dans les analyses des relations internationales

L'état de nature de Thomas Hobbes repose sur une étude des limites de la connaissance de l'être humain. Ces limites sont considérables, si bien qu'il est selon Hobbes impossible pour le genre humain de naturellement instaurer un système de vérité commun à l'espèce. L'homme est à l'état de nature dans une situation que nous qualifions « d'anarchie épistémologique » ce qui se traduit dans le Léviathan de Hobbes comme étant une situation de guerre de chacun contre chacun. Ce n'est que par l'institution d'un souverain tout puissant que l'homme peut espérer dépasser la condition de misère qui caractérise sa situation à l'état de nature. Le projet philosophique et politique de Hobbes concerne donc essentiellement l'être humain dans sa situation politique domestique. Hobbes ne consacre effectivement rien de substantiel à l'analyse des relations internationales. Pourtant, le nom de Thomas Hobbes revient souvent à ce niveau d'analyse, particulièrement lorsqu'il s'agit de conceptualiser les rapports interétatiques comme étant analogues à ceux des hommes à l'état de nature. Cette transposition est à notre avis problématique plutôt que constructive puisqu'elle ne reflète en rien les analyses du philosophe. Nous proposons de démontrer ce point par le biais d'une étude exégétique de la pensée de Hobbes.

An integrative framework of supervisor responses to workgroup conflict

It is well-established that prolonged exposure to workplace conflict, as a work stressor, is linked to physical illness and psychological dysfunction in employees (see Spector and Jex, 1998; Romanov, Appelberg, Honkasalo, and Koskenvuo, 1996; Skogstad, Einarsen, Torsheim, Aasland, and Hetland, 2007). In addition to the negative implications for physiological and psychological health, workplace conflict has been shown to influence employee behaviors that have consequences for organizational effectiveness (e.g., turnover and impaired performance; see Bowling and Beehr, 2006; De Dreu and Weingart, 2003). Further, research suggests that managers spend approximately 20 percent of their time managing conflict (Thomas, 1992; Baron, 1989). There also are substantial financial implications associated with workplace conflict. For example, in the United Kingdom, costs at the national level for sickness absence and replacement costs has been estimated to be close to £2 billion per annum (Hoel, Sparks, and Cooper, 2001).