Application of a floating well concept to a latch-up-free, low-cost, smart power high-side switch technology

The aim of this brief is to present an original design methodology that permits implementing latch-up-free smart power circuits on a very simple, cost-effective technology. The basic concept used for this purpose is letting float the wells of the MOS transistors most susceptible to initiate latch-up.

Were Spanish migrants attracted by industrial agglomerations?: an analysis for the interwar years in the light of the new economic geography

In this paper we examine whether access to markets had a significant influence onmigration choices of Spanish internal migrants in the inter-war years. We perform astructural contrast of a New Economic Geography model that focus on the forwardlinkage that links workers location choice with the geography of industrial production,one of the centripetal forces that drive agglomeration in the NEG models. The resultshighlight the presence of this forward linkage in the Spanish economy of the inter-warperiod. That is, we prove the existence of a direct relation between workers¿ localizationdecisions and the market potential of the host regions. In addition, the direct estimationof the values associated with key parameters in the NEG model allows us to simulatethe migratory flows derived from different scenarios of the relative size of regions andthe distances between them. We show that in Spain the power of attraction of theagglomerations grew as they increased in size, but the high elasticity estimated for themigration costs reduced the intensity of the migratory flows. This could help to explainthe apparently low intensity of internal migrations in Spain until its upsurge during the1920s. This also explains the geography of migrations in Spain during this period,which hardly affected the regions furthest from the large industrial agglomerations (i.e.,regions such as Andalusia, Estremadura and Castile-La Mancha) but had an intenseeffect on the provinces nearest to the principal centres of industrial development.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.

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Over the last few decades, the Swiss higher education system has faced important reforms - both concerning its structure and its governance. As with other European countries, one of the most important changes consists of the strengthening of the higher education institutions' research mission through the reinforcement of the role of the National Science Foundation (NSF), which has become increasingly involved in sustaining academic careers. Meanwhile, traditionally and historically, the definition of a faculty member and his or her financial support has come from the higher education institutions (HEI) themselves. This redefinition of power relationships around the funding of academic temporary positions and research activities by the NSF can be analyzed as an attempt to reform the structure of academic careers and the allocation modes of academic positions. Being able to analyze the issue of allocating academic positions within the normative structure of science (Merton, The sociology of science. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973) is a constant concern for those involved in Higher Education Studies. This chapter is an attempt to nurture the debate by questioning, though a quantitative and qualitative research, the tension between the uses of universalist and particularist criteria in the allocation of academic positions. It analyses the possible exclusion process as a consequence of the organization of academic markets and their embeddedness in a wider societal organization.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Prediction markets supporting technology assessment

In this thesis, we study the use of prediction markets for technology assessment. We particularly focus on their ability to assess complex issues, the design constraints required for such applications and their efficacy compared to traditional techniques. To achieve this, we followed a design science research paradigm, iteratively developing, instantiating, evaluating and refining the design of our artifacts. This allowed us to make multiple contributions, both practical and theoretical. We first showed that prediction markets are adequate for properly assessing complex issues. We also developed a typology of design factors and design propositions for using these markets in a technology assessment context. Then, we showed that they are able to solve some issues related to the R&D portfolio management process and we proposed a roadmap for their implementation. Finally, by comparing the instantiation and the results of a multi-criteria decision method and a prediction market, we showed that the latter are more efficient, while offering similar results. We also proposed a framework for comparing forecasting methods, to identify the constraints based on contingency factors. In conclusion, our research opens a new field of application of prediction markets and should help hasten their adoption by enterprises. Résumé français: Dans cette thèse, nous étudions l'utilisation de marchés de prédictions pour l'évaluation de nouvelles technologies. Nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement aux capacités des marchés de prédictions à évaluer des problématiques complexes, aux contraintes de conception pour une telle utilisation et à leur efficacité par rapport à des techniques traditionnelles. Pour ce faire, nous avons suivi une approche Design Science, développant itérativement plusieurs prototypes, les instanciant, puis les évaluant avant d'en raffiner la conception. Ceci nous a permis de faire de multiples contributions tant pratiques que théoriques. Nous avons tout d'abord montré que les marchés de prédictions étaient adaptés pour correctement apprécier des problématiques complexes. Nous avons également développé une typologie de facteurs de conception ainsi que des propositions de conception pour l'utilisation de ces marchés dans des contextes d'évaluation technologique. Ensuite, nous avons montré que ces marchés pouvaient résoudre une partie des problèmes liés à la gestion des portes-feuille de projets de recherche et développement et proposons une feuille de route pour leur mise en oeuvre. Finalement, en comparant la mise en oeuvre et les résultats d'une méthode de décision multi-critère et d'un marché de prédiction, nous avons montré que ces derniers étaient plus efficaces, tout en offrant des résultats semblables. Nous proposons également un cadre de comparaison des méthodes d'évaluation technologiques, permettant de cerner au mieux les besoins en fonction de facteurs de contingence. En conclusion, notre recherche ouvre un nouveau champ d'application des marchés de prédiction et devrait permettre d'accélérer leur adoption par les entreprises.