A bibliography of birds : with special reference to anatomy, behavior, biochemistry --. by Reuben Myron Strong

v.25:pt.4(1959)

Trophic ecology and foraging behavior of Tropidurus hispidus and Tropidurus semitaeniatus (Squamata, Tropiduridae) in a caatinga area of northeastern Brazil

This study aimed to analyze the seasonal variation in diet composition and foraging behavior of Tropidurus hispidus (Spix, 1825) and T. semitaeniatus (Spix, 1825), as well as measurement of the foraging intensity (number of moves, time spent stationary, distance traveled and number of attacks on prey items) in a caatinga patch on the state of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil. Hymenoptera/Formicidae and Isoptera predominated in the diet of both species during the dry season. Opportunistic predation on lepidopteran larvae, coleopteran larvae and adults, and orthopteran nymphs and adults occurred in the wet season; however, hymenopterans/Formicidae were the most important prey items. The number of food items was similar between lizard species in both seasons; however the overlap for number of prey was smaller in the wet season. Preys ingested by T. hispidus during the wet season were also larger than those consumed by T. semitaeniatus. Seasonal comparisons of foraging intensity between the two species differed, mainly in the wet season, when T. hispidus exhibited less movement and fewer attacks on prey, and more time spent stationary if compared to T. semitaeniatus. Although both lizards are sit-and-wait foragers, T. semitaeniatus is more active than T. hispidus. The diet and foraging behavior of T. hispidus and T. semitaeniatus overlap under limiting conditions during the dry season, and are segregative factors that may contribute to the coexistence of these species in the wet season.

The influence of prior experience with artificial fruits on the ovipositioning behavior of Anastrepha fraterculus (Diptera, Tephritidae)

The South American fruit fly, Anastrepha fraterculus (Wiedemann, 1830) (Diptera, Tephritidae), is a leading pest of Brazilian fruit crops. This study evaluated how prior experience with artificial fruits containing peach and/or guabiroba pulp influenced the ovipositing behavior of A. fraterculus. Insects 15-21 days old were exposed to four treatments: 1) experience with guabiroba, Campomanesia xanthocarpa O. Berg (Myrtaceae); 2) experience with peach, Prunus persica (L.) Batsch (Chimarrita cultivar; Rosaceae); 3) experience with both fruits; and 4) no experience (naive). Naive females and females experienced with guabiroba pulp and with both fruits (peach and guabiroba) oviposited and showed dragging and puncturing behavior on substrates containing guabiroba, but females that were only exposed to peach pulp did not show a preference for any substrate. The study shows that prior experience with substrate influences ovipositing behavior in A. fraterculus.

Intermediate asymptotics beyond homogeneity and self-similarity: long time behavior for [formula]

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Consumers' behavior and the Bertrand paradox: an ACE approach

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the process behavior. Second, we use nite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the rst approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the rst approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach.

The behavior of money velocity in low and high inflation countries

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of money demand where the velocity of money changes in response to endogenous fluctuations in the interest rate. The parameter space can be divided into two subsets: one where velocity is constant as in standard cash-in-advance models, and another one where velocity fluctuates as in Baumol (1952). The model provides an explanation of why, for a sample of 79 countries, the correlation between the velocity of money and the inflation rate appears to be low, unlike common wisdom would suggest. The reason is the diverse transaction technologies available in different economies.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Unemployment and wage formation in a growth model with public capital

We study the relation between public capital, employment and growth under different assumptions concerning wage formation. We show that public capital increases economic growth, and that, if there is wage inertia, employment positively depends on both economic growth and public capital.