Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Sôbre u'a modificação do meio de Monteverde

It is well known that the culture media used in the presumptive diagnosis of suspiciuous colonies from plates inoculated with stools for isolation of enteric organisms do not always correctly indicate the major groups of enterobacteria. In an effort to obtain a medium affording more exact indications, several media (1-9) have been tested. Modifications of some of these media have also been tested with the result that a satisfactory modification of Monteverde's medium was finaly selected. This proved to be most satisfactory, affording, as a result of only one inoculation, a complete series of basic indications. The modification involves changes in the formula, in the method of preparation and in the manner of storage. The formulae are: A. Thymol blue indicator: NaOH 0.1/N .............. 34.4 ml; Thymol blue .............. 1.6 g; Water .................... 65.6 ml. B. Andrade's indicator. C. Urea and sugar solution: Urea ..................... 20 g; Lactose ................... 30 g; Sucrose ................... 30 g; Water .................... 100 ml. The mixture (C.) should be warmed slightly in order to dissolve the ingredients rapidly. Sterilise by filtration (Seitz). Keep stock in refrigeratior. The modification of Monteverde's medium is prepared in two parts. Semi-solid part - Peptone (Difco) 2.0 g; NaCl 0.5 g; Agar 0.5 g; Water 100.0 ml. Boil to dissolve the ingredients. Adjust pH with NaOH to 7.3-7.4. Boil again for precipitation. Filter through cotton. Ad indicators "A" 0.3 ml and "B" 1.0 ml. Sterilise in autoclave 115ºC, 15 minutes in amounts not higher than 200 ml. Just before using, add solution "C" asseptically in amounts of 10 ml to 200 ml of the melted semi-solid medium, maintained at 48-50ºC. Solid part - Peptone (Difco) 1.5 g; Trypticase (BBL) 0.5 g; Agar 2.0 g; Water 100,00 ml. Boil to dissolve the ingredients. Adjust pH with NaOH to 7.3-7.4. Boils again. Filter through cotton. Add indicators "A" 0.3 ml and "B" 1.0 ml; ferrous ammonium sulfate 0.02 g; sodiun thiosulfate 0.02 g. Sterilise in autoclave 115ºC, 15 minutes in amounts not higher than 200 ml. Just before using, add solution "C" asseptically in amounts of 10 ml to 200 ml of the melted solid medium, maintained at 48-50ºC. Final medium - The semi-solid part is dispensed first (tubes about 12 x 120 mm) in 2.5 ml amounts and left to harden at room temperature, in vertical position. The solid part is dispensed over the hardened semi-solid one in amounts from 2.0 ml to 2.5 ml and left to harden in slant position, affording a butt of 12 to 15 mm. The tubes of medium should be subjected to a sterility test in the incubator, overnight. Tubes showing spontaneous gas bubbles (air) should then be discarded. The medium should be stored in the incubator (37ºC), for not more than 2 to 4 days. Storage of the tubes in the ice-box produces the absorption of air which is released as bubbles when the tubes are incubated at 37ºC after inoculation. This fact confirmed the observation of ARCHAMBAULT & McCRADY (10) who worked with liquid media and the aplication of their observation was found to be essential to the proper working conditions of this double-layer medium. Inoculation - The inoculation is made by means of a long straight needle, as is usually done on the triple sugar, but the needel should penetrate only to about half of the height of the semi-solid column. Indol detection - After inoculation, a strip of sterelized filter papaer previously moistened with Ehrlich's reagent, is suspended above the surface of the medium, being held between the cotton plug and the tube. Indications given - In addition to providing a mass of organisms on the slant for serological invetigations, the medium gives the following indications: 1. Acid from lactose and/or sucrose (red, of yellowsh with strains which reduce the indicators). 2. Gas from lactose and/or sucrose (bubbles). 3. H[2]S production, observed on the solid part (black). 4. Motility observed on the semi-solid part (tubidity). 5. Urease production, observed on solid and semi-solid parts (blue). 6. Indol production, observed on the strip of filter paper (red or purplish). Indol production is not observed with indol positive strains which rapidly acidify the surface o the slant, and the use of oxalic acid has proved to give less sensitive reaction (11). Reading of results - In most cases overnight incubation is enough; sometimes the reactions appear within only a few hours of incubation, affording a definitive orientation of the diagnosis. With some cultures it is necessary to observe the medium during 48 hours of incubation. A description showing typical differential reaction follows: Salmonella: Color of the medium unchanged, with blackening of the solid part when H[2]S is positive. The slant tends to alkalinity (greenish of bluish). Gas always absent. Indol negative. Motility positive or negative. Shigella: Color of the medium unchanged at the beginning of incubation period, but acquiring a red color when the strain is late lactose/sucrose positive. Slant tending to alkalinity (greenish or purplish). Indol positive or negative. Motility, gas and H[2]S always negative. Proteus: Color of the medium generally changes entirely to blue or sometimes to green (urease positive delayed), with blackening of solid part when H[2]S is positive. Motility positive of negative. Indol positive. Gas positive or negative. The strains which attack rapidly sucrose may give a yellow-greenish color to the medium. Sometimes the intense blue color of the medium renders difficult the reading of the H[2]S production. Escherichiae and Klebsiellae: Color of the medium red or yellow (acid) with great and rapid production of gas. Motility positive or negative. Indol generally impossible to observe. Paracoli: Those lactose of sucrose positive give the same reaction as Esherichia. Those lactose or sucrose negatives give the same reactions as Salmonellae. Sometimes indol positive and H[2]S negative. Pseudomonas: Color of the medium unchanged. The slant tends to alkalinity. It is impossible to observe motility because there is no growth in the bottom. Alkaligenes: Color of the medium unchanged. The slant tends to alkalinity. The medium does not alter the antigenic properties of the strains and with the mass of organisms on the slant we can make the serologic diagnosis. It is admitted that this medium is somewhat more laborious to prepare than others used for similar purposes. Nevertheless it can give informations generally obtained by two or three other media. Its use represents much saving in time, labor and material, and we suggest it for routine laboratory work in which a quick presumptive preliminary grouping of enteric organisms is needed.

Who participates in R&D subsidy programs? The case of spanish manufacturing firms.

Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies to firms has produced mixed results so far. One possible explanation is that firms and project selection rules may be quite heterogeneous both across agencies and across industries, leading to different outcomes in terms of the induced additional private effort. Here we focus on the participation stage. Using a sample of Spanish firms, we test for differences across agencies and industries. Our results suggest that firms in the same industry face different hurdles to participate in different agencies’ programs, that participation patterns may reflect a combination of agency goals, and that patterns differ across high-tech and low-tech industries.

El dret a l'educació i la igualtat d'oportunitats. Perspectiva històrica

La importància del sistema educatiu per a la formació d’una consciència democràtica és un tema ja present en el pensament il•lustrat i recollit en la Constitució de 1812 on es pretenia que, amb els plans d’instrucció, a partir de l’any 1830 sabessin llegir i escriure tots els ciutadans. L’objectiu d’aquesta recerca és analitzar com el dret a l’educació és determinant per al desplegament de la nostra personalitat i per a la igualtat d’oportunitats. Molts dels problemes i de les tensions presents en la configuració d’un model de sistema educatiu per a la nostra societat democràtica són conseqüència de plantejaments no resolts des de fa dos segles. La consolidació, per primer cop en la nostra història, d’un ordenament jurídic democràtic, exigeix un esforç per part de tots els agents implicats en el sistema educatiu per a possibilitar una societat on sigui vigent el principi d’igualtat d’oportunitats.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Treball de camp a una colònia de xatrac comú (sterna hirundo) en Alemanya

Estudio elaborado a partir de una estancia en el Institut fur Vogelforschung. El objeto de la estancia fue participar en la campaña de campo en la colonia de Charrán común (Sterna hirundo) situada en Wilhelmshaven (Alemania), entre los meses de mayo y agosto de 2005. Esta participación se llevó a cabo bajo la dirección del Prof. Dr. Peter H. Becker y junto a su equipo. Se participó en la recogida rutinaria de datos de la colonia así como en distintas técnicas relacionadas con el presente proyecto, como el marcaje de pollos, su observación directa desde escondites y la recogida de distintas muestras biológicas. El objetivo principal era continuar con la obtención de datos para el trabajo de investigación sobre la influencia de la calidad y la condición parental en la manipulación adaptativa de la razón de sexos y la asignación por sexos. La obtención de datos se basa en la implantación de transponders en pollos, que permiten la identificación de cada charrán de por vida. La combinación de esta información con la observación directa de cebas hace de la colonia un lugar excepcional, lo que permite conocer los factores que influyen en las tendencias que existan. Sin embargo, el objetivo específico de la campaña se centraba en investigar la variabilidad individual de la respuesta inmune en los pollos de charrán en relación a un número de atributos de los propios pollos (sexo, tamaño, tasa de crecimiento, proteínas en plasma, hematocrito, carga parasitaria, carotenos en plasma, isótopos de las plumas), de los padres (fecha y tamaño de puesta, calidad parental) y de las condiciones de cría (orden de eclosión, densidad de la sub-colonia). Los resultados de estos datos obtenidos durante la campaña respaldan que existe una influencia de la condición nutricional y la calidad parental en la respuesta immune de los pollos, debida probablemente a un esfuerzo reproductivo diferencial.

The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Inequality and a repeated joint project

Agents voluntarily contribute to an infinitely repeated joint project. We investigate the conditions for cooperation to be a renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof equilibrium before examining the influence of output share inequality on the sustainability of cooperation. When shares are not equally distributed, cooperation requires agents to be more patient than under perfect equality. Beyond a certain degree of share inequality, full efficiency cannot be reached without redistribution. This model also explains the coexistence of one cooperating and one free-riding coalition. In this case, increasing inequality can have a positive or negative impact on the aggregate level of effort.

Análisis y diseño de filtros apilados basados en resonadores acústicos

Durant els últims anys la demanda de filtres pas banda de ràdio freqüència, de reduïdes dimensions, lleugers i d'elevades prestacions destinats a sistemes de comunicacions inalàmbriques s'ha incrementat de forma significativa. Aquests sistemes principalment són els sistemes de telefonia mòbil de tercera generació UMTS y el sistema de navegació GPS. Els filtres actuals, basats en ressonadors SAW (Surface Acoustic Wave), tenen unes dimensions reduïdes però estan limitats en freqüència (3 GHz) i la seva tecnologia no és compatible amb les tecnologies estàndards de circuits integrats. Per aquestes raons s'espera que els filtres basats en ressonadors BAW (Bulk Acoustic Wave) substitueixin als SAW. Els dos tenen dimensions similars, però els filtres BAW poden funcionar a freqüències superiors a 3 GHz, poden treballar amb nivells de potència majors, i és important destacar el fet que la seva tecnologia és compatible amb les tecnologies estàndards de circuits integrats. La investigació en l'àmbit dels filtres BAW s'ha centrat en millorar els processos tecnològics i la qualitat dels materials, però s'ha treballat poc en l'adaptació de les tècniques sistemàtiques de disseny de filtres a les particularitats d'aquesta tecnologia, per tant el principal objectiu d'aquest treball és presentar mètodes sistemàtics per al disseny de filtres BAW, centrant-se en l'estudi d’estructures apilades.

Molecular estimation of dispersal for ecology and population genetics

The dispersal process, by which individuals or other dispersing agents such as gametes or seeds move from birthplace to a new settlement locality, has important consequences for the dynamics of genes, individuals, and species. Many of the questions addressed by ecology and evolutionary biology require a good understanding of species' dispersal patterns. Much effort has thus been devoted to overcoming the difficulties associated with dispersal measurement. In this context, genetic tools have long been the focus of intensive research, providing a great variety of potential solutions to measuring dispersal. This methodological diversity is reviewed here to help (molecular) ecologists find their way toward dispersal inference and interpretation and to stimulate further developments.

Nest distribution varies with dispersal method and familiarity-mediated aggression for two sympatric ants

Dispersal mechanisms and competition together play a key role in the spatial distribution of a population. Species that disperse via fission are likely to experience high levels of localized competitive pressure from conspecifics relative to species that disperse in other ways. Although fission dispersal occurs in many species, its ecological and behavioural effects remain unclear. We compared foraging effort, nest spatial distribution and aggression of two sympatric ant species that differ in reproductive dispersal: Streblognathus peetersi, which disperse by group fission, and Plectroctena mandibularis, which disperse by solitary wingless queens. We found that although both species share space and have similar foraging strategies, they differ in nest distribution and aggressive behaviour. The spatial distribution of S. peetersi nests was extremely aggregated, and workers were less aggressive towards conspecifics from nearby nests than towards distant conspecifics and all heterospecific workers. By contrast, the spatial distribution of P. mandibularis nests was overdispersed, and workers were equally aggressive towards conspecific and heterospecific competitors regardless of nest distance. Finally, laboratory experiments showed that familiarity led to the positive relationship between aggression and nest distance in S. peetersi. While unfamiliar individuals were initially aggressive, the level of aggression decreased within 1 h of contact, and continued to decrease over 24 h. Furthermore, individuals from near nests that were not aggressive could be induced to aggression after prolonged isolation. Overall, these results suggest that low aggression mediated by familiarity could provide benefits for a species with fission reproduction and an aggregated spatial distribution.