Hydraulic economy and logographic writing in ancient China: factor of topography

Chinese civilisation is characterised by two distinctive features – a strong centralised administration and the system of logographic writing. This paper investigates nature’s powerful impacts on human development, in terms of organisation and communication in ancient China. It argues that ancient China’s topography played a crucial role in the formation of ancient Chinese civilisation and its hydraulic economy pushed the state stronger than society, hence a strong centralised government emerged.

The political economy of markets and development: a case study of health care consumption in the State of Kerala, India

Marketing theory has largely ignored the issue of power in influencing exchanges. Most of the studies either disregard the role of power, or resource power is the only dimension taken into account. In this study, we expand the existing understanding by centrally situating the role of socio-political power in the consumption process. We examine the health care system in the Indian state of Kerala and highlight that socio-political power is a crucial determinant of consumption levels. In the process, we argue that in a resource—constrained Third World society socio-political empowerment is critical to the development process.

Auditor industry specialization, political economy and earnings quality: some cross-country evidence

Using cross-country data, we evaluate the impact of investor protection on the association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists. Our findings show that the positive association between industry specialist auditors and earnings quality as documented in the literature is affected by the political electoral system, which reflects investor protection rights in a country. We document that audits by industry specialists are associated with higher earnings quality in countries with the proportional electoral system, reflecting weak investor protection. Our results also confirm Kwon et al.'s findings that overall there is a positive association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists in countries with weak legal enforcement. Our findings, however, indicate that Kwon et al.'s results are valid only for countries with weak investor protection reflected by the proportional electoral system and not for countries with strong investor protection reflected by the majoritarian electoral system. These findings thus suggest that higher earnings quality of firms audited by industry specialists across countries can especially be expected when investor protection is low and legal enforcement is also weak. In addition, our research suggests that future cross-country studies could explicitly consider the role of the political electoral system of a country in evaluating corporate governance, management and accounting issues.

Does political economy reduce agency costs? Some evidence from dividend policies around the world

This study shows that firms in proportional-electoral countries pay out lower dividends and that the correlation between a firm's growth potential and dividend payout ratio is weaker in proportional-electoral countries. However, firms in proportional-electoral countries that cross-list in majoritarian system countries, tend to pay out higher dividends and the negative relation between growth potential and dividend payout tend to be stronger than their peers that do not cross-list. For a few countries that changed their electoral system towards a more proportional system, we observe a decrease in dividend payout ratio and a weaker relation between growth and dividends after the change. Overall these results indicate that a country's political system affects the severity of agency problems. Further, the effect of legal origin on dividend policy reverses once we include the political economy variables in the regressions. We also document that the electoral system not only affects the amount of dividends paid by a firm but also the form of payment.

Introduction: Exploring entrepreneurial activity and small business issues in the Chinese economy

© The Author(s) 2014. This introduction summarises the International Small Business Journal special issue on ‘Exploring Entrepreneurial Activity and Small Business Issues in the Chinese Economy’ and discusses the future research agenda.

Balanced-budget consumption taxes and aggregate stability in a small open economy

In a small open economy facing a perfect world capital market, this paper shows that if the government follows a balanced-budget fiscal policy based on endogenous consumption tax rates, then the steady state is saddle-path stable and hence beliefs-driven aggregate instability can be ruled out. This result is in contrast to those obtained in some closed economy models, and it suggests that unrestricted world capital mobility can help stabilize the economy under the balanced-budget fiscal policy based on consumption taxation.

The political economy of development in a globalizing world

The topics in this issue include the political economy of economic reforms, privatization and labor, structural change and growth, democracy and policy volatility, the role of trade intermediaries in the avoidance of export taxes, and the impact of the middle class on democratization and the international propagation of democratic values.

The new Keynesian Phillips curve in a small open economy: empirical evidence from Australia

This study estimates the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) ofGali and Monacelli for a small open economy using Australian data.Our detailed investigation hinges on estimating the structuralparameters in five different variants of the Gali–Monacelli NKPC,which relates the inflation process to terms of trade and the realexchange rate; the marginal cost and output gap as proxies for realeconomic activity and the hybrid version incorporating bothforward- and backward-looking inflation expectations. The analysisand extensive robustness checks overwhelmingly establish that theGali–Monacelli NKPC cannot explain the dynamics of inflation andis rejected by the Australian data.

The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

The political economy of exchange rate in Brazil

This paper reviews part of the political economy literature on exchange rate policy relevant to understanding the political motivations behind the Brazilian exchange rate policy. We shall first examine the distributive role of the exchange rate, and the way it unfolds in terms of the desired political goals. We will follow by analyzing exchange policy as indicative of government effciency prior to elections. Finally, we discuss fiscal policy from the point of view of political economy, in which the exchange rate results from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Over this review, the Brazilian exchange rate policy is discussed in light of the theories presented.

Service industries and service economy

The study analyses the role of services in modern and less-developed economies. It shows the different meanings of the value, definition and classification of service activities found in economic literature. It discusses the relation between service production growth and economic development observing the role of these activities in the dynamics of economic restructuring. Further, it also examines the differences between private and public sector service restructuring and the consequences of internationalization of services. It concludes that economic restructuring also caused by changes in the nature of goods and services has important regional effects.