Contra os semi-sábios — notas sobre a racionalidade nos Pensamentos de Pascal

Ao longo dos Pensamentos, Pascal expressa a sua antipatia filosófica por alguns tipos de pensadores. Um desses tipos de pensadores corresponde à figura do "demi-savant". Os "demi-savants", ou semi-sábios, caracterizam-se essencialmente por uma pretensão de saber fracassada: são homens que julgam estar na posse de um saber que na verdade não possuem. O objectivo desta investigação é fixar, com o maior detalhe possível, o que está em causa na denúncia dos semi-sábios — um aspecto pouco trabalhado no âmbito dos estudos sobre o pensamento de Pascal. A primeira parte da investigação consiste assim na delimitação formal da categoria semi-sábios. Quais são as notas definitórias destes pensadores? Que tipo de erro está em jogo na sua atitude? Que opiniões fazem de alguém um semi-sábio? Estas perguntas acabam rapidamente por nos levar a outras, que dizem directamente respeito à tentativa de determinação do poder de fogo da razão humana. Com efeito, o fundamento filosófico da crítica aos semi-sábios é o diagnóstico arrasador que Pascal faz da capacidade da nossa razão na tarefa do conhecimento — de tal modo que estudar o problema que os semi-sábios representam é estudar sob um determinado ângulo o problema geral da procura da verdade. Nesse sentido, depois de esclarecido o significado da designação semi-sábio, analisamos dois argumentos apresentados nos Pensamentos que visam contestar a compreensão habitualmente constituída acerca das possibilidades do homem na tarefa do conhecimento. Procuramos ainda, por último, desfazer possíveis equívocos quanto à fixação da posição de Pascal no campo da epistemologia. Embora haja poucas referências aos semi-sábios nos textos que compõem os Pensamentos, trata-se de uma figura que funciona como ponto de cruzamento de vários aspectos relevantes de um problema que está no centro do projecto apologético de Pascal: o problema do modo de apuramento da verdade.

Da valoração de gravações e fotografias obtidas por particulares no processo penal

Recordings and photographs obtained by private individuals can be two of the most relevant evidences in helping finding the truth; however, they can also conflict with fundamental rights such as privacy, spoken word or image of the targets. It is not enough that only the violation of the right to privacy is withdrawn because rights to spoken word or image, unattached from the first one, show up independently as the main violated rights and are criminally protected in article 199º of the criminal code. Its use as evidence is, on a first moment, dependent on the private's conduct lawfulness, as it is stated in article 167º of the criminal procedure code. In order to consider its lawfulness, and accept its use as evidence, portuguese higher courts have been defending constructions mostly based on legal causes of defense. Although agreeing with a more flexible position of weighing all the interests at stake instead of denying its use as evidence, we believe notwithstanding that some of these solutions are misleading and shall not be spared from critics. Lastly, even if we reach a positive conclusion about the lawfulness of obtaining and using recordings and photogtaphs carried out to court by private individuals, they must not be however automatically admitted as evidence, still being necessary to proceed to a separate weighting, within the criminal procedure and its own legal rules, about their real purposes in the case.

A intervenção dos orgãos de polícia criminal em sede de julgamento

Currently, Portugal assumes itself as a democratic rule of substantive law State, sustained by a legal system seeking the right balance between the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms constitutional foreseen in Portugal’s Fundamental Law and criminal persecution. The architecture of the penal code lies with, roughly speaking, a accusatory basic structure, “deliberately attached to one of the most remarkable achievements of the civilizational democratic progress, and by obedience to the constitutional commandment”, in balance with the official investigation principle, valid both for the purpose of prosecution and trial. Regarding the principle of non self-incrimination - nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare, briefly defined as the defendant’s right of not being obliged to contribute to the self-incrimination, it should be stressed that there isn’t an explicit consecration in the Portuguese Constitution, being commonly accepted in an implicit constitutional prediction and deriving from other constitutional rights and principles, first and foremost, the meaning and scope of the concept of democratic rule of Law State, embedded in the Fundamental Law, and in the guidelines of the constitutional principles of human person dignity, freedom of action and the presumption of innocence. In any case, about the (in) applicability of the principle of the prohibition of self-incrimination to the Criminal Police Bodies in the trial hearing in Court, and sharing an idea of Guedes Valente, the truth is that the exercise of criminal action must tread a transparent path and non-compliant with methods to obtain evidence that violate the law, the public order or in violation of democratic principles and loyalty (Guedes Valente, 2013, p. 484). Within the framework of the penal process relating to the trial, which is assumed as the true phase of the process, the witness represents a relevant figure for the administration of criminal justice, for the testimonial proof is, in the idea of Othmar Jauernig, the worst proof of evidence, but also being the most frequent (Jauernig, 1998, p. 289). As coadjutant of the Public Prosecutor and, in specific cases, the investigating judge, the Criminal Police Bodies are invested with high responsibility, being "the arms and eyes of Judicial Authorities in pursuing the criminal investigation..." which has as ultimate goal the fulfillment of the Law pursuing the defense of society" (Guedes Valente, 2013, p. 485). It is in this context and as a witness that, throughout operational career, the Criminal Police Bodies are required to be at the trial hearing and clarify the Court with its view about the facts relating to occurrences of criminal context, thus contributing very significantly and, in some cases, decisively for the proper administration of the portuguese criminal justice. With regards to the intervention of Criminal Police Bodies in the trial hearing in Court, it’s important that they pay attention to a set of standards concerning the preparation of the testimony, the very provision of the testimony and, also, to its conclusion. Be emphasized that these guidelines may become crucial for the quality of the police testimony at the trial hearing, thus leading to an improvement of the enforcement of justice system. In this vein, while preparing the testimony, the Criminal Police Bodies must present itself in court with proper clothing, to read before and carefully the case files, to debate the facts being judged with other Criminal Police Bodies and prepare potential questions. Later, while giving his testimony during the trial, the Criminal Police Bodies must, summing up, to take the oath in a convincing manner, to feel comfortable, to start well by convincingly answering the first question, keep an attitude of serenity, to adopt an attitude of collaboration, to avoid the reading of documents, to demonstrate deference and seriousness before the judicial operators, to use simple and objective language, to adopt a fluent speech, to use nonverbal language correctly, to avoid spontaneity responding only to what is asked, to report only the truth, to avoid hesitations and contradictions, to be impartial and to maintain eye contact with the judge. Finally, at the conclusion of the testimony, the Criminal Police Bodies should rise in a smooth manner, avoiding to show relief, resentment or satisfaction, leaving a credible and professional image and, without much formality, requesting the judge permission to leave the courtroom. As final note, it’s important to stress that "The intervention of the Police Criminal Bodies in the trial hearing in Court” encloses itself on a theme of crucial importance not only for members of the Police and Security Forces, who must welcome this subject with the utmost seriousness and professionalism, but also for the proper administration of the criminal justice system in Portugal.

A necessária implicação das fontes na produção da verdade jornalística e na concreta realização da Justiça

Na fundamentada opinião de Javier del Moral1, a fonte de informação é “uma pessoa, um grupo de pessoas, organizadas ou não, que foram testemunhas ou conhecem os factos que o jornalista vai converter em notícia, de maneira direta (informação verbal) ou mediante a entrega de documentos”. O autor refere ainda que estes dois tipos de fontes se complementam. Desta forma, são um elemento central no processo de investigação, quer ao nível do jornalismo, quer ao nível dos órgãos de polícia criminal. Ambas as instâncias, para desenvolverem um trabalho aprofundado, necessitam de ter por base diversas informações, sendo estas fornecidas pelas fontes. Quanto mais credíveis forem as fontes, mais credíveis são as informações. A presente dissertação pretende averiguar qual o papel desenvolvido pelas fontes na investigação judiciária e na investigação jornalística. Tentaremos, ao longo deste estudo, perceber que diferenças existem entre aquelas que são as fontes da comunicação e aquelas que são as fontes da Justiça. Existirão semelhanças entre ambas? Podem os dois sistemas funcionar como fonte um do outro? É a estas perguntas que procurámos dar resposta. Queremos ainda identificar os cuidados necessários no relacionamento com as fontes de informação. E entender como é que estas podem contribuir para a produção da verdade jornalística e para a concreta realização da Justiça. Não deixaremos de parte um olhar abrangente sobre o relacionamento entre o sistema da Justiça e os Media. Uma relação que ao longo dos anos se tem revelado conflituosa, distante de uma comunicação possível, mas estritamente necessária ao funcionamento de uma sociedade democrática. Para que esta dissertação estivesse à luz daquilo que acontece atualmente nas redações e nos tribunais, entrevistámos agentes da Justiça e dos Media, que nos apresentam a sua visão sobre as fontes, sobre o segredo de justiça e sobre o jornalismo judiciário. Por fim e a título de ilustração, elaborámos um estudo de caso sobre a Tragédia do Meco, onde analisaremos dois dos principais jornais diários portugueses: o Correio da Manhã e o Público. O objetivo é verificar o tratamento jornalístico-­‐judiciário que foi feito durante a primeira semana do acontecimento.

A «vontade de verdade» nas Confissões de Santo Agostinho

Pelo menos a partir de Platão, o problema da “vontade de verdade” tornou-se um dos problemas filosóficos mais badalados do pensamento ocidental. A polémica e a tinta gasta à volta deste problema, a partir daí, foram mais que muitas. Desde a Antiguidade até aos séculos mais recentes o trabalho filosófico tenta e volta a tentar olhar para este problema. Muito resumidamente, o problema da “vontade de verdade” diz respeito à pergunta pela forma como está constituída a relação entre o homem e a verdade, i.e., entre o projecto vital humano e o seu projecto de conhecimento. Não deve causar espanto, por isso, que seja um dos problemas centrais da filosofia; está preso a duas questões essenciais do homem: a vida boa e a possibilidade de conhecer. As Confissões de Agostinho são um momento importante da discussão em torno do conceito de «vontade de verdade». Ao longo dos treze livros, Agostinho, que diz ter descoberto a verdade, parece situar-se numa posição impossível que se caracteriza pela radicalização tanto da necessidade de perseguição da “vontade de verdade” para alcançar a felicidade como pela radicalização do diagnóstico da profunda fragilidade do conhecimento humano. O objectivo deste estudo é mostar como tanto a identificação do homem com a ideia de “cor inquietum” como com a ideia de “cor contenebratum” se articula com a tese agostiniana de que se deve, a risco de todo o perigo, procurar a verdade.

History of biological warfare and bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism literally means using microorganisms or infected samples to cause terror and panic in populations. Bioterrorism had already started 14 centuries before Christ, when the Hittites sent infected rams to their enemies. However, apart from some rare well-documented events, it is often very difficult for historians and microbiologists to differentiate natural epidemics from alleged biological attacks, because: (i) little information is available for times before the advent of modern microbiology; (ii) truth may be manipulated for political reasons, especially for a hot topic such as a biological attack; and (iii) the passage of time may also have distorted the reality of the past. Nevertheless, we have tried to provide to clinical microbiologists an overview of some likely biological warfare that occurred before the 18th century and that included the intentional spread of epidemic diseases such as tularaemia, plague, malaria, smallpox, yellow fever, and leprosy. We also summarize the main events that occurred during the modern microbiology era, from World War I to the recent 'anthrax letters' that followed the World Trade Center attack of September 2001. Again, the political polemic surrounding the use of infectious agents as a weapon may distort the truth. This is nicely exemplified by the Sverdlovsk accident, which was initially attributed by the authorities to a natural foodborne outbreak, and was officially recognized as having a military cause only 13 years later.

Hurry up and slow down : education to close the ingenuity gap /

To explore the idea of education to close the ingenuity gap I use Thomas Homer-Dixon's work to define ingenuity. The notion that the supply of ingenuity to solve our technical and social problems is not keeping pace with the ingenuity required to solve those problems is called the ingenuity gap. Man-made technological developments are increasing the density, intensity, and pace of globalisation. People must reorganise decision-making organisations and problem-solving methods to pragmatically combat the growing ingenuity gap. John Dewey's work illustrates the fundamental attitudes for the thinking and judgment associated with educating for ingenuity. Howard Gardner's idea that truth, beauty, and morality ought to form the core values and tenets of the philosophy of educating for ingenuity is integral to this thesis. The act of teaching facilitates the invitation to the communication necessary to foster ingenuity. John Novak-discusses the five relationships of educational leadership that enhance an environment of ingenuity. The International Baccalaureate (IB) is an existing model of global education, one that defines some of the school experiences and academic development of core values of educating for ingenuity. Expanding upon the structure of the IB and other research within this thesis, I speculate upon what my school, where educating for ingenuity so as to close the ingenuity gap is the goal, would be like.

Gadamer's transformation of hermeneutics : from Dilthey to Heidegger

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show how Gadamer's hermeneutics synthesizes the insights of both Heidegger and Dilthey in order to introduce a new hermeneutics. Gadamer's hermeneutics is based not only on the priority of ontology, as Heidegger insists, and neither is it only a product of life which can be objectively understood through study and rigorous method, as Dilthey suggests. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is the bringing together of ontology in terms of history. By this synthesis Gadamer not only places himself within the context of a Lebensphilosophie, but also shows that it is within language that Being can be disclosed according to a lived context. Throughout this paper the philosophies ofDilthey and Heidegger are explicated within a historical context as to bring out how, and why, Gadamer sees the need to surpass these philosophies. Through Gadamer's philosophy of play and the game, language, the dialogical model, application, and the fusion of horizons we can see how Gadamer's critique and questioning of these two philosophy leads to his new hermeneutics. Special attention is paid to the role in which these two contrasting philosophies were used to complement each other in the product of Gadamer' s philosophical hermeneutics as it is presented in his major work Truth andMethod. For Gadamer, the task of understanding is never complete. Therefore, his hermeneutics remains a dynamic structure with which we can always question the past and our traditions. This paper seeks to show his philosophical movements within these questions

Graffiti, memory and contested space : mnemonic initiatives following trauma and/or repression in Buenos Aires, Argentina

Graffiti, Memory and Contested Space: Mnemonic Initiatives Following Periods of Trauma and/or Repression in Buenos Aires, Argentina This thesis concerns the popular articulation ofmemory following periods or incidents of trauma in Argentina. I am interested in how groups lay claim to various public spaces in the city and how they convert these spaces into mnemonic battlegrounds. In considering these spaces of trauma and places of memory, I am primarily interested in how graffiti writing (stencils, spray-paint, signatures, etchings, wall-paintings, murals and installations) is used to make these spaces transmit particular memories that impugn official versions of the past. This thesis draws on literatures focused on popular/public memory. Scholars argue that memory is socially constructed and thus actively contested. Marginal initiatives such as graffiti writing challenge the memory projects of the state as well as state projects that are perceived by citizens to be 'inadequate,' 'inappropriate,' and/or as promoting the erasure of memory. Many of these initiatives are a reaction to the proreconciliation and pro-oblivion strategies of previous governments. I outline that the history of silences and impunity, and a longstanding emphasis on reconciliation at the expense of truth and justice has created an environment of vulnerable memory in Argentina. Popular memory entrepreneurs react by aggressively articulating their memories in time and in space. As a result of this intense memory work, the built landscape in Buenos Aires is dotted with mnemonic initiatives that aim to contradict or subvert officially sanctioned memories. I also suggest that memory workers in Argentina persistently and carefially use the sites of trauma as well as key public spaces to ensure official as well as popular audiences . The data for this project was collected in five spaces in Buenos Aires, the Plaza de Mayo, Plaza Congreso, La Republica Cromanon nightclub, Avellaneda Train Station and El Olimpo, a former detention centre from the military dictatorship.

Nietzsche's will-to-power ontology : an interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil

Abstract: Nietzsche's Will-to-Power Ontology: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil § 36 By: Mark Minuk Will-to-power is the central component of Nietzsche's philosophy, and passage 36 of Beyond Good and Evil is essential to coming to an understanding of it. 1 argue for and defend the thesis that will-to-power constitutes Nietzsche's ontology, and offer a new understanding of what that means. Nietzsche's ontology can be talked about as though it were a traditional substance ontology (i.e., a world made up of forces; a duality of conflicting forces described as 'towards which' and 'away from which'). However, 1 argue that what defines this ontology is an understanding of valuation as ontologically fundamental—^the basis of interpretation, and from which a substance ontology emerges. In the second chapter, I explain Nietzsche's ontology, as reflected in this passage, through a discussion of Heidegger's two ontological categories in Being and Time (readiness-to-hand, and present-at-hand). In a nutshell, it means that the world of our desires and passions (the most basic of which is for power) is ontologically more fundamental than the material world, or any other interpretation, which is to say, the material world emerges out of a world of our desires and passions. In the first chapter, I address the problematic form of the passage reflected in the first sentence. The passage is in a hypothetical style makes no claim to positive knowledge or truth, and, superficially, looks like Schopenhaurian position for the metaphysics of the will, which Nietzsche rejects. 1 argue that the hypothetical form of the passage is a matter of style, namely, the style of a free-spirit for whom the question of truth is reframed as a question of values. In the third and final chapter, 1 address the charge that Nietzsche's interpretation is a conscious anthropomorphic projection. 1 suggest that the charge rests on a distinction (between nature and man) that Nietzsche rejects. I also address the problem of the causality of the will for Nietzsche, by suggesting that an alternative, perspectival form of causality is possible.

Educating for love of wisdom : John Dewey and Simone Weil

The writings of John Dewey (1859-1952) and Simone Weil (1909-1943) were analyzed with a view to answering 3 main questions: What is wisdom? How is wisdom connected to experience? How does one educate for a love of wisdom? Using a dialectical method whereby Dewey (a pragmatist) was critiqued by Weil (a Christian Platonist) and vice versa, commonalities and differences were identified and clarified. For both, wisdom involved the application of thought to specific, concrete problems in order to secure a better way of life. For Weil, wisdom was centered on a love of truth that involved a certain way of applying one's attention to a concrete or theoretical problem. Weil believed that nature was subject to a divine wisdom and that a truly democratic society had supernatural roots. Dewey believed that any attempt to move beyond nature would stunt the growth of wisdom. For him, wisdom could be nourished only by natural streams-even if some ofthem were given a divine designation. For both, wisdom emerged through the discipline of work understood as intelligent activity, a coherent relationship between thinking and acting. Although Weil and Dewey differed on how they distinguished these 2 activities, they both advocated a type of education which involved practical experience and confronted concrete problems. Whereas Dewey viewed each problem optimistically with the hope of solving it, Weil saw wisdom in, contemplating insoluble contradictions. For both, educating for a love of wisdom meant cultivating a student's desire to keep thinking in line with acting-wanting to test ideas in action and striving to make sense of actions observed.

Exploring the personal and professional lives of teachers in the search for authenticity /

"We teach who we are" (Palmer, 1998, p. 2). This simple, yet profound, statement was the catalyst that began my thesis journey. Using a combination of self-study and participant narratives, Palmer's idea was explored as search for authenticity. The self-study component of this narrative was enhanced by the stories of two other teachers, both women. I chose to use narrative methodology to uncover and discover the relationship between the personal and professional lives of being a teacher. Do teachers express themselves daily in their classrooms? Do any lessons from the classroom translate into teachers' personal lives? The themes of reflection, authenticity, truth, and professional development thread themselves throughout this narrative study. In order to be true to myself as a teacher/researcher, arts-based interpretations accompany my own and each participant's profile. Our conversations about our pasts, our growth as teachers and journeys as individuals were captured in poetry and photographic mosaics. Through rich and detailed stories we explored who we are as teachers and how we became this way. The symbiotic relationship between our personal and professional lives was illustrated by tales of bravery, self-discovery, and reflection. The revelations uncovered illustrate the powerful role our past plays in shaping the present and potentially the friture. It may seem indulgent to spend time exploring who we are as teachers in a time that is increasingly focused on improving student test scores. Yet, the truth remains that, "Knowing myself is as crucial to good teaching as knowing my students and my subject" (Palmer, 1998, p. 2).

An exploration of transformation theory and the western tradition: a critical evaluation of a graduate studies class

This qualitative study is an exploration of transformation theory, the Western tradition, and a critical evaluation of a graduate studies class at a university. It is an exploration of assumptions that are embedded in experience, that influence the experience and provide meaning about the experience. An attempt has been made to identify assumptions that are embedded in Western experience and connect them with assumptions that shape the graduate class experience. The focus is on assumptions that facilitate and impede large group discussions. Jungian psychology of personality type and archetype and developmental psychology is used to analyze the group experience. The pragmatic problem solving model, developed by Knoop, is used to guide thinking about the Western tradition. It is used to guide the analysis, synthesis and writing of the experience of the graduate studies class members. A search through Western history, philosophy. and science revealed assumptions about the nature of truth, reality, and the self. Assumptions embedded in Western thinking about the subject-object relationship, unity and diversity are made explicit. An attempt is made to identify Western tradition assumptions underlying transformation theory. The critical evaluation of the graduate studies class experience focuses upon issues associated with group process, self-directed learning, the educator-learner transaction and the definition of adult education. The advantages of making implicit assumptions explicit is explored.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).