Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Petrol consumption and redistributive effects of its taxation in Spain

The objective of this paper is to estimate a petrol consumption function for Spain and to evaluate the redistributive effects of petrol taxation. We use micro data from the Spanish Household Budget Survey of 1990/91 and model petrol consumption taking into account the effect that income changes may have on car ownership levels, as well as the differences that exist between expenditure and consumption. Our results show the importance that household structure, place of residence and income have on petrol consumption. We are able to compute income elasticities of petrol expenditure, both conditional and unconditional on the level of car ownership. Non-conditional elasticities, while always very close to unit values, are lower for higher income households and for those living in rural areas or small cities. When car ownership levels are taken into account, conditional elasticities are obtained that are around one half the value of the non- conditional ones, being fairly stable across income categories and city sizes. As regards the redistributive effects of petrol taxation, we observe that for the lowest income deciles the share of petrol expenditure increases with income, and thus the tax can be regarded as progressive. However, after a certain income level the tax proves to be regressive.

Subjective income expectations, canonical models and income risk

Expectations are central to behaviour. Despite the existence of subjective expectations data, the standard approach is to ignore these, to hypothecate a model of behaviour and to infer expectations from realisations. In the context of income models, we reveal the informational gain obtained from using both a canonical model and subjective expectations data. We propose a test for this informational gain, and illustrate our approach with an application to the problem of measuring income risk.

La transmissió dels models bizantins d’Itàlia a Hispània

Estudi realitzat a partir d’una estada a Roma entre el 7 de gener i el 28 de febrer de 2006. S’ estudia la influència de les produccions bizantines i orientals a la península Ibèrica, a l’època visigoda i més enllà, fins i tot justificant una cronologia dels segles VIII-X dC per a molts dels capitells tradicionalment denominats mossàrabs del nord-oest peninsular. A més, s’enuncia una via per la investigació de les possibles influències llombardes a la península Ibèrica. També es comenten les relacions entre els capitells del nord-est peninsular i els de la Gàl.lia.

Els models d'organització metropolitana: el cas de Montreal

Estudi realitzat a partir d’una estada a l’Institut National de Recherche Scientifique, de Montreal, entre l’1 de setembre i el 30 de desembre de 2005. S’analitza el model d’organització de l’àrea metropolitana de Montreal (Canadà) després de la reforma realitzada entre 2000 i 2002, així com les causes que van conduïr a adoptar-lo.

Stable rank of leavitt path algebra

We characterize the values of the stable rank for Leavitt path algebras, by giving concrete criteria in terms of properties of the underlying graph.

Tendències temporals de la mortalitat per càncer de fetge a Catalunya: periode 1983-2002 i projeccions pel 2005

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Finnish Cancer Registry a Helsinki, Finlandia entre setembre i novembre del 2006. Davant l’increment dels tumors hepàtics en països industrialitzats, s’avaluen les tendències temporals de la malaltia hepàtica a Catalunya durant el període 1983-2002 i s’estima la tendència futura a partir de l’any 2005. L’estudi s’ha basat en dades del Registre de Mortalitat de Catalunya i de l’Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya. La malaltia hepàtica inclou diverses tipologies de tumors hepàtics i la cirrosi hepàtica. Els models edad-període-cohort s’han emprat per estimar els efectes període de mortalitat i cohort de naixement. Els resultats han mostrat que les taxes de mortalitat per cirrosi han disminuït en ambdós sexes, exceptuant els homes d’entre els 35-50 anys, pels quals la mortalitat es mantingué estable. S’han observat increments en la mortalitat per carcinoma hepatocel•lular i en els tumors de vies biliars intrahepàtiques, mentre que les projeccions mostren estabilitat en la tendència d’aquestes malalties durant el període 2005-2009. Les tendències de la mortalitat per malaltia hepàtica constatades poden ser degudes a la implementació de teràpies noves, nous mètodes de diagnòstic, infecció pel virus de l’hepatitis C d’altres factors desconeguts.

Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Estudi comparatiu dels models d’organització de les últimes sis seus olímpiques

Transcripció de la intervenció del Sr. Gabriel Colomé en el Curs Universitari sobre Olimpisme que va organitzar el Centre d'Estudis Olí­mpics (CEO-UAB) el febrer de 1992. L'autor amb aquest text es proposa dos objectius principals: d'una banda, analitzar la influència de l'entorn sociopolí­tic sobre l'estructura organitzativa del Comitè Organitzador dels Jocs; de l'altra, veure com afecta el tipus de finançament en l'estructura i la infrastructura dels mateixos Jocs, i quines diferències hi ha entre els Jocs de 1972 i els següents fins a arribar a Barcelona.

Well-posedness and invariant measures for HJM models with deterministic volatility and Lévy noise

We give sufficient conditions for existence, uniqueness and ergodicity of invariant measures for Musiela's stochastic partial differential equation with deterministic volatility and a Hilbert space valued driving Lévy noise. Conditions for the absence of arbitrage and for the existence of mild solutions are also discussed.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.