Ecological economics

Ecological economics is a recently developed field, which sees the economy as a subsystem of a larger finite global ecosystem. Ecological economists question the sustainability of the economy because of its environmental impacts and its material and energy requirements, and also because of the growth of population. Attempts at assigning money values to environmental services and losses, and attempts at correcting macroeconomic accounting, are part of ecological economics, but its main thrust is rather in developing physical indicators and indexes of sustainability. Ecological economists also work on the relations between property rights and resource management, they model the interactions between the economy and the environment, they study ecological distribution conflicts, they use management tools such as integrated environmental assessment and multi-criteria decision aids, and they propose new instruments of environmental policy.

Ecological conflicts and valuation - mangroves vs. shrimp in the late 1990s

Shrimps are produced in two different ways. They are fished in the sea (sometimes at the cost of turtle destruction) or they are "farmed" in ponds in coastal areas. Such aquaculture is increasing around the world as shrimps become a valuable item of world trade. Mangrove forests are sacrificed for commercial shrimp farming. This paper considers the conflict between mangrove conservation and shrimp exports in different countries.Who has title to the mangroves, who wins and who loses in this tragedy of enclosures? Which languages of valuation are used by different actors in order to compare the increase in shrimp exports and the losses in livelihoods and in environmental services? The economic valuation of damages is only one of the possible languages of valuation which are relevant in practice. Who has the power to impose a particular language of valuation?

Environmental conflicts, environmental justice and valuation

In this article some historical and contemporary environmental conflicts are described. The international environmental liability of mining corporations is discussed. Comparisons are made with conflicts in the United States and in South Africa which fall under the rubric of the Environmental Justice movement. Such conflicts are fought out in many languages, and the economic valuation of damages is only one of such languages. Who has the power to impose particular languages of valuation? Who rules over the ways and means of simplifying complexity, deciding that some points of view are out of order? Who has power to determine which is the bottom-line in an environmental discussion?

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

The Macroeconomics of the labor market: three fundamental views

We distinguish and assess three fundamental views of the labor market regarding the movements in unempoyment: (i) the frictionless equilibrium view; (ii) the chain reaction theory, or prolonged adjustment view; and (iii) the hysteresis view. While the frictionless view implies a clear compartmentalization between the short- and long-run, the hysteresis view implies that all the short-run fluctuations automatically turn into long-run changes in the unemployment rate. We assert the problems faced by these conceptions in explaining the diversity of labor market experiences across the OECD labor markets. We argue that the prolonged adjustment view can overcome these problems since it implies that the short, medium, and long runs are interrelated, merging with one another along an intertemporal continuum.

Do institutions matter for economic fluctuations? Weak property rights in a business cycle model for Mexico

This paper shows that introducing weak property rights in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model can help to explain economic fluctuations. This is motivated by the empirical observation that changes in institutions in emerging markets are related to the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. In particular, in Mexico, the movements in productivity in the data are associated with changes in institutions, so that we can explain productivity shocks to a large extent as shocks to the quality of institutions. We find that the model with shocks to the degree of protection of property rights only - without technology shocks - can match the second moments in the data for Mexico well. In particular, the fit is better than that of the standard neoclassical model with full protection of property rights regarding the auto-correlations and cross-correlations in the data, especially those related to labor. Viewing productivity shocks as shocks to institutions is also consistent with the stylized fact of falling productivity and non-decreasing labor hours in Mexico over 1980-1994, which is a feature that the neoclassical model cannot match.

Climbing to the top? Foreign Direct Investment and Property Rights.

This paper operates at the interface of the literature on the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries, and the literature on the determinants of institutional quality. We argue that FDI contributes to economic development by improving institutional quality in the host country and we attempt to test this proposition using a large panel data set of 70 developing countries during the period 1981 and 2005, and we show that FDI inflows have a positive and highly significant impact on property rights. The result appears to be very robust and is and not affected by model specification, different control variables, or a particular estimation technique. As far as we are aware this is the first paper to empirically test the FDI – property rights linkage.

Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective

Institutions, and more speci cally private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic development. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the production of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.

Temper and Temperature: The Missing Link of Climate on Armed Conflicts

We investigate the causes of a conflict by adding ambient climate factors to the existing bundle of most significant variables. It turns out that – controlling for possible associations – temperature could actually induce a conflict. We emphasise that temperature could not be a dominant reason in starting a conflict; however, it could escalate the chances when other factors are present. This paper references some of the related psychological studies to support this claim. We also show that grievance factors could actually be rightfully effective in starting an internal conflict alongside greed based reasons. In the end, we believe that it could be informative to study ambient factors more often in economics.

Debunking Mill’s “Fourth Fundamental Proposition on Capital”

J S Mill’s enigmatic "Fourth Proposition on Capital" has been brought to our notice by Steven Kates (2015). Kates takes a positive view of the proposition. Our focus is not, however, on Kates, but on the aforesaid proposition. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, via close examination of Mill’s explanatory examples, just how unsatisfactory are its foundations. We conclude that the doubters are justified: Mill’s Fourth Proposition is, demonstrably, a muddle.

Are Dictators Immune to Human Rights Shaming?

This paper examines whether human rights naming and shaming destabilizes the rule of authoritarian leaders. We argue that human rights shaming can destabilize autocratic leaders by signaling international disapproval to elites in the targeted country, increasing their capacity to replace the incumbent. In personalist regimes, shaming increases the risk of irregular exit because regime elite do not have a means to peacefully replace the incumbent. Shaming campaigns also decrease foreign aid and international trade in personalist regimes, denying the leader access to resources to pay his coalition – further destabilizing his rule. In non-personalist regimes where parties or the military allow elites to peacefully replace incumbents, human rights shaming increases the risk of regular turnover of power, but has little effect on the risk of irregular exit or international flows of aid and trade. These findings have implications for understanding when and where shaming campaigns are likely to reduce or deter repression.

Bringing actors and violent conflict into forced migration literature. A model of the decision to return

Populations displaced as a result of mass violent conflict have become one of the most pressing humanitarian concerns of the last decades. They have also become one salient political issue as a perceived burden (in economic and security terms) and as an important piece in the shift towards a more interventionist paradigm in the international system, based on both humanitarian and security grounds. The saliency of these aspects has detracted attention from the analysis of the interactions between relocation processes and violent conflict. Violent conflict studies have also largely ignored those interactions as a result of the consideration of these processes as mere reaction movements determined by structural conditions. This article takes the view that individual’s agency is retained during such processes, and that it is consequential, calling for the need to introduce a micro perspective. Based on this, a model for the individual’s decision of return is presented. The model has the potential to account for the dynamics of return at both the individual and the aggregate level. And it further helps to grasp fundamental interconnections with violent conflict. Some relevant conclusions are derived for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and about the implications of the politicization of return.

Indigenous people's mobilization and their struggle for rights in Colombia

This text aims at showing the history of indigenous peoples’ mobilization in Colombia, the effects that it has brought about on Colombian democracy and political system, and the state’s reactions to their claims and actions. It will show how they have moved from class-based claims to a politics where identity claims have been central in their agenda and part of their strategies to negotiate with the state. It will also show the existing constitutional and legal framework that recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples, despite the context of persecution, murder, and forced displacement.

Territorial autonomy and self-determination conflicts: opportunity and willingness cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand

The paradox of autonomy is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates armed conflict. This study attempts to unpack the puzzle examining the effectiveness of territorial autonomy as a state response to self-determination conflicts throughout the world. It challenges the conflict-inducing features of autonomy arguing that territorial autonomy can mitigate armed conflict by channeling group grievances into peaceful forms of protest. Thus, this study aims at arriving at a comprehensive theory that identifies which factors are responsible for violent escalation of conflicts grounded in self-determination demands. By using the concepts of opportunity structures and willingness dimension, this study shows that conflict escalation only takes place when minorities with greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the center, in contexts of high levels of economic inequality within dyad, are mobilized around autonomy and separatist demands.

Measuring peace. Initiatives, limitations and proposals. Seminar proceedings Barcelona, March 2010

These proceedings correspond to the international seminar “Measuring Peace. Initiatives, Limitations and Proposals” organized by the International Catalan Institute for Peace, which took place in Barcelona on the 4th and the 5th of March 2010. The Human Development Index is the most visible attempt over the last years to improve the statistical tools so that they offer results which are closer to social realities. In the field of Peace the attempts to create new measuring mechanisms have not been able to move beyond the negative conception of peace, which means that it has just been considered as an absence of violent conflicts. In this context, the international seminar organized by the ICIP was an attempt to compile recent contributions of different investigation centres which have focused in conceptualizing positive peace and new ways to measure it.