Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson (2 pages, handwritten), n.d.

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns, January, 1878.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Le "Dollar Cost Averaging", modèle conditionnel d'investissement, et modèle de régression prévisionnel.

Rapport de recherche

The euro impact of the banking system of Greece : cost-benefit analysis.

Rapport de recherche

Determining the Social Cost of the Project Proposed by the Regie Intermunicipale de Gestion des Dechets sur l'Ile de Montreal.

Rapport de recherche

Ordinal Cost Sharing.

We ask how the three known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions - the value, the proportional, and the serial mechanisms - should be extended to arbitrary problem. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares be invariante under all transactions preserving the nature of a cost sharing problem.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies

We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.

The Efficient Use of Multiple Sources of a Nonrenewable Resource under Supply Cost Uncertainty

Uncertainties as to future supply costs of nonrenewable natural resources, such as oil and gas, raise the issue of the choice of supply sources. In a perfectly deterministic world, an efficient use of multiple sources of supply requires that any given market exhausts the supply it can draw from a low cost source before moving on to a higher cost one; supply sources should be exploited in strict sequence of increasing marginal cost, with a high cost source being left untouched as long as a less costly source is available. We find that this may not be the efficient thing to do in a stochastic world. We show that there exist conditions under which it can be efficient to use a risky supply source in order to conserve a cheaper non risky source. The benefit of doing this comes from the fact that it leaves open the possibility of using it instead of the risky source in the event the latter’s future cost conditions suddenly deteriorate. There are also conditions under which it will be efficient to use a more costly non risky source while a less costly risky source is still available. The reason is that this conserves the less costly risky source in order to use it in the event of a possible future drop in its cost.

An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method

We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.

Email Evidence Preservation. How to Balance the Obligation and the High Cost

With the great advancement of computer technologies, electronic information starts to play a more and more important role in modern business transactions. Therefore, electronic data, such as e-mail, is frequently required in the process of litigation. Companies, on the one hand, have the legal obligations to produce this kind of e-mail evidence. On the other hand, they also undertake a high cost of e-mail evidence preservation due to the great volume on a daily basis. This Article firstly analyzed features of e-mail evidence with the comparison of paper evidence. Then, it discussed about how e-mail is authenticated and admitted into evidence. By using the case laws in different legal aspects and current Canadian legislations, the Author demonstrated the importance of e-mail evidence preservation in ordinary business course. After that, the Article focused on the practical dilemma of the companies between their legal obligation and the expensive cost to preserve e-mail evidence. Finally, the Author proposed suggestions to both companies and courts on how to coordinate the obligation and cost. More specifically, while companies should adopt a document management policy to implement e-mail evidence preservation, courts need to take into consideration of the high cost of e-mail evidence preservation in electronic discovery.