The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Regional industrialisation without national growth: The Catalan industrialization and the growth of Spanish economy (1830-1861)

This paper has two main objectives. First, it provides a stylised descriptionof the Catalan industrial path of the period 1830-1861. Second, it reviewsthe evolution of the Catalan industry in the Spanish context and, thus, canserve to describe the relative importance of the Catalan industrialexperience. Consequently, it is mainly devoted to computing and analysing thegrowth rates of Catalan industries during the early phase of industrialisation.The results show that Catalonia experienced a true process ofindustrialisation during the period 1830 to 1861, but that its contributionin rapid increase in Spanish GDP was relatively small.

Audit report on the Heart of Iowa Regional Transit Agency, Des Moines, for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Heart of Iowa Regional Transit Agency, Des Moines, for the year ended June 30, 2007

Special investigation of the Area XV Regional Planning Commission located in Ottumwa, Iowa for the period July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2006

Special investigation of the Area XV Regional Planning Commission located in Ottumwa, Iowa for the period July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2006

Audit report on the South Central Iowa Regional E-911 Service Board for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the South Central Iowa Regional E-911 Service Board for the year ended June 30, 2007

Trade, migration and regional unemployment

We formulate a dynamic core-periphery model with frictions in the job matching process to study the interplay between trade costs, migration and regional unemploymentin the short- and long-run. We find that the spatial distribution of unemployment mirrors (inversely) the distribution of economic activities. Further, we highlight a contrast between the short-run and the long-run effects of trade-induced migration on regional unemployment. In particular, an inßow of immigrants from the periphery into the core reduces the unemployment gap in the short-run, but exacerbates unemployment disparities in the long-run.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2007

Shocks and institutions in a job matching model

This paper explains the divergent behavior of European an US unemploymentrates using a job market matching model of the labor market with aninteraction between shocks an institutions. It shows that a reduction inTF growth rates, an increase in real interest rates, and an increase intax rates leads to a permanent increase in unemployment rates when thereplacement rates or initial tax rates are high, while no increase inunemployment occurs when institutions are "employment friendly". The paperalso shows that an increase in turbulence, modelle as an increase probabilityof skill loss, is not a robust explanation for the European unemploymentpuzzle in the context of a matching model with both endogenous job creationand job estruction.

Estimadores compuestos en estadística regional: aplicación para la tasa de variación de la ocupación en la industria

This work is part of a project studying the performance of model basedestimators in a small area context. We have chosen a simple statisticalapplication in which we estimate the growth rate of accupation for severalregions of Spain. We compare three estimators: the direct one based onstraightforward results from the survey (which is unbiassed), and a thirdone which is based in a statistical model and that minimizes the mean squareerror.

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the five years ended June 30, 2007

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the five years ended June 30, 2007

Crecimiento de las regiones españolas: estructura sectorial, dinámica regional y distribución de rentas.

El análisis de las regiones españolas en el período 1980-1995 indicaque la composición sectorial explica la mayor parte de la evolución del empleo y de las diferencias en productividad, salarios medios y participación de las rentas del trabajo. Para el VAB el componenteregional es más importante que el sectorial, aunque éste no esdespreciable. Nuestro análisis permite identificar a lo largo del tiempo aquellas regiones que han crecido más (menos) que lo esperado dada su composición sectorial. Identificamos una clara relación inversa entre la participación de las rentas del trabajo en el producto y el componente puramente regional del crecimiento del empleo. Sin embargo no observamos relación entre la tasa de paro y la distribución del producto. Ello sugiere que los salarios son poco elásticos a las condiciones del mercado de trabajo, pero el crecimiento del empleo sí lo es a la evolución de las rentas del capital de la región.

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Human Services for the five years ended June 30, 2007

Combined report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Human Services for the five years ended June 30, 2007