965 resultados para product market predation
Resumo:
We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.
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We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.
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We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.
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In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
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We present a Search and Matching model with heterogeneous workers (entrants and incumbents) that replicates the stylized facts characterizing the US and the Spanish labor markets. Under this benchmark, we find the Post-Match Labor Turnover Costs (PMLTC) to be the centerpiece to explain why the Spanish labor market is as volatile as the US one. The two driving forces governing this volatility are the gaps between entrants and incumbents in terms of separation costs and productivity. We use the model to analyze the cyclical implications of changes in labor market institutions affecting these two gaps. The scenario with a low degree of workers heterogeneity illustrates its suitability to understand why the Spanish labor market has become as volatile as the US one.
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In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.
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The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.
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We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.
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This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to purs
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How did the leading capital market start to attract international bullion? Why did London become the main money market? Monetary regulations, including the charges for minting money and the restrictions on bullion exchange, have played the key role in defining the direction of the flow of international bullion. Countries that abolished minting charges and permitted the free movement of bullion were able to attract international bullion, and countries that applied minting taxes suffered an outflow of bullion. In these cases monetary authorities tried to limit bullion movement through prohibitions on domestic bullion exchange at a free price, and tariffs and quantitative restrictions on bullion exports. The paper illustrates the logic of international monetary flow in the 18th century, using empirical evidence for England, France and Spain. The first section defines and measures monetary policy, and the second section introduces minting charges into the arbitrage equation in order to explain the logic of bullion flow between the pairs of nations England-France, England-Spain and France-Spain. The conclusion emphasises the importance of monetary policy in the creation of leading money markets.
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Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.
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Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.
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In this article we develop a theoretical microstructure model of coordinated central bank intervention based on asymmetric information. We study the economic implications of coordination on some measures of market quality and show that the model predicts higher volatility and more significant exchange rate changes when central banks coordinate compared to when they intervene unilaterally. Both these predictions are in line with empirical evidence. Keywords: coordinated foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classification: D82, E58, F31, G14
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The Republic of Haiti is the prime international remittances recipient country in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region relative to its gross domestic product (GDP). The downside of this observation may be that this country is also the first exporter of skilled workers in the world by population size. The present research uses a zero-altered negative binomial (with logit inflation) to model households' international migration decision process, and endogenous regressors' Amemiya Generalized Least Squares method (instrumental variable Tobit, IV-Tobit) to account for selectivity and endogeneity issues in assessing the impact of remittances on labor market outcomes. Results are in line with what has been found so far in this literature in terms of a decline of labor supply in the presence of remittances. However, the impact of international remittances does not seem to be important in determining recipient households' labor participation behavior, particularly for women.
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This paper empirically analyses the hypothesis of the existence of a dual market for contracts in local services. Large firms that operate on a national basis control the contracts for delivery in the most populated and/or urban municipalities, whereas small firms that operate at a local level have the contracts in the least populated and/or rural municipalities. The dual market implies the high concentration and dominance of major firms in large municipalities, and local monopolies in the smaller ones. This market structure is harmful to competition for the market as the effective number of competitors is low across all municipalities. Thus, it damages the likelihood of obtaining cost savings from privatization.