Dynamics of Spatial Game Theory Networks with Novel Modifications

Introduction: Advances in biotechnology have shed light on many biological processes. In biological networks, nodes are used to represent the function of individual entities within a system and have historically been studied in isolation. Network structure adds edges that enable communication between nodes. An emerging fieldis to combine node function and network structure to yield network function. One of the most complex networks known in biology is the neural network within the brain. Modeling neural function will require an understanding of networks, dynamics, andneurophysiology. It is with this work that modeling techniques will be developed to work at this complex intersection. Methods: Spatial game theory was developed by Nowak in the context of modeling evolutionary dynamics, or the way in which species evolve over time. Spatial game theory offers a two dimensional view of analyzingthe state of neighbors and updating based on the surroundings. Our work builds upon this foundation by studying evolutionary game theory networks with respect to neural networks. This novel concept is that neurons may adopt a particular strategy that will allow propagation of information. The strategy may therefore act as the mechanism for gating. Furthermore, the strategy of a neuron, as in a real brain, isimpacted by the strategy of its neighbors. The techniques of spatial game theory already established by Nowak are repeated to explain two basic cases and validate the implementation of code. Two novel modifications are introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 that build on this network and may reflect neural networks. Results: The introduction of two novel modifications, mutation and rewiring, in large parametricstudies resulted in dynamics that had an intermediate amount of nodes firing at any given time. Further, even small mutation rates result in different dynamics more representative of the ideal state hypothesized. Conclusions: In both modificationsto Nowak's model, the results demonstrate the network does not become locked into a particular global state of passing all information or blocking all information. It is hypothesized that normal brain function occurs within this intermediate range and that a number of diseases are the result of moving outside of this range.

Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) Fail to Be Equitable in an Ultimatum Game

The ultimatum game is a commonly used economics game testing humans' sense of fairness. In the game, a "proposer" is given a sum of money and is told they can split it however they want with another human partner. The partner can then either accept the division and both proposer and responder receive the proposed amounts, or the responder can reject the offer and neither player will get anything. Human subjects from most western cultures typically share almost half of an allotted amount, but it remains unknown whether our close primate relatives share this generosity. Recent attempts to present chimpanzees with the ultimatum game have provided inconclusive results, with some studies finding the animals share humans' disposition to behave 'fairly' and others concluding that chimpanzees act selfishly to maximize their own rewards. Capuchin monkeys are known to share many human and chimpanzee social and cooperative behaviors, and this study was the first to present capuchin monkeys with a version of the ultimatum game. Subjects were presented with two differently colored tokens representing different qualitative reward contingencies, one equitable and the other inequitable in favor of the subject proposer. Subjects could select and place one of the tokens in a transfer container. The capuchins were first tested with a "dictator game" where, after the subject monkey selected a token, the rewards (equitable or inequitable) were distributed to the subject and a nearby partner monkey that was not an active participant. The capuchins were then tested on an ultimatum game in which after the subject selected and placed a token in the container, the container was moved to the partner. The partner needed to remove the token and transfer it back to the experimenter for the rewards to be distributed. As such, the partner could reject the subject's offer by refusing to participate and neither would receive a reward. The experiment was conducted to determine if the subject monkey would select the equitable reward option rather than the selfish option in order to maintain the partner's cooperation in the task. Capuchin subjects behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable token significantly more often than the equitable token in both the dictator and ultimatum game with no significant difference in preference between the two games. Interestingly, despite the occasional occurrence of rejection by the partner monkeys (resulting in no reward for the subject), subjects never altered their strategy, continuing to prefer the selfish token. The study may indicate that capuchin monkeys have an inability to judge the effect of their behavior on a conspecific's reward outcome, or an indifference to the outcome if there is an individual cost associated with behaving prosocially.

Closed-loop control of mean arterial blood pressure during surgery with alfentanil: clinical evaluation of a novel model-based predictive controller

BACKGROUND: In contrast to hypnosis, there is no surrogate parameter for analgesia in anesthetized patients. Opioids are titrated to suppress blood pressure response to noxious stimulation. The authors evaluated a novel model predictive controller for closed-loop administration of alfentanil using mean arterial blood pressure and predicted plasma alfentanil concentration (Cp Alf) as input parameters. METHODS: The authors studied 13 healthy patients scheduled to undergo minor lumbar and cervical spine surgery. After induction with propofol, alfentanil, and mivacurium and tracheal intubation, isoflurane was titrated to maintain the Bispectral Index at 55 (+/- 5), and the alfentanil administration was switched from manual to closed-loop control. The controller adjusted the alfentanil infusion rate to maintain the mean arterial blood pressure near the set-point (70 mmHg) while minimizing the Cp Alf toward the set-point plasma alfentanil concentration (Cp Alfref) (100 ng/ml). RESULTS: Two patients were excluded because of loss of arterial pressure signal and protocol violation. The alfentanil infusion was closed-loop controlled for a mean (SD) of 98.9 (1.5)% of presurgery time and 95.5 (4.3)% of surgery time. The mean (SD) end-tidal isoflurane concentrations were 0.78 (0.1) and 0.86 (0.1) vol%, the Cp Alf values were 122 (35) and 181 (58) ng/ml, and the Bispectral Index values were 51 (9) and 52 (4) before surgery and during surgery, respectively. The mean (SD) absolute deviations of mean arterial blood pressure were 7.6 (2.6) and 10.0 (4.2) mmHg (P = 0.262), and the median performance error, median absolute performance error, and wobble were 4.2 (6.2) and 8.8 (9.4)% (P = 0.002), 7.9 (3.8) and 11.8 (6.3)% (P = 0.129), and 14.5 (8.4) and 5.7 (1.2)% (P = 0.002) before surgery and during surgery, respectively. A post hoc simulation showed that the Cp Alfref decreased the predicted Cp Alf compared with mean arterial blood pressure alone. CONCLUSION: The authors' controller has a similar set-point precision as previous hypnotic controllers and provides adequate alfentanil dosing during surgery. It may help to standardize opioid dosing in research and may be a further step toward a multiple input-multiple output controller.

Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Control of recycle processes using neural networks combined with PID controller

This thesis is focused on the control of a system with recycle. A new control strategy using neural network combined with PID controller was proposed. The combined controller was studied and tested on the pressure control of a vaporizer inside a para-xylene production process. The major problems are the negative effects of recycle and the delays on instability and performance. The neural network was designed to move the process close to the set points while the PID accomplishes the finer level of disturbance rejection and offset reductions. Our simulation results show that during control, the neural network was able to determine the nonlinear relationship between steady state and manipulated variables. The results also show the disturbance rejection was handled by PID controller effectively.

Marker-Based Embodied Interaction for Handheld Augmented Reality Games

This article deals with embodied user interfaces for handheld augmented reality games, which consist of both physical and virtual components. We have developed a number of spatial interaction techniques that optically capture the device's movement and orientation relative to a visual marker. Such physical interactions in 3-D space enable manipulative control of mobile games. In addition to acting as a physical controller that recognizes multiple game-dependent gestures, the mobile device augments the camera view with graphical overlays. We describe three game prototypes that use ubiquitous product packaging and other passive media as backgrounds for handheld augmentation. The prototypes can be realized on widely available off-the-shelf hardware and require only minimal setup and infrastructure support.