The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

Modeling Dependence Structure and Forecasting Portfolio Value-at-Risk with Dynamic Copulas

We study the asymmetric and dynamic dependence between financial assets and demonstrate, from the perspective of risk management, the economic significance of dynamic copula models. First, we construct stock and currency portfolios sorted on different characteristics (ex ante beta, coskewness, cokurtosis and order flows), and find substantial evidence of dynamic evolution between the high beta (respectively, coskewness, cokurtosis and order flow) portfolios and the low beta (coskewness, cokurtosis and order flow) portfolios. Second, using three different dependence measures, we show the presence of asymmetric dependence between these characteristic-sorted portfolios. Third, we use a dynamic copula framework based on Creal et al. (2013) and Patton (2012) to forecast the portfolio Value-at-Risk of long-short (high minus low) equity and FX portfolios. We use several widely used univariate and multivariate VaR models for the purpose of comparison. Backtesting our methodology, we find that the asymmetric dynamic copula models provide more accurate forecasts, in general, and, in particular, perform much better during the recent financial crises, indicating the economic significance of incorporating dynamic and asymmetric dependence in risk management.

A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem

We present an envelope theorem for establishing first-order conditions in decision problems involving continuous and discrete choices. Our theorem accommodates general dynamic programming problems, even with unbounded marginal utilities. And, unlike classical envelope theorems that focus only on differentiating value functions, we accommodate other endogenous functions such as default probabilities and interest rates. Our main technical ingredient is how we establish the differentiability of a function at a point: we sandwich the function between two differentiable functions from above and below. Our theory is widely applicable. In unsecured credit models, neither interest rates nor continuation values are globally differentiable. Nevertheless, we establish an Euler equation involving marginal prices and values. In adjustment cost models, we show that first-order conditions apply universally, even if optimal policies are not (S,s). Finally, we incorporate indivisible choices into a classic dynamic insurance analysis.

Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.

Modeling Dependence Structure and Forecasting Market Risk with Dynamic Asymmetric Copula

We investigate the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure between equity portfolios from the US and UK. We demonstrate the statistical significance of dynamic asymmetric copula models in modelling and forecasting market risk. First, we construct “high-minus-low" equity portfolios sorted on beta, coskewness, and cokurtosis. We find substantial evidence of dynamic and asymmetric dependence between characteristic-sorted portfolios. Second, we consider a dynamic asymmetric copula model by combining the generalized hyperbolic skewed t copula with the generalized autoregressive score (GAS) model to capture both the multivariate non-normality and the dynamic and asymmetric dependence between equity portfolios. We demonstrate its usefulness by evaluating the forecasting performance of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall for the high-minus-low portfolios. From back-testing, e find consistent and robust evidence that our dynamic asymmetric copula model provides the most accurate forecasts, indicating the importance of incorporating the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure in risk management.

Migration and trade: Theory with an Application to the Eastern- Western European Integration

The remarkable increase in trade flows and in migratory flows of highly educated people are two important features of globalization of the last decades. This paper extends a two-country model of inter- and intraindustry trade to a rich environment featuring technological differences, skill differences and the possibility of international labor mobility. The model is used to explain the patterns of trade and migration as countries remove barriers to trade and to labor mobility. We parameterize the model to match the features of the Western and Eastern European members of the EU and analyze first the effects of the trade liberalization which occured between 1989 and 2004, and then the gains and losses from migration which are expected to occur if legal barriers to labor mobility are substantially reduced. The lower barriers to migration would result in significant migration of skilled workers from Eastern European countries. Interestingly, this would not only benefit the migrants and most Western European workers but, via trade, it would also benefit the workers remaining in Eastern Europe. Key Words: Skilled Migration, Gains from Variety, Real Wages, Eastern-Western Europe. JEL Codes: F12, F22, J61.

On the current existence of a coccidial line of development in the malaria parasites: a theory

Most opinion favors the origin of the malaria parasites from a coccidial ancestor. It is assumed that whatever the process through which the coccidia differentiated into a Plasmodium this phenomenon very probably occured millions of year ago, and during that differentiation process the original coccidia vanished. Therefore it has never repeated. At the light of some experiments the existence, at the present time, of a coccidial cycle of development in the malaria parasites, is proposed. The conection routes and mechanisms through which the malaria parasite changes to a coccidial life, and the routes in reverse are exposed. Transmission of the malaria-coccidial forms is suggested.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.

Lp theory for the multidimensional aggregation equation

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Estimation of dynamic latent variable models using simulated nonparametric moments

Abstract. Given a model that can be simulated, conditional moments at a trial parameter value can be calculated with high accuracy by applying kernel smoothing methods to a long simulation. With such conditional moments in hand, standard method of moments techniques can be used to estimate the parameter. Because conditional moments are calculated using kernel smoothing rather than simple averaging, it is not necessary that the model be simulable subject to the conditioning information that is used to define the moment conditions. For this reason, the proposed estimator is applicable to general dynamic latent variable models. It is shown that as the number of simulations diverges, the estimator is consistent and a higher-order expansion reveals the stochastic difference between the infeasible GMM estimator based on the same moment conditions and the simulated version. In particular, we show how to adjust standard errors to account for the simulations. Monte Carlo results show how the estimator may be applied to a range of dynamic latent variable (DLV) models, and that it performs well in comparison to several other estimators that have been proposed for DLV models.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.