Evidence-Based Practice in the Juvenile Justice System: Balancing Clinical Expertise with Best Available Research and Client Variables

Each year, thousands of adolescents are processed through the juvenile justice system -- a system that is complicated, expensive, and inadequately addressing the needs of the youth in its care. While there is extensive literature available in support of interventions for youthful offenders that are clinically superior to current care and more cost-effective than the existing structure, there is a gap between research and practice that is preventing their implementation. The use of Evidence-Based Practice in Psychology (EBPP) as defined by the American Psychological Association is presented as one method to bridge this gap. This paper identifies and discusses each of five barriers to effective use of EBPP: cost, fragmentation of the mental health system, historical and systemic variables, research methodology, and clinician variables. These barriers are first defined and then illustrated using examples from the author's experience working in the juvenile justice field. Finally, recommendations for the field are presented.

Assessment of corrective measures for alleviating slope instabilities in carbonatic Flysch formations: Alicante (SE of Spain) case study

As is well known, in order to select remediation measures to correct or prevent slope instabilities, it is essential to identify and characterize the instability mechanisms. This task is especially complex for heterogeneous rock masses such as Flysch formations. This paper addresses the assessment of corrective measures used in carbonate Flysch formations by classifying and grouping field data reported in an available database in order to associate this data with various instability mechanisms and stratigraphic column types as well as with the corrective measures taken to stabilise them. For this purpose, 194 slopes have been geomechanically characterized, mainly by considering the observed instability mechanisms. The corrective measures that were applied have been evaluated for their suitability and performance, and, if applicable, the causes of their malfunction have been also studied. As a result, some guidelines based on the observed behaviour and the suitability of the correction measure as a function of instability type are proposed for similar slopes.

Les successions et donations internationales face au droitt européen: réflexions critiques sur l'arrêt de la Cour de justice du 3 septembre 2014

El trabajo contiene una reflexión crítica sobre la normativa española en materia de sucesiones y donaciones en relación con los no residentes. Se denuncia la discriminación existente en este ámbito entre residentes y no residentes, al no poderse beneficiar estos últimos de las importantes ventajas autonómicas previstas para los residentes. Así lo ha reconocido el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, en su Sentencia de 3 de septiembre de 2014 que, sin embargo, no zanja todos los aspectos de la polémica. La autora analiza el pronunciamiento y advierte sobre los casos problemáticos susceptibles de plantearse en el futuro, ante la insuficiencia de la sentencia del Alto Tribunal.

Notes about cases heard as Justice of the Peace, 1784-1795

This small paper-bound notebook contains notes Winthrop made concerning the cases he heard between 1784 and 1795 as a Justice of the Peace for Middlesex County. These notes provide insight into the nature of crimes being committed in Cambridge in the post-Revolutionary period, as well as the names and occupations of those accused and their victims. The cases involved the following individuals, among others: Samuel Bridge, Benjamin Estabrook, Joseph Jeffords, Cato Bordman, John Kidder, Spenser Goddin, Jacob Cromwell, Benjamin Stratton, Mary Flood, Bender Temple, John Willett, Joseph Hartwell, Nathaniel Stratton, Amos Washburn, Francis Moore, Thomas Malone, Thomas Cook, and Amboy Brown. The cases involved a range of offenses, and occasionally Winthrop decided that a case exceeded his jurisdiction and forwarded it to the General Court or the Supreme Judicial Court.

Justice of the peace docket books, 1769-1808

A collection of notebooks in which Hubbard recorded both legal and personal transactions in detail, including: writs, arrests, wills, boundary disputes, damages awarded in court cases over which he presided, various payments and expenses, etc. Also included are three notebooks kept by his nephew James Hubbard, who inherited Joshua Hubbard's farm; these primarily record the sale of cider and vinegar from his farm, costs of hired labor, and bank loans.

Justice of the peace day book, 1797-1816

Contains records of summons and judgements in various court cases, and fines paid.

Notes of cases decided in the Superior and Supreme Judicial Courts of Massachusetts from 1772 to 1789: taken by the Hon. William Cushing, one of the judges during that period and most of the time Chief Justice

Notes of cases taken by Judge William Cushing during his tenure on the Massachusetts superior and supreme courts. (Formerly MS 2141.)

Warrants from the governor and chief justice of New York, 1703-1704

Copies of warrants and writs concerning public unrest caused by an attempt to survey lands on Long Island in 1702.

Appointment as justice of the peace for Suffolk County,

Legal document from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts appointing Tudor as a justice of the peace for Suffolk County.

Justice of the Peace record book, Windham, Vermont, 1799-1807

Contains records of summons and judgements in various kinds of court cases, fees and fines paid, and index of names.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.