Providing a law degree for the 'real world' : perspective of an Australian law school

This paper focuses on the ‘real world’ approach to the degree achieved through the first year program, embedding and scaffolding law graduate capabilities through authentic and valid assessment and work integrated learning to assist graduates with transition into the workplace.

Loss of chance in medical negligence claims now a lost cause?

The question whether the loss of chance of a better medical outcome in cases of medical negligence should be recognised as actionable damage is ‘a question which has divided courts and commentators throughout the common law world.’ In April 2010, the High Court handed down its anticipated decision in the case of Tabet (by her Tutor Sheiban) v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. The issue considered by the court was whether the appellant could claim in negligence for the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome. This issue had not been considered by the High Court previously, the most relevant cases being Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678 and Gavalas v Singh (2001) 3 VLR 404. Claiming for a loss of chance in a personal injury action raises questions as to recognised damage and causation, and the members of the High Court considered both of these.

Transfer of Title by a Non-Owner : Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) exceptions to the nemo dat quod non habet rule

The fundamental personal property rule – no one can transfer a better title to property than they had – is subject to exceptions in the Sale of Goods legislation, which aim to protect innocent buyers who are deceived by a seller’s apparent physical possession of property. These exceptions cover a limited range of transactions and are restrictive in their operation. Australia now has national legislation - the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) - which will apply to many transactions outside the scope of the Sale of Goods Act and which includes rules for sales by non-owners which will provide exceptions to the nemo dat quod non habet rule for many common commercial transactions. This article explores the effect of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) on the Sale of Goods exceptions, explains that the new provisions are so wide that there is little continuing relevance for the Sale of Goods Act exceptions, and indicates where they may still apply.

Advance directives, autonomy and the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment

As Australian society 1s agemg, individuals are increasingly concerned about managing their future, including making decisions about the medical treatment they may wish to receive or refuse if they lose decision-making capacity. To date, there has been relatively little research into the extent to which legal regulation allows competent adults to make advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment that will bind health professionals and others when a decision needs to be made at a future time. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the research by presenting the results of research into the legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. In the five papers that comprise this thesis, the law that governs this area is examined, and the ethical principle of autonomy is used to critically evaluate that law. The principal finding of this research is that the current scheme of regulation is ineffective to adequately promote the right of a competent adult to make binding advance directives about refusal of medical treatment. The research concludes that legislation should be enacted to enable individuals to complete an advance directive, only imposing restrictions to the extent that this is necessary to promote individual autonomy. The thesis first examines the principle of autonomy upon which the common law (and some statutory law) is expressed to be based, to determine whether that principle is an appropriate one to underpin regulation. 1 The finding of the research is that autonomy can be justified as an organising principle on a number of grounds: it is consistent with the values of a liberal democracy; over recent decades, it is a principle that has been even more prominent within the discipline of medical ethics; and it is the principle which underpins the legal regulation of a related topic, namely the contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. Next, the thesis reviews the common law to determine whether it effectively achieves the goal of promoting autonomy by allowing a competent adult to make an advance directive refusing treatment that will operate if he or she later loses decision-making capacity. 2 This research finds that conunon law doctrine, as espoused by the judiciary, prioritises individual choice by recognising valid advance directives that refuse treatment as binding. However, the research also concludes that the common law, as applied by the judiciary in some cases, may not be effective to promote individual autonomy, as there have been a number of circumstances where advance directives that refuse treatment have not been followed. The thesis then examines the statutory regimes in Australia that regulate advance directives, with a focus on the regulation of advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment.3 This review commences with an examination ofparliamentary debates to establish why legislation was thought to be necessary. It then provides a detailed review of all of the statutory regimes, the extent to which the legislation regulates the form of advance directives, and the circumstances in which they can be completed, will operate and can be ignored by medical professionals. The research finds that legislation was enacted mainly to clarify the common law and bring a level of certainty to the field. Legislative regimes were thought to provide medical professionals with the assurance that compliance with an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment will not expose them to legal sanction. However, the research also finds that the legislation places so many restrictions on when an advance directive refusing treatment can be made, or will operate, that they have not been successful in promoting individual autonomy.

Refusal of medical treatment : a child's prerogative?

Society has a need for children to be able to make health care decisions. Homeless children need access to health care. Parents may not be accessible or competent to consent to their child’s health care. The familial relationship may have broken down. Children may not want their parents to know about drug, alcohol or pregnancy related issues. There is legal and academic support for the right of children to make autonomous decisions with respect to their health care. However what these decisions cover and who can make them is not clear. Whether or not a minor has capacity and is therefore competent to consent to medical treatment is a question of law. Some states of Australia have enacted legislation, while others rely on the common law to determine this issue. At common law a minor is capable of giving consent to medical treatment when he or she achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be able to understand fully what is proposed. Known as ‘Gillick competence’ this is a well known principle of law. The question posed by this paper is whether the decision of a ‘Gillick competent’ child can and should be overridden by the court?

The politicization of youth crime in Scotland and the rise of the 'Burberry Court'

In 2003, the youth justice system in Scotland entered a new phase with the introduction of a pilot youth court. The processing of persistent 16 and 17 year old (and serious 15 year olds) represented a stark deviation from a ‘child centred’ and needs-oriented state apparatus for dealing with young offenders to one based on deeds and individual responsibility. This article, based on an evaluation funded by the Scottish Executive, is the first to provide a critical appraisal of this youth justice reform. It examines the views of the judiciary and young offenders and reveals that the pilot youth court in Scotland represents a punitive excursion that poses serious concerns for due process, human rights and net widening.

Section 64 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and the reluctant buyer

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Dunworth v Mirvac Qld Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 200 arose from unusual circumstances associated with the flood in Brisbane earlier this year. Maris Dunworth (‘the buyer’) agreed to purchase a ground floor residential apartment located beside the Brisbane River at Tennyson from Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd (‘Mirvac’). The original date for completion was 12 May 2009. In earlier proceedings, the buyer had alleged that she had been induced to purchase the apartment by false, misleading and deceptive representations. This claim was dismissed and an order for specific performance was made with a new completion date of 8 February 2011...

Drawing the line : the legal status and treatment of the 17-year-old accused in Queensland

Seventeen year olds who come into contact with the police in Queensland are classified as adults and are not afforded the protections available under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (YJA). As with any other adult, their offences are dealt with under a raft of legislative provisions including the Criminal Code 1889 (Qld) (the Code), the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (PPRA) and the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA). This article argues that this situation is unfair and contravenes international human rights agreements which Australia has ratified, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC). Article 1 of that Convention defines a child as a person under the age of 18. The youth offences legislation in Queensland only applies to those who have not yet turned 17. This article examines the effects of this anomaly in Queensland, focusing in particular on the pre-adjudication treatment of ‘17 year old adults’.

Country of Origin and Internet Publication : Applying the Berne Convention in the Digital Age

Historically, determining the country of origin of a published work presented few challenges, because works were generally published physically – whether in print or otherwise – in a distinct location or few locations. However, publishing opportunities presented by new technologies mean that we now live in a world of simultaneous publication – works that are first published online are published simultaneously to every country in world in which there is Internet connectivity. While this is certainly advantageous for the dissemination and impact of information and creative works, it creates potential complications under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), an international intellectual property agreement to which most countries in the world now subscribe. Under the Berne Convention’s national treatment provisions, rights accorded to foreign copyright works may not be subject to any formality, such as registration requirements (although member countries are free to impose formalities in relation to domestic copyright works). In Kernel Records Oy v. Timothy Mosley p/k/a Timbaland, et al. however, the Florida Southern District Court of the United States ruled that first publication of a work on the Internet via an Australian website constituted “simultaneous publication all over the world,” and therefore rendered the work a “United States work” under the definition in section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act, subjecting the work to registration formality under section 411. This ruling is in sharp contrast with an earlier decision delivered by the Delaware District Court in Håkan Moberg v. 33T LLC, et al. which arrived at an opposite conclusion. The conflicting rulings of the U.S. courts reveal the problems posed by new forms of publishing online and demonstrate a compelling need for further harmonization between the Berne Convention, domestic laws and the practical realities of digital publishing. In this article, we argue that even if a work first published online can be considered to be simultaneously published all over the world it does not follow that any country can assert itself as the “country of origin” of the work for the purpose of imposing domestic copyright formalities. More specifically, we argue that the meaning of “United States work” under the U.S. Copyright Act should be interpreted in line with the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic law to limit its application to only those works with a real and substantial connection to the United States. There are gaps in the Berne Convention’s articulation of “country of origin” which provide scope for judicial interpretation, at a national level, of the most pragmatic way forward in reconciling the goals of the Berne Convention with the practical requirements of domestic law. We believe that the uncertainties arising under the Berne Convention created by new forms of online publishing can be resolved at a national level by the sensible application of principles of statutory interpretation by the courts. While at the international level we may need a clearer consensus on what amounts to “simultaneous publication” in the digital age, state practice may mean that we do not yet need to explore textual changes to the Berne Convention.

Physicality in Australian Patent Law

It is generally understood that the patent system exists to encourage the conception and disclosure of new and useful inventions embodied in machines and other physical devices, along with new methods that physically transform matter from one state to another. What is not well understood is whether, and to what extent, the patent system is to encourage and protect the conception and disclosure of inventions that are non-physical methods – namely those that do not result in a physical transformation of matter. This issue was considered in Grant v Commissioner of Patents. In that case the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia held that an invention must involve a physical effect or transformation to be patentable subject matter. In doing so, it introduced a physicality requirement into Australian law. What this article seeks to establish is whether the court’s decision is consistent with the case law on point. It does so by examining the key common law cases that followed the High Court’s watershed decision in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, the undisputed authoritative statement of principle in regard to the patentable subject matter standard in Australia. This is done with a view to determining whether there is anything in those cases that supports the view that the Australian patentable subject matter test contains a physicality requirement.

Interim bills and costs assessment : was the application in or out of time?

This article examines the decision in Turner v Mitchells Solicitors [2011] QDC 61 and the issue whether an application for assessment of costs under an interim bill at the time of a final bill is subject to the usual 12-month restriction.

Female genital mutilation : legal, attitudinal and practical reform

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a cultural practice common in many Islamic societies. It involves the deliberate, non-therapeutic physical modification of young girls’ genitalia. FGM can take several forms, ranging from less damaging incisions to actual removal of genitalia and narrowing or even closing of the vagina. While often thought to be required by religion, FGM both predates and has no basis in the Koran. Rather, it is a cultural tradition, motivated by a patriarchal social desire to control female bodies to ensure virginity at marriage (preserving family honour), and to prevent infidelity by limiting sexual desire. In the USA and Australia in 2010, peak medical bodies considered endorsing the medical administration of a ‘lesser’ form of FGM. The basis for this was pragmatic: it would be preferable to satisfy patients’ desire for FGM in medically-controlled conditions, rather than have these patients seek it, possibly in more severe forms, under less safe conditions. While arguments favouring medically-administered FGM were soon overcome, the prospect of endorsing FGM illuminated the issue in these two Western countries and beyond. This paper will review the nature of FGM, its physical and psychological health consequences, and Australian laws prohibiting FGM. Then, it will scan recent developments in Africa, where FGM has been made illegal by a growing number of nations and by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2003 (the Maputo Protocol), but is still proving difficult to eradicate. Finally, based on arguments derived from theories of rights, health evidence, and the historical and religious contexts, this paper will ask whether an absolute human right against FGM can be developed.

Practice and procedure : a recent Court of Appeal case examines the meaning of 'third party payer' in terms of Part 3.4 of the Legal Profession Act 2007.

In Legal Services Commissioner v Wright [2010] QCA 321 the Queensland Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the first instance decision. The decision involved the construction of “third party payer” in Part 3.4 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld).