Innovative implementation by non-state actors in environment-related areas : towards a positive implementation gap ?

This contribution (presented in the first International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP) in Grenoble in June 2013) explores the phenomena of innovation in action ("innovative implementation"). To do so, we operationalize "innovative implementation" as a strategy by which (coalitions of) non-state actors seek to develop ad hoc solutions to address a given environmental issue, going beyond what is provided for in formal policy designs. Following an inductive research strategy, we elaborate a conceptual framework whose main advantage is to bring the actors and their coalition (in all their diversity) back in the analysis. More concretely, we state that perceiving implementation as broader 'social interaction processes' (De Boer & Bressers 2011) within which actors play strategic 'games' (Bardach 1977, Scharpf 1997) opens interesting lines of research to better account for their innovative and strategic behaviours. In a second step, we apply this framework to three strategies of innovative implementation in different contexts, and identify on this basis empirical regularities in the individual pathways related to the emergence and success (or failure) of these strategies.

Caracterização social e tecnológica da produção de uvas para mesa em pequenas propriedades rurais da região de Jales-SP

A viticultura é uma atividade relevante para os produtores rurais do Estado de São Paulo, sobretudo aqueles detentores de pequenas áreas. O presente trabalho teve como objetivo caracterizar os principais aspectos sociais e tecnológicos utilizados na produção de uvas para mesa na região de Jales (SP). Os dados foram levantados nos anos de 2009 e 2010, a partir da aplicação de questionários a 19 produtores de uva e do acompanhamento do ciclo de produção de 10 propriedades. Os produtores cultivam pelo menos três cultivares diferentes de uva, sendo as principais: 'Niagara Rosada', 'Itália' e 'Benitaka'. A área média das propriedades é de, aproximadamente, 21 ha, e a área média com parreiras de uva é de 2,4 ha. A maioria dos produtores não conta com assistência técnica regular, não segue recomendações de adubação e não emprega critérios técnicos para o manejo da irrigação. O controle de doenças é realizado de forma preventiva e intensa, chegando a superar 100 aplicações por ciclo, no caso das uvas finas para mesa. Os resultados devem subsidiar a realização de outras pesquisas, assim como programas de planejamento e transferência de tecnologia, proporcionando ao produtor um manejo mais adequado da cultura, bem como o desenvolvimento sustentável rural regional.

Resistência de cultivares de videira ao ácaro-rajado Tetranychus urticae na região de Jales, estado de São Paulo

As videiras da região de Jales, Estado de São Paulo, têm sido intensamente atacadas pelo ácaro-rajado, Tetranychus urticae Koch. O presente trabalho teve por objetivo comparar cultivares de uva quanto à adequação como hospedeiras da espécie. Em experimento de campo, naquele local, a ocorrência da praga, ao longo de 12 meses, foi acompanhada nas cultivares de uvas finas, Itália e Benitaka, e na cultivar de uva rústica, Niagara Rosada. No laboratório, a biologia de T. urticae foi estudada nessas três cultivares e na 'Redimeire'. Na cultivar Niagara Rosada, o ácaro-rajado apresentou menor fecundidade e menor sobrevivência, indicando a presença de mecanismos de resistência por antibiose. Além disso, houve maior tentativa de fuga dessa cultivar, sugerindo resistência por não preferência.

The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities

[eng] We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.

The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities

[eng] We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.

Political market and regulatory uncertainty: Insights and implications for integrated strategy

Managers can craft effective integrated strategy by properly assessing regulatory uncertainty. Leveraging the existing political markets literature, we predict regulatory uncertainty from the novel interaction of demand and supply side rivalries across a range of political markets. We argue for two primary drivers of regulatory uncertainty: ideology-motivated interests opposed to the firm and a lack of competition for power among political actors supplying public policy. We align three, previously disparate dimensions of nonmarket strategy - profile level, coalition breadth, and pivotal target - to levels of regulatory uncertainty. Through this framework, we demonstrate how and when firms employ different nonmarket strategies. To illustrate variation in nonmarket strategy across levels of regulatory uncertainty, we analyze several market entry decisions of foreign firms operating in the global telecommunications sector.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

Epäasianmukainen verontorjunta ympäristöverotuksessa

Epäasianmukaisella verontorjunnalla kannustintyyppisten ympäristöverojen yhteydessä tarkoitetaan sitä, että veron määrä vähenee ilman ympäristön tilan paranemista. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään, millaisia epäasianmukaisia verontorjuntakeinoja ympäristöveroihin liittyy, kuinka paljon niissä on kyse lainsäädäntöteknisistä valinnoista sekä lainsäädännön puutteellisuudesta ja kuinka ympäristöverotusta voitaisiin mahdollisesti parantaa. Esitys painottuu normatiiviseen sääntelyteoriaan eli siihen, minkälainen ohjauskeino tai sääntely palvelee parhaiten tietyn yhteiskuntapoliittisen päämäärän saavuttamista. Päästöt ovat usein suorassa suhteessa tuotteen ominaisuuksiin, mutta ympäristöverot eivät. Ongelmalliseksi muodostuvat lisäksi veronalennukset, kuten veroporrastukset ja veron palautukset. Nämä kannustavat epäasianmukaiseen verontorjuntaan, kuten yritysjärjestelyihin, hamstraukseen ja esimerkiksi jätteiden sijoittamiseen kaatopaikkojen ulkopuolelle. Epäasianmukaista verontorjuntaa voidaan ehkäistä muun muassa kiristämällä rangaistuksia, tiedottamalla, kaventamalla normaaliverokohtelun ja lievennetyn verokohtelun eroa sekä verotuksen kohdetta muuttamalla. Tärkeintä tulevaisuudessa olisi kuitenkin keskittyä kansainväliseen yhteistyöhön ja ympäristöverotuksen yhdenmukaistamiseen.

COMPORTAMENTO DA CULTIVAR NIÁGARA ROSADA ENXERTADA SOBRE DIFERENTES PORTA-ENXERTOS NO SUL DE SANTA CATARINA, BRASIL

RESUMO A videira ‘Niagara Rosada’ é a principal cultivar de uva de mesa plantada no Sul do Brasil. Para avaliar a qualidade da uva produzida, foi conduzido um experimento com aNiagara Rosada nos seguintes porta-enxertos: ‘Jales’, ‘Tropical’, ‘Campinas’, ‘VR 043-43’, ‘R-99’, ‘Paulsen 1103’, ‘Schwarzmann’,‘Traviú’, ‘Golias’, ‘Gravesac’, ‘RR 101-14’, ‘Dog Ridge’, ‘VR 044-4’, ‘Kobber5BB’ e ‘SO4’, mais o pé-franco. Foram avaliados a fenologia, o vigor, a sobrevivência das plantas ea produção (produtividade, tamanho do cacho e número de cachos por planta). Os diferentes porta-enxertos não influenciam na fenologia da planta. O maior vigor foi observado para o ‘Dog Ridge’, seguido do‘Campinas’, ‘Paulsen 1103’ e ‘VR 043-43’. As maiores mortalidades de planta ocorreram para pé-franco (56%), ‘Traviú’ (50%) e ‘Schwarzmann’(41%). Os porta-enxertos ‘Paulsen 1103’, ‘Campinas’ e ‘Golias’, além de altaprodutividade, apresentam cachos maiores e mais compactos.

Liiketoimintakokonaisuus ja verotuksen neutraalisuus yritysjärjestelyissä

In the beginning of the year 2007 there was a change in our taxation laws, allowing the use of partial division in business restructuring without any direct taxation consequences. In this literature research thesis, partial division and transfer of assets and their similarities and differences have been examined. In addition, the concept of branch of activity, which is closely related to partial division and transfer of assets, has been defined. The concept of branch of activity has changed over the years in the Central Tax Board rulings towards more allowing, taking the taxpayer’s opinions into consideration better. The definition of branch of activity can be made relatively flexibly as long as there is a valid commercial reason behind the restructuring. Partial division can be more usable in business restructuring than division, because the transferring company does not dissolve in partial division. Compared to transfer of assets, the advantage of partial division is the transfer of losses to the receiving company and the possibility to use cash payments.

Local capitalism and neoliberalization in a Shenzhen former lineage-village

This article examines the process of neoliberalization in the Shenzhen special economic zone in Guangdong province, China. Building on the case study of a former peasant and almost single-lineage village that has become a part of Shenzhen city, I show how neoliberal principles aimed at advancing the transition to capitalism are combined with and countered by other ethical traditions. Owing to the long-standing conception of the lineage as an enterprise, the maintenance of the lineage structure in the transformation of the rural collectives has offered fertile ground for the emergence of a local capitalist coalition. Yet the current discourses on the necessity of obliterating the remains of the collective economy and introducing individual ownership run counter to the collectivist values of the lineage-village community and the embeddedness of its economy in kinship and territorial ties. I further illustrate this discordance by the way in which the villagers managed to save their founding ancestor's gravesite following government requests to clear the land by removing tombs. These policies form a complex blend of state interventions in the economy, neoliberal governance and Confucian principles.

Los gobiernos de coalición y su incidencia sobre los presidencialismos latinoamericanos: el caso del Cono Sur

Si bien los estudios sobre las coaliciones de gobierno constituyeron uno de los campos más estudiados en la literatura en ciencias políticas, merece precisar que la gran mayoría de los estudios sufren de un eurocentrismo al centrarse esencialmente sobre los sistemas parlamentarios de gobierno. Al ubicarse en la órbita del debate en boga sobre presidencialismo vs. Parlamentarismo, los gobiernos de coaliciones fueron ampliamente sub-estudiados en los presidencialismos. Los pocos trabajos que se publicaron, se limitaron generalmente al análisis de los repartos de las parcelas de poder, o las disoluciones de las coaliciones. Este trabajo se propone asimismo realizar una actualización de las teorías de las coaliciones aplicándolas a los residencialismos latinoamericanos. Nos centralizaremos sobre las experiencias conosurianas, y demostraremos asimismo que lejos de ser un fenómeno «accidental», esas coaliciones incidieron sobre la gobernanza y el qué hacer político, y condujeron a un reordenamiento sustantivo de los sistemas partidarios.

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

El defensor del contribuyente. Un estudio de derecho comparado: Italia y EEUU

El artículo analiza en primer lugar la figura del defensor del contribuyente en Italia y, en segundo lugar, los servicios norteamericanos de defensa del contribuyente.