Puisque vous etes revenue : Mazurka chantée

comp. par la Bnne W. de Rothschild

Special Tax Treatment as Trade Policy: A Database on Export Processing and Special Economic Zones

Many countries treat income generated via exports favourably, especially when production takes places in special zones known as export processing zones (EPZs). EPZs can be defined as specific, geographically defined zones or areas that are subject to special administration and that generally offer tax incentives, such as duty‐free imports when producing for export, exemption from other regulatory constraints linked to import for the domestic market, sometimes favourable treatment in terms of industrial regulation, and the streamlining of border clearing procedures. We describe a database of WTO Members that employ special economic zones as part of their industrial policy mix. This is based on WTO notification and monitoring through the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism (TPRM), supplemented with information from the ILO, World Bank, and primary sources. We also provide some rough analysis of the relationship between use of EPZs and the carbon intensity of exports, and relative levels of investment across countries with and without special zones.

The Optimal Capital Structure of Banks: Balancing Deposit Insurance, Capital Requirements and Tax-Advantaged Debt

The capital structure and regulation of financial intermediaries is an important topic for practitioners, regulators and academic researchers. In general, theory predicts that firms choose their capital structures by balancing the benefits of debt (e.g., tax and agency benefits) against its costs (e.g., bankruptcy costs). However, when traditional corporate finance models have been applied to insured financial institutions, the results have generally predicted corner solutions (all equity or all debt) to the capital structure problem. This paper studies the impact and interaction of deposit insurance, capital requirements and tax benefits on a bankÇs choice of optimal capital structure. Using a contingent claims model to value the firm and its associated claims, we find that there exists an interior optimal capital ratio in the presence of deposit insurance, taxes and a minimum fixed capital standard. Banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required in order to balance the risks of insolvency (especially the loss of future tax benefits) against the benefits of additional debt. Because we derive a closed- form solution, our model provides useful insights on several current policy debates including revisions to the regulatory framework for GSEs, tax policy in general and the tax exemption for credit unions.

Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries

A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export-oriented industries to attract more assistance than import-competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries. This paper shows within a standard protection for sale framework, how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable. The model is then estimated and its predictions tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained.

Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. The model generates the testable hypothesis that firm governance characteristics determine how incentive compensation changes sheltering decisions. In order to test the model, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that, for the full sample of firms, increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, suggesting a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. As predicted by the model, the relationship between incentive compensation and tax sheltering is a function of a firm.s corporate governance. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the .undersheltering puzzle,. and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.

Tax Motivated Takings

Tax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project promised spillover public benefits in the form of jobs and taxes. This paper argues that tax motivated takings can lead to inefficient transfers of land for the simple reason that assessed values understate owners' true values. We therefore propose a reassessment scheme that greatly reduces the risk of this sort of inefficiency.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 529 - Korrespondenzen mit u.a. Henryk Grossmann (p. VI 10, 1 - 200)

24 Briefe und Abrechnugen von New York State Income Tax Resident Return (New York) an Henryk Grossmann, 1938 - 1948; 3 Briefe von Henryk Grossmann an das Department of Taxation and Finance, 1946; 5 Briefe zwischen C. Hartwig Inc. und der Social Studies Association (New York), 1949; 1 Brief an F. Pollock von A. P. Bersohn, 14.12.1948; 2 Briefe von Max Horkheimer an Henryk Grossmann, 1945/1947; 2 Briefe zwischen Henryk Grossmann und F. Pollock, 1948 - 1949; 1 Brief von American Scantic Line/Moore-McCormack Lines Inc (New York) an C. Hartwig Inc., 18.02.1949; 1 Brief an Collector of Internal Revenue (New York) von Max Horkheimer, 25.01.1949; 1 Brief von Frederick Wild an Herrn Edelman, 17.09.1946; 80 Briefe zwischen Julian und Lotte Gumperz und Max Horkheimer, 1934 - 1942; 4 Briefe zwischen dem Institut für Sozialforschung (Frankfurt a. M.) und Helen Mack, 1974 - 1975; 3 Briefe zwischen der Columbia University (New York) und Julian Gumperz, Juli 1934; 4 Briefe von Max Horkheimer an die Columbia University (New York), 1934/1938; 1 Brief von Julian Gumperz an A. E. Burns, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief an Louis H. Bean von Julian Gumperz, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief von Julian Gumperz an E. A. Goldenweiser, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief an F. H. Thomson von Julian Gumperz, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief von Julian Gumperz an Gardiner Means, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief an Hildegard Kneeland von Julian Gumperz, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief von Julian Gumperz an Mordecai Execiel, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief an Isador Lubin von Julian Gumperz, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief von Julian Gumperz an Boris Stern, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief an Lauchlin Currie von Julian Gumperz, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief von Julian Gumperz an B. H. Beckhart, 24.02.1938; 1 Brief von der Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (New York) an Julian Gumperz, 08.10.1937;

The Sierra Leone Hut-tax disturbances : a reply to Mr. Stephen

by E. D. M.

サウジアラビアにおけるザカートの徴収－イスラームの税制と国家財政－

本稿ではサウジアラビアにおけるザカート(ザカー)の徴収について検討した。イスラーム諸国におけるザカートは、一般的には、イスラーム教徒が任意で提供する「お布施」的なものとして理解されることが多い。しかし、ザカートは初期イスラーム時代には、イスラームの教団国家の歳入の大きな柱であり、事実上、公租の役割を果たしていた。サウジアラビアでは18世紀半ばにサウード朝が興ったが、サウード朝は初期イスラーム時代を模範とするワッハーブ派と協力して国家を建設したため、サウード朝においてはザカートが重要な国家の歳入源となった。20世紀には石油開発が進み、石油収入が国家歳入の大部分を占めるようになったが、ザカートの徴収は現在でも続けられている。続いて、イスラーム法で定められているザカートの賦課対象と賦課率について述べ、のサウジアラビアの事例を示しながら賦課対象と賦課率について検討した。さらに、企業や個人がザカートを支払う場合の賦課対象や賦課率について述べ、サウジ企業に課せられるザカートと外資に課せられる所得税の相違について検討した。

Tax differentials and inflow of foreign direct investments : evidence from foreign operations of U.S. multinational companies

This paper concerns the measurement of the impact of tax differentials across countries on inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by using comprehensive data on the foreign operations of U.S. multinational corporations that has been collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the U.S. Department of Commerce. In particular, this research focuses on examining: (1) how responsive FDI locations are to tax differentials across countries, (2) how different the tax effect on FDI inflow is between developed and developing countries, and (3) whether investment location decisions have become more or less sensitive to tax differences between countries over time ranging from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Estimation results suggest that high rates of corporate income taxation are associated with reduced foreign assets of U.S. multinational firms in all industries by decreasing the return to foreign asset investment. Further, foreign assets of U.S. multinationals in all industries have become more responsive to non-income tax differentials across countries than to income tax differences from 1999 to 2004. Empirical estimates also indicate that foreign investment by American firms is associated with higher tax sensitivity more in developed countries than in those that are developing.