Indenture acknowledging sale of property, Boston, 1753

Document acknowledges the sale of the late Samuel Clark's house and property to Alexander Hill. Samuel Clark's executor, James Clark, was required by law to sell the property to the highest bidder in order to pay the debts of the deceased.

Addresses given by Adam Winthrop, 1724-1727

This small notebook with marbled paper covers contains three Latin addresses delivered by Adam Winthrop during Harvard College ceremonies: the valedictory oration on Class Day, 1724, the "Oratio Salutatoria" at the 1724 Commencement, and the "Oratio Gratulatoria" which closed the exercises of the 1727 Commencement. The last page of the volume is signed "Adam Winthrop Jun'r."

Writ, 1808 April 23

Writ of the Middlesex County Court of Common Pleas for the case of Andrew Bordman vs. John Bates ordering Bates to relinquish possession of a house lot in Concord and to pay costs and damages to Andrew Bordman IV.

Portugal. In economics, we call it conflict of interest! CEPS Commentary, 12 April 2013

Faced with limited options for coming up with the funds needed to pay off the next instalment on its bailout loan, Portugal is advised in this Commentary by economist Leonor Coutinho to trim the number of public sector employees, in combination with an increase in public sector working hours, among the lowest in Europe. In her view, these measures will have the best long-term implications both in terms of fiscal sustainability and of labour productivity, and may finally allow the country to resume the catching-up process that has been stalled since the start of EMU.

Políticas europeas para la competitividad, salarios mìnimos y tutela del poder adquisitivo de las retribuciones en Italia tras el acuerdo de noviembre de 2012 [European Policies for competitiveness, minimum wages and purchasing power protection in Italy after the November 2012 agreement]. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 99/2013

On the floor of the Global Wage Report 2012/2013 by ILO, entitled Wages and equitable growth, the A. thinks that the wage regulation has to take into account competitiveness without compressing global aggregate demand. Therefore, International and European rules are necessary to avoid the spiral towards the wages dampen, which is bad for the economic development. The rules in action at the different levels are inadequate. The A. proposes an interpretation of Article 153 and Article 155 TFEU that is more suitable for a European regulation promoting better minimum wages and more coherent with the current legal framework of the right to pay, which can be considered, even if partially, as a social right.

Perceptions des femmes exerçant différentes formes d'activités sexuelles rémunérées hors rue sur leur pratique

La présente recherche rend compte de la perception de leurs activités de huit femmes ayant pratiqué ou pratiquant toujours diverses formes d’activités sexuelles rémunérées dans un contexte hors rue. Les formes d’activités les plus souvent abordées sont la danse nue avec et sans contacts, l’escorte, le massage érotique et le phénomène communément appelé « sugar daddy », soit l’échange des services contre rémunération avec un client en particulier. Deux participantes de l’échantillon ont, parallèlement à leurs pratiques hors rue, exercé dans la rue. Le terme « pratiques sexuelles rémunérées » a été privilégié afin d’assurer une perspective neutre, c’est-à-dire sans parti pris a priori pour aucune des deux visions préexistantes par rapport au phénomène se situant à deux extrémités de ce que nous percevons plutôt être un continuum, soit la vision abolitionniste voulant que la « prostitution » soit une forme d’exploitation et de violence sexuelle commise principalement à l’égard des femmes, qui devrait être décriminalisée pour les femmes, mais criminalisée pour les clients et les proxénètes, et la vision soutenant que le « travail du sexe » est un choix qui constitue un travail comme un autre et, conséquemment, mérite d’être décriminalisé complètement, et ce, même pour les clients et les proxénètes. Notre approche visait essentiellement à permettre d’aller chercher les visions subjectives des femmes sur leur pratique, point de vue que nous retrouvons peu dans les écrits et les débats sur le sujet. La cadre théorique qui sous-tend notre analyse est celui de l’intersectionnalité. Les principales sources de discrimination ressorties sont l’âge, le statut socioéconomique, et l’origine ethnique pour une participante. Ces sources augmentent les facteurs de vulnérabilité faisant que les femmes se dirigent vers l’univers des pratiques sexuelles rémunérées, y demeurent ou parfois y retournent après un arrêt, ceci afin d’assurer leur subsistance, la consommation de substances psychoactives ou pour pouvoir rembourser des dettes et/ou se payer certains luxes. Le but de notre étude est de découvrir et de comprendre la perception des femmes quant à leur expérience associée à la pratique de différentes formes d’activités sexuelles rémunérées hors rue. Il s’agissait plus spécifiquement de décrire, comprendre et analyser la trajectoire ayant conduit les femmes vers la pratique d’activités sexuelles rémunérées; comprendre leurs trajectoires et leurs expériences en fonction des différents types de pratique, plus ou moins intense, plus ou moins variée et plus ou moins étendue dans le temps et, enfin, de situer leur perspective sur le continuum du débat social positionnant la pratique d’activités sexuelles rémunérées comme étant soit une forme d’exploitation ou une forme de travail comme un autre. Afin d’atteindre ces objectifs, une approche qualitative faite d’entretiens semi-dirigés auprès des femmes a été réalisée. Nous avons ainsi pu situer les perspectives des femmes sur un continuum où plusieurs trouvaient leur place dans des visions plus nuancées de leur réalité, alors que d’autres rejoignaient davantage une des deux visions polarisées. En effet, certaines ont vécu leur expérience essentiellement comme une forme d’exploitation et de violence à leur égard, alors que d’autres en traitent comme un choix et un travail comme un autre.

Ukraine, Russia and the need for more flexibility in EU foreign policy-making. CEPS Policy Brief No. 320, 25 July 2014

After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s indirect responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, Steven Blockmans asks what it will take before the EU is able to confront a conflict on its borders and prove to both its own citizens and third countries that it has a meaningful role to play in foreign policy. With numerous competing national interests and some member states unwilling to pay different prices for collective action, any sector-wide EU sanctions are likely to lack serious bite. In an effort to paper over the cracks, the author makes a number of recommendations for policy-makers.

It has only just begun: EU and anticorruption institutions in Moldova. EPC Policy Brief, 1 August 2014

The Republic of Moldova recently signed the Association Agreement with the EU, closely followed by a detailed Association Agenda, which comes with concrete steps and conditionalities in the future dialogue between Chisinau and Brussels. The current paper discusses the most recent evolutions of the anticorruption institutions in Moldova, which owe a lot to EU`s influence. We pay specific attention to the justice reforms chapters in the Agenda and we conclude with recommendations for the EU to continue to pay attention to corruption in Moldova, but address it in a more coherent manner.

Europe’s Dog in the Nighttime. CEPS Commentary, 12 November 2014

Two recent instances of flagrant infringement of agreed EU rules – the submission by Italy and France of budget plans for 2015 that clearly violated their governments’ vows of continued austerity under the Stability and Growth Pact and David Cameron’s petulant refusal to pay a back payment of billions of euros to the EU budget – threaten the EU’s fundamental workings, which are based on a clear rulebook enforced vigorously by a strong Commission. As warned by Daniel Gros in his latest CEPS Commentary, Juncker’s Commission risks losing its authority from the start if rules can be bent or broken to accommodate the larger member states’ domestic political priorities. He also calls upon leaders in member states to play their part as well. Pandering to populists may be attractive in terms of short-term electoral gains, but the long-term cost in terms of credibility, both their own and that of the EU, will be very high.

Kazakhstan's attitude towards integration with Russia: less love, more fear. OSW Commentary No. 137, 29.05.2014

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine have created a new context for Kazakhstan’s foreign and domestic policy. The ongoing crisis in the relations with Russia and the West has also changed the current order in the entire post-Soviet area. From Astana’s perspective, the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine can be considered dangerous since it shows Russia’s determination to interfere with the domestic affairs of its neighbours in the pursuit of its own interests. Furthermore, this policy reveals and raises the price a country needs to pay for its potential attempts to break free from the Russian zone of influence. At present the biggest challenge for the authorities in Astana is the accelerated implementation of the idea of the Eurasian Union promoted by Moscow, which is to be another stage in the integration of post-Soviet states (presently Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus). The signing of the Eurasian Union’s founding documents planned for late May 2014 and the launch of this organisation (scheduled for January 2015) is sure to bring Kazakhstan closer to Russia and simultaneously limit its economic and political independence. Nevertheless, Astana’s position in relations with Moscow will to a large extent depend on the new shape of the relations between Russia and China. China is pursuing its own strategic interests in Central Asia (including in the energy sector) and its main partner in the region is Kazakhstan. At the domestic level, Russia’s actions in Ukraine made the authorities in Astana fear that measures similar to those used in Ukraine could be applied towards Kazakhstan. On the one hand this has led to increased efforts aimed at consolidating the state and strengthening its structures, and on the other hand it has brought about a revision of those aspects of domestic policy which Russia could interpret as a pretext for interfering.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

Nothing personal: The age of ego-diplomacy. EuropEos Commentary No. 7, 17 March 2011

A new EuropEos Commentary laments the decline of diplomacy and the rise of ‘summits’ in recent history as the predominant way of conducting international relations. World leaders are urged to pay more attention to the sound and unimpeded analysis of their ambassadors and professional diplomatic corps whenever possible.

Ideas and Policy: The European Union considers social policy futures. ACES Cases No. 2010.2

The European Union’s social policy perspectives have changed quite dramatically over the last several decades. Now EU’s social policy discourse often promises to “invest in people,” sometimes “to invest in children,” and always to pay particular attention to youth. This paper argues that the tools of historical institutionalism can lead to understanding the ideational roots of this social investment perspective so distant from the “European social model.” Coming out of social movements, and with collective identities shaped both by those movement roots and national experiences, activists have effectively focused their practices on altering the social representations of European social solidarity through their interest group interventions, their participation in policy forums, and their mobilization within civil society at the European and sub-European levels. They have been able to make common cause with several epistemic communities that themselves revamped their ideas in the face of new institutional constraints, in order to advance their interests in promoting particular directions for social policy. The paper documents that “ideas” are not a variable and discourse “sometimes important” but that the ideas carried by movements and in epistemic communities are integral to the very definition of their interests that they promote within and with institutions.

Ukraine on the financial front – the problem of Ukraine’s foreign public debt. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 178|05.08.2015

One of the key challenges that Ukraine is facing is the scale of its foreign debt (both public and private). As of 1st April it stood at US$ 126 billion, which is 109.8% of the country’s GDP. Approximately 45% of these financial obligations are short-term, meaning that they must be paid off within a year. Although the value of the debt has fallen by nearly US$ 10 billion since the end of 2014 (due to the private sector paying a part of the liabilities), the debt to GDP ratio has increased due to the recession and the depreciation of the hryvnia. The value of Ukraine’s foreign public debt is also on the rise (including state guarantees); since the beginning of 2015 it has risen from US$ 37.6 billion to US$ 43.6 billion. Ukraine does not currently have the resources to pay off its debt. In this situation a debt restructuring is necessary and this is one of the top priorities for the Ukrainian government as well as for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its assistance programme. Without this it will be much more difficult for Ukraine to overcome the economic crisis.