989 resultados para optimal trigger speed
Resumo:
In this paper we analyse the behaviour of the EU market for CO2 emission allowances; specifically, we focus on the contracts maturing in the Kyoto Protocol's second period of application (2008 to 2012). We calibrate the underlying parameters for the allowance price in the long run and we also calibrate those from the Spanish wholesale electricity market. This information is then used to assess the option to install a carbon capture and storage (CCS) unit in a coal-fired power plant. We use a two-dimensional binomial lattice where costs and profits are valued and the optimal investment time is determined. In other words, we study the trigger allowance prices above which it is optimal to install the capture unit immediately. We further analyse the impact of several variables on the critical prices, among them allowance price volatility and a hypothetical government subsidy. We conclude that, at current permit prices, from a financial point of view, immediate installation does not seem justified. This need not be the case, though, if carbon market parameters change dramatically and/or a specific policy to promote these units is adopted.
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The purpose of this article is to characterize dynamic optimal harvesting trajectories that maximize discounted utility assuming an age-structured population model, in the same line as Tahvonen (2009). The main novelty of our study is that uses as an age-structured population model the standard stochastic cohort framework applied in Virtual Population Analysis for fish stock assessment. This allows us to compare optimal harvesting in a discounted economic context with standard reference points used by fisheries agencies for long term management plans (e.g. Fmsy). Our main findings are the following. First, optimal steady state is characterized and sufficient conditions that guarantees its existence and uniqueness for the general case of n cohorts are shown. It is also proved that the optimal steady state coincides with the traditional target Fmsy when the utility function to be maximized is the yield and the discount rate is zero. Second, an algorithm to calculate the optimal path that easily drives the resource to the steady state is developed. And third, the algorithm is applied to the Northern Stock of hake. Results show that management plans based exclusively on traditional reference targets as Fmsy may drive fishery economic results far from the optimal.
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In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of firms.
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Building on Item Response Theory we introduce students’ optimal behavior in multiple-choice tests. Our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high, because although correction for guessing discriminates against risk-averse subjects, this effect is small compared with the measurement error that the penalty prevents. This result obtains when knowledge is binary or partial, under different normalizations of the score, when risk aversion is related to knowledge and when there is a pass-fail break point. We also find that the mean degree of difficulty should be close to the mean level of knowledge and that the variance of difficulty should be high.
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This paper investigates optimal fiscal policy in a static multisector model. A Ramsey type planner chooses tax rates on each good type as well as spending levels on each good type subject to an exogenous total expenditure constraint and requirements that some minimum amount of spending be undertaken in each sector. It is shown that optimal policy does not equally spend in each sector but instead results in one of the minimum expenditure constraints binding.
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This paper analyzes whether a minimum wage can be an optimal redistribution policy when distorting taxes and lump-sum transfers are also available in a competitive economy. We build a static general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner making decisions on taxes, transfers, and minimum wage levels. Workers are assumed to differ only in their productivity. We find that optimal redistribution may imply the use of a minimum wage. The key factor driving our results is the reaction of the demand for low skilled labor to the minimum wage law. Hence, an optimal minimum wage appears to be most likely when low skilled households are scarce, the complementarity between the two types of workers is large or the difference in productivity is small. The main contribution of the paper is a modelling approach that allows us to adopt analysis and solution techniques widely used in recent public finance research. Moreover, this modelling strategy is flexible enough to allow for potential extensions to include dynamics into the model.
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Published as an article in: Topics in Macroeconomics, 2005, vol. 5, issue 1, article 17.
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This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) model to explore whether some of the variation in parameter estimates seen in the literature could arise from this source. A time varying value for the unemployment volatility parameter can be motivated through several means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve or variation in the preferences of the monetary authority.We show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemployment volatility parameter improves the model fit and it helps to provide an explanation of inflation bias based on asymmetric central banker preferences, which is consistent across subsamples.
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Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).