965 resultados para Prise alimentaire


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Comprend : Sur la prise de Bellegarde par le :mareschal: +maréchal+ duc de Schomberg ; L'Avantage remporté par le comte de Lorge, lieutenant general de l'armée du :Roy: +Roi+ , sur les Imperiaux

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Comprend : Vestibule de ma maison d'Auteuil avec la vue de l'escalier, juillet 1883 ; Salle à manger de ma maison d'Auteuil. Panneau de la cheminée, juillet 1883 ; Petit salon de ma maison d'Auteuil. Panneau de la cheminée, juillet 1883 ; Grand salon de ma maison d'Auteuil. Panneau du fond, juillet 1883 ; Grand salon de ma maison d'Auteuil. Panneau de la glace sans tain, juillet 1883 ; Chambre à coucher de ma maison d'Auteuil. Vue prise par la porte du cabinet de toilette montrant le couronnement du lit répété dans la glace, juillet 1883

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Comprend : Au Roy, sur la prise de Mastric, sonnet. 2 ff. n. ch.

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Il existe des interactions complexes entre les perceptions du public, les demandes et les attentes envers les professionnels de la santé par rapport au dépistage des gènes de susceptibilité au cancer et aux services médicaux offerts. Ce chapitre étudie les aspects éthiques et juridiques de ces interactions avec une emphase sur le consentement, la confidentialité, l’emploi, l’assurance et le dépistage chez les mineurs et les majeurs inaptes. Ce chapitre conclu sur la prise en compte d’enjeux entourant la propriété de l’information génétique et les brevets et propose des principes pouvant servir de base pour une responsabilité partagée quant à la participation des patients dans le développement de lignes directrices encadrant le dépistage des gènes de susceptibilité au cancer.

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A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

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We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

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This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

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We analyze an alternative to the standard rationalizability requirement for observed choices by considering non-deteriorating selections. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. A selection function is non-deteriorating if there exists an ordering over the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are at least as good as the reference option. We characterize non-deteriorating selection functions in an abstract framework and in an economic environment.

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We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set rankings include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertainty, rankings of opportunity sets, set rankings that appear in matching theory, and the structure of assembly preferences. The survey is prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory, vol. 2, edited by Salvador Barberà, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers. The chapter number is provisional.

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We identify conditions under which preferences over sets of consumption opportunities can be reduced to preferences over bundles of \"commodities\". We distinguish ordinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to monotone transformations, from cardinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to positive linear transformations only.

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The notion of diversity is an issue that is of relevance in several contexts. For example, the biodiversity of a given ecological environment and the diversity of the options available to a decision maker have attracted some attention in recent research. This paper provides an axiomatic approach to the measurement of diversity. We characterize two nested classes of ordinal measures of diversity and an important member of these classes. We prove that the latter special case is equivalent to a diversity ordering proposed by Weitzman.

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This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

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In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2n strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corrollary, we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave. When the policy space is multi-dimensional, we establish Arrow's impossibility theorem. Among others, we show that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.

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In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).