Land acquisition, investment, and development in the Lao coffee sector: Successes and failures

Despite the increasing acknowledgment of scholars and practitioners that many large-scale agricultural land acquisitions in developing countries fail or never materialize, empirical evidence about how and why they fail to date is still scarce. Too often, land deals are portrayed as straightforward investments and their success is taken for granted. Looking at the coffee sector in Laos, the authors of this article explore dimensions of the land grab debate that have not yet been sufficiently examined. Coffee concessionaires in southern Laos often fail to use all of the land granted them and fail to produce high yields on the land they do use. Thus, the authors challenge the often-assumed superiority and effectiveness of large-scale versus small-scale production, specifically the argument that they modernize agricultural production and optimize land use. They argue that examining failed investments is as important as studying successful ones for understanding the implications of the land grabbing phenomenon for social, economic, and environmental outcomes. Knowledge about the scale of “failed land deals” provides important motivation for national governments to close the gap between intentions and actual outcomes. This article engages with the current debate on quality of investment and challenges the approach of employing land concessions as a vehicle for economic development in the Lao coffee sector and in other sectors and countries.

Labour Migration, Trade and Investment: From Fragmentation to Coherence

Trade, investment and migration are strongly intertwined, being three key factors in international production. Yet, law and regulation of the three has remained highly fragmented. Trade is regulated by the WTO on the multilateral level, and through preferential trade agreements on the regional and bilateral levels – it is fragmented and complex in its own right. Investment, on the other hand, is mainly regulated through bilateral investment treaties with no strong links to the regulation of trade or migration. And, finally, migration is regulated by a web of different international, regional and bilateral agreements which focus on a variety of different aspects of migration ranging from humanitarian to economic. The problems of institutional fragmentation in international law are well known. There is no organizational forum for coherent strategy-making on the multilateral level covering all three areas. Normative regulations may thus contradict each other. Trade regulation may bring about liberalization of access for service providers, but eventually faces problems in recruiting the best people from abroad. Investors may withdraw investment without being held liable for disruptions to labour and to the livelihood and infrastructure of towns and communities affected by disinvestment. Finally, migration policies do not seem to have a significant impact as long as trade policies and investment policies are not working in a way that is conducive to reducing migration pressure, as trade and investment are simply more powerful on the regulatory level than migration. This chapter addresses the question as to how fragmentation of the three fields could be reme-died and greater coherence between these three areas of factor allocation in international economic relations and law could be achieved. It shows that migration regulation on the international level is lagging behind that on trade and investment. Stronger coordination and consideration of migration in trade and investment policy, and stronger international cooperation in migration, will provide the foundations for a coherent international architecture in the field.

Corporate aging and investment decisions

Paper I: Corporate aging and internal resource allocation Abstract Various observers argue that established firms are at a disadvantage in pursuing new growth opportunities. In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth lines of business. However, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation in established firms. Redirecting resources from high-growth to low-growth lines of business does not result in lower profitability. Also, resource allocation towards new growth opportunities does not increase when managers of established firms are exposed to takeover and product market threats. Rather, it seems that conservative resource allocation strategies are driven by pressures to meet investors’ expectations. Our empirical evidence, thus, favors the hypothesis that established firms wisely choose to allocate fewer resources to new growth opportunities as external pressures force them to focus on efficiency rather than novelty (Holmström 1989). Paper II: Corporate aging and asset sales Abstract This paper asks whether divestitures are motivated by strategic considerations about the scope of the firm’s activities. Limited managerial capacity implies that exploiting core competences becomes comparatively more attractive than exploring new growth opportunities as firms mature. Divestitures help stablished firms free management time and increase the focus on core competences. The testable implication of this attention hypothesis is that established firms are the main sellers of assets, that their divestiture activity increases when managerial capacity is scarcer, that they sell non-core activities, and that they return the divestiture proceeds to the providers of capital instead of reinvesting them in the firm. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Paper III: Corporate aging and lobbying expenditures Abstract Creative destruction forces constantly challenge established firms, especially in competitive markets. This paper asks whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to counteract the decline in rents over time. We find a statistically and economically significant positive relation between firm age and lobbying expenditures. Moreover, the documented age-effect is weaker when firms have unique products or operate in concentrated product markets. To address endogeneity, we use industry distress as an exogenous nonlegislative shock to future rents and show that established firms are relatively more likely to lobby when in distress. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying efforts by established firms forestall the creative destruction process. In sum, our findings suggest that corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to retain profitability in competitive environments.

Sustainable investment in land in the Global South: What would it require from a coherence perspective? The case of Sierra Leone

Large scale acquisitions of land in the Global South have signifi-cantly increased since the millennium. It is often the case that foreign investors are involved in such acquisitions, which are commonly aimed at facilitating the export of commodities. These investments in land tend to transform conventional, rather small scale agricultural systems into large scale, industrial agricultural systems. While investment in ag-riculture in the Global South is much needed, large-scale investments in land often goes hand-in-hand with environmental and human rights re-lated challenges. As a consequence, lawyers need to address questions of sovereignty over natural resources (this paper focuses in particular on land resources), to peoples’ right to self-determination, to the responsi-bilities of the home and host states of the investors, including public-private relationships, and the role of international institutions who are involved, as well as relevant jurisprudence. This paper approaches these questions from the perspective of a theory on policy coherence for sus-tainable development.

A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: Implications for Swiss Agriculture

To say that regionalism is gaining momentum has become an understatement. To mourn the lack of progress in multilateral trade rule-making is a commonplace in the discourse of politicians regretting the WTO negotiation standstill, and of “know-what-to-do” academics. The real problem is the uneven level-playing field resulting from increasing differences of rules and obligations. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is a very ambitious project. WTI studies in 2014 have shown that the implications for Switzerland could be enormous. But even the combined market power of the two TTIP participants – the EU and the USA – will not level the playing field impairing the regulatory framework, and the market access barriers for trade in agriculture. Such differences will remain in three areas which, incidentally, are also vital for a global response to the food security challenge to feed 9 billion people before the year 2050: market access, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic support programmes. This means that without multilateral progress the TTIP and other so-called mega-regionals, if successfully concluded, will exacerbate rather than lessen trade distortions. While this makes farmers in rich countries safer from competition, competitive production in all countries will be hampered. Consequently, and notwithstanding the many affirmations to the contrary, farm policies worldwide will continue to only address farmer security without increasing global food security. What are the implications of the TTIP for Swiss agriculture? This article, commissioned by Waseda University in Tokyo, finds that the failure to achieve further reforms – including a number of areas where earlier reforms have been reversed – is presenting Switzerland and Swiss agriculture with a terrible dilemma in the eventuality of a successful conclusion of the TTIP. If Swiss farm production is to survive for more than another generation, continuous reform efforts are required, and over-reliance on the traditional instruments of border protection and product support is to be avoided. Without a substantial TTIP obliging Switzerland to follow suit, autonomous reforms will remain extremely fragile.

Grabbing or investment? On judging large-scale land acquisitions

Although analyses of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) often contain an explicit or implicit normative judgment about such projects, they rarely deduce such judgment from a nuanced balancing of pros and cons. This paper uses assessments about a well-researched LSLA in Sierra Leone to show that a utilitarian approach tends to lead to the conclusion that positive effects prevail, whereas deontological approaches lead to an emphasis on negative aspects. LSLA are probably the most radical land-use change in the history of humankind. This process of radical transformation poses a challenge for balanced evaluations. Thus, we line out a framework that focuses on the options of local residents but sets boundaries of acceptability through the core contents of human rights. In addition, systemic implications of a project need to be regarded.

Time-Limited Property Rights and Investment Incentives

Although it is axiomatic that property rights of infinite duration are necessary for owners to make efficient long term investments in their property, time limits on property rights are pervasive in the law. This paper provides an economic justification for such limits by arguing that they actually enhance property values in the presence of various sorts of market failure. The analysis offers a coherent approach for understanding what otherwise appear to be unrelated doctrines in the law.

Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment

Agents on the same side of a two-sided matching market (such as the marriage or labor market) compete with each other by making self-enhancing investments to improve their worth in the eyes of potential partners. Because these expenditures generally occur prior to matching, this activity has come to be known in recent literature (Peters, 2007) as pre-marital investment. This paper builds on that literature by considering the case of sequential pre-marital investment, analyzing a matching game in which one side of the market invests first, followed by the other. Interpreting the first group of agents as workers and the other group as firms, the paper provides a new perspective on the incentive structure that is inherent in labor markets. It also demonstrates that a positive rate of unemployment can exist even in the absence of matching frictions. Policy implications follow, as the prevailing set of equilibria can be altered by restricting entry into the workforce, providing unemployment insurance, or subsidizing pre-marital investment.

Economies of Scale and Cost Efficiencies: A Panel-Data Stochastic-Frontier Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data model specifying a translog cost function, covering 1995 to 2003. The results disagree with previous research in that we find little evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, the results also show that self-management of a REIT associates with more inefficiency when we measure output with assets. When we use revenue to measure output, selfmanagement associates with less inefficiency. Also contrary with previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results further suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications.

Cost Improvements, Returns to Scale, and Cost Inefficiencies for Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate stochastic-frontier, panel-data models specifying a translog cost function. The specified model updates the cost frontier with new information as it becomes available over time. The model can identify frontier cost improvements, returns to scale, and cost inefficiencies over time. The results disagree with most previous research in that we find no evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency.