Strategy communication and measurement systems

Organizations often face the challenge of communicating their strategiesto local decision makers. The difficulty presents itself in finding away to measure performance wich meaningfully conveys how to implement theorganization's strategy at local levels. I show that organizations solvethis communication problem by combining performance measures in such away that performance gains come closest to mimicking value-added asdefined by the organization's strategy. I further show how organizationsrebalance performance measures in response to changes in their strategies.Applications to the design of performance metrics, gaming, and divisionalperformance evaluation are considered. The paper also suggests severalempirical ways to evaluate the practical importance of the communicationrole of measurement systems.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

Keeping up with the Joneses: An international asset pricing model

We derive an international asset pricing model that assumes local investorshave preferences of the type "keeping up with the Joneses." In aninternational setting investors compare their current wealth with that oftheir peers who live in the same country. In the process of inferring thecountry's average wealth, investors incorporate information from the domesticmarket portfolio. In equilibrium, this gives rise to a multifactor CAPMwhere, together with the world market price of risk, there existscountry-speciffic prices of risk associated with deviations from thecountry's average wealth level. The model performs signifficantly better, interms of explaining cross-section of returns, than the international CAPM.Moreover, the results are robust, both for conditional and unconditionaltests, to the inclusion of currency risk, macroeconomic sources of risk andthe Fama and French HML factor.

A decomposition formula for option prices in the Heston model and applications to option pricing approximation

By means of classical Itô's calculus we decompose option prices asthe sum of the classical Black-Scholes formula with volatility parameterequal to the root-mean-square future average volatility plus a term dueby correlation and a term due to the volatility of the volatility. Thisdecomposition allows us to develop first and second-order approximationformulas for option prices and implied volatilities in the Heston volatilityframework, as well as to study their accuracy. Numerical examples aregiven.

A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

Iowa’s Drug Control Strategy, November 1, 2007

The attached annual report is submitted in satisfaction of Chapter 80E.1 of the Code of Iowa which directs the Drug Policy Coordinator to monitor and coordinate all drug prevention, enforcement and treatment activities in the state. Further, it requires the Coordinator to submit an annual report to the Governor and Legislature concerning the activities and programs of the Coordinator, the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy and all other state departments with drug enforcement, substance abuse treatment, and prevention programs. Chapter 80E.2 establishes the Drug Policy Advisory Council (DPAC), chaired by the Coordinator, and consisting of a prosecuting attorney, substance abuse treatment specialists, law enforcement officers, a prevention specialist, a judge and representatives from the departments of corrections, education, public health, human services, public safety and human rights. This report and strategy were in developed in consultation with the DPAC.

Asset pricing with idiosyncratic risk and overlapping generations

A number of existing studies have concluded that risk sharing allocations supported by competitive, incomplete markets equilibria are quantitatively close to first-best. Equilibrium asset prices in these models have been difficult to distinguish from those associated with a complete markets model, the counterfactual features of which have been widely documented. This paper asks if life cycle considerations, in conjunction with persistent idiosyncratic shocks which become more volatile during aggregate downturns, can reconcile the quantitative properties of the competitive asset pricing framework with those of observed asset returns. We begin by arguing that data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics support the plausibility of such a shock process. Our estimates suggest a high degree of persistence as well as a substantial increase in idiosyncratic conditional volatility coincident with periods of low growth in U.S. GNP. When these factors are incorporated in a stationary overlapping generations framework, the implications for the returns on risky assets are substantial. Plausible parameterizations of our economy are able to generate Sharpe ratios which match those observed in U.S. data. Our economy cannot, however, account for the level of variability of stock returns, owing in large part to the specification of its production technology.

The impact of generic reference pricing interventions in the statin market

The objective of this study was to evaluate the intended and unintended impact on pharmaceutical use and sales of three public financing reforms applied to the prescription of statins: a Spanish generic reference pricing (RP) system for lovastatin and simvastatin, and two competing policies introduced by the Andalusian Public Health Service (APHS) for all statins, first a maximum consumer price (MCP) and then a so called quality prescribing incentive for general practitioners (MCP plus PI).This study is designed as an observational, retrospective, interrupted time series analysis with comparison series (APHS and the rest of Spain) of 46 monthly drug use and sales ratios from January 2001 to October 2004 for each active ingredient in the group of statins.RP has been effective at reducing the volume of sales growth of the off-patent statins, yet its overall impact on sales of all statins has been relatively modest. The quantity and volume of sales impact heavily depends on regulatory RP details such as when the system is introduced, how often it is updated, and how the reference price is calculated.

Long run relationships and price rigidity

I study a repeated buyer-seller relationship for the exchange of a givengood. Asymmetric information over the buyer's reservation price, which issubject to random shocks, may lead the seller to use a rigid pricing policydespite the possibility of making higher profits through price discriminationacross the different satates of the buyer's reservation price. The existence of a flexible price subgame perfect equilibrium is shown for the buyerssufficiently locked-in. When the seller faces a population of buyers whose degree of involvmentin the relatioship is unknown, the flexible price equilibrium is notnecessarily optimal. Thus tipically the seller will prefer to use therigid price strategy. A learning process allowing the seller to screenthe population of buyers is derived abd the existence of a switching pointbetween the two regimes (i.e. price rigidity and price felxibility) isshown.

On the robustness of least-squares Monte Carlo (LSM) for pricing American derivatives

This paper analyses the robustness of Least-Squares Monte Carlo, a techniquerecently proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) for pricing Americanoptions. This method is based on least-squares regressions in which theexplanatory variables are certain polynomial functions. We analyze theimpact of different basis functions on option prices. Numerical resultsfor American put options provide evidence that a) this approach is veryrobust to the choice of different alternative polynomials and b) few basisfunctions are required. However, these conclusions are not reached whenanalyzing more complex derivatives.

Iowa's Drug Control Strategy, 2009

The 2009 Iowa Drug Control Strategy is the annual report and Drug Control Strategy for the State of Iowa, produced in accordance with Iowa law, by the Governor's Office of Drug Control Policy, in cooperation with the Drug Policy Advisory Council.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articlesare accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through authorfees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal s qualitystandard. If the journal s objective was to maximize social welfare, open accesswould be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusionexceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open accessjournal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers payoffs, the impactof the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the sociallyefficient level.

Protective or counter-productive? Labor market institutions and the effect of immigration on EU natives

We estimate the effect of immigrant flows on native employment in WesternEurope, and then ask whether the employment consequences of immigrationvary with institutions that affect labor market flexibility. Reducedflexibility may protect natives from immigrant competition in the nearterm, but our theoretical framework suggests that reduced flexibility islikely to increase the negative impact of immigration on equilibriumemployment. In models without interactions, OLS estimates for a panel ofEuropean countries in the 1980s and 1990s show small, mostly negativeimmigration effects. To reduce bias from the possible endogeneity ofimmigration flows, we use the fact that many immigrants arriving after1991 were refugees from the Balkan wars. An IV strategy based onvariation in the number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia generateslarger though mostly insignificant negative estimates. We then estimatemodels allowing interactions between the employment response toimmigration and institutional characteristics including business entrycosts. These results, limited to the sample of native men, generallysuggest that reduced flexibility increases the negative impact ofimmigration. Many of the estimated interaction terms are significant,and imply a significant negative effect on employment in countrieswith restrictive institutions.

Portable alphas from pension mispricing

We introduce a new dynamic trading strategy based on the systematic misspricing of U.S. companies sponsoring Defined Benefit pension plans. This portfolio produces an average return of 1.51% monthly between 1989 and 2004, with a Sharpe Ratio of 0.26. The returns of the strategy are not explained by those of primary assets. These returns are not related to those of benchmarks in the alternative investments industry either. Hence, we are in the presence of a "pure alpha" strategy that can be ported into a large variety of portfolios to significantly enhance their performance.