Explaining the Transition Between Exchange Rate Regimes

This paper studies the transition between exchange rate regimes using a Markov chain model with time-varying transition probabilities. The probabilities are parameterized as nonlinear functions of variables suggested by the currency crisis and optimal currency area literature. Results using annual data indicate that inflation, and to a lesser extent, output growth and trade openness help explain the exchange rate regime transition dynamics.

The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

Methods to Estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models

This paper employs the one-sector Real Business Cycle model as a testing ground for four different procedures to estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. The procedures are: 1 ) Maximum Likelihood, with and without measurement errors and incorporating Bayesian priors, 2) Generalized Method of Moments, 3) Simulated Method of Moments, and 4) Indirect Inference. Monte Carlo analysis indicates that all procedures deliver reasonably good estimates under the null hypothesis. However, there are substantial differences in statistical and computational efficiency in the small samples currently available to estimate DSGE models. GMM and SMM appear to be more robust to misspecification than the alternative procedures. The implications of the stochastic singularity of DSGE models for each estimation method are fully discussed.

Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S.

This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.

Deprivation and Social Exclusion

Social exclusion manifests itself in the lack of an individual’s access to functionings as compared to other members of society. Thus, the concept is closely related to deprivation. We view deprivation as having two basic determinants: the lack of identification with other members of society and the aggregate alienation experienced by an agent with respect to those with fewer functioning failures. We use an axiomatic approach to characterize classes of deprivation and exclusion measures and apply some of them to EU data for the period from 1994 to 2000.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

The Macroeconomic Effects of Infrequent Information with Adjustment Costs

In the last decade, the potential macroeconomic effects of intermittent large adjustments in microeconomic decision variables such as prices, investment, consumption of durables or employment – a behavior which may be justified by the presence of kinked adjustment costs – have been studied in models where economic agents continuously observe the optimal level of their decision variable. In this paper, we develop a simple model which introduces infrequent information in a kinked adjustment cost model by assuming that agents do not observe continuously the frictionless optimal level of the control variable. Periodic releases of macroeconomic statistics or dividend announcements are examples of such infrequent information arrivals. We first solve for the optimal individual decision rule, that is found to be both state and time dependent. We then develop an aggregation framework to study the macroeconomic implications of such optimal individual decision rules. Our model has the distinct characteristic that a vast number of agents tend to act together, and more so when uncertainty is large. The average effect of an aggregate shock is inversely related to its size and to aggregate uncertainty. We show that these results differ substantially from the ones obtained with full information adjustment cost models.

Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism

This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative definition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.

A Theory of Random Consumer Demand

This paper presents a new theory of random consumer demand. The primitive is a collection of probability distributions, rather than a binary preference. Various assumptions constrain these distributions, including analogues of common assumptions about preferences such as transitivity, monotonicity and convexity. Two results establish a complete representation of theoretically consistent random demand. The purpose of this theory of random consumer demand is application to empirical consumer demand problems. To this end, the theory has several desirable properties. It is intrinsically stochastic, so the econometrician can apply it directly without adding extrinsic randomness in the form of residuals. Random demand is parsimoniously represented by a single function on the consumption set. Finally, we have a practical method for statistical inference based on the theory, described in McCausland (2004), a companion paper.

Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being

This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provides an introduction to social-choice theory with interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We argue that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s theorem is to use a richer informational environment than ordinal measurability and the absence of interpersonal comparability of well-being. We discuss welfarist social evaluation (which requires that the levels of individual well-being in two alternatives are the only determinants of their social ranking) and present characterizations of some important social-evaluation orderings.

Time Reversibility of Stationary Regular Finite State Markov Chains

We propose an alternate parameterization of stationary regular finite-state Markov chains, and a decomposition of the parameter into time reversible and time irreversible parts. We demonstrate some useful properties of the decomposition, and propose an index for a certain type of time irreversibility. Two empirical examples illustrate the use of the proposed parameter, decomposition and index. One involves observed states; the other, latent states.

Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.