998 resultados para ROLE CHECKLIST
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2014
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2015
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2015
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Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Naturwissenschaften, Univ., Dissertation, 2015
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Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Fakultät für Naturwissenschaften, Dissertation, 2016
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The relative population sizes of a species complex of Chauliognathus are reported, as well as their spatial distribution associated with different patches of food plants. Field work was done at Fazenda Santa Isabel, municipality of Guaíba, State of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. The results suggest that two mechanisms account for the reduction in food competition among the species involved: one is asynchrony in the appearance of the species in the area, and the other is aggregation in different patches of food plants. Since the species here reported show a similar colour pattern (yellow-black) the possibility of the occurrence of serial mimicry in this complex of species is dicussed.
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Specialized setae placed on proximal segments of appendages in tarantulas have been related to sound production (stridulation), used in defense or sexual communication. The surface structure of called stridulatory setae of Acanthoscurria suina Pocock, 1903 was studied by SEM. Three morphological types of setae were recognized and at least two of them could be involved in stridulation. Their role in sexual communication was tested by experimental removal. Our results showed no differences in the sexual success between the setaeless and control individuals. Consequently, a defensive function for stridulatory setae seems to be more likely than a sexual function.
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n.s. no.21(1984)
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This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information
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We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to
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The choice of either the rate of monetary growth or the nominal interest rate as the instrument controlled by monetary authorities has both positive and normative implications for economic performance. We reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the monetary policy instrument in a dynamic general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous growth in which a fraction of productive government spending is financed by means of issuing currency. When we evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments attending to the fluctuations of endogenous variables, we find that the inflation rate is less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning the fluctuations of consumption and of the growth rate, both monetary policy instruments lead to statistically equivalent volatilities. Finally, we show that none of these two targeting procedures displays unambiguously higher welfare levels.
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We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.
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This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005,American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy?s data cannot reject the hipótesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person?s decisión of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. We find that our data cannot reject this hypothesis either, but we also discover substantial differences in behavior between our sub jects and Gneezy?s sub jects.