980 resultados para RESOURCES ALLOCATION
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The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of an ongoing cognitive task on an individual’s ability to generate a compensatory arm response. Twenty young and 16 older adults recovered their balance from a support surface translation while completing a cognitive (counting) task of varying difficulty. Surface electromyographic (EMG) recordings from the shoulders and kinematics of the right arm were collected to quantify the compensatory arm response. Results indicated that the counting task, regardless of its difficulty as well as the age of the individual, had minimal influence on the onset or magnitude of arm muscle activity that occurred following a loss of balance. In contrast to previous research, this study’s findings suggest that the cortical or cognitive resources utilized by the cognitive task are not relied upon for the generation of compensatory arm responses and that older adults are not disproportionately affected by dual-tasking than young adults.
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This study contributes to current research on voice behaviour by investigating several under-explored drivers that motivate employees’ expression of constructive ideas about work-related issues. It draws from the concept of psychological climate to examine how voice behaviour is influenced by employees’ (1) personal resources (tenacity and passion for work), (2) perceptions of social interdependence (task and outcome interdependence), and (3) supervisor leadership style (transformational and transactional). Using a multi-source research design, surveys were administered to 226 employees and to 24 supervisors at a Canadian-based not-for-profit organization. The hypotheses are tested with hierarchical regression analysis. The results indicate that employees are more likely to engage in voice behaviour to the extent that they exhibit higher levels of passion for work. Further, their voice behaviour is lower to the extent that their supervisor adopts a transformational leadership style characterized by high performance expectations or a transactional leadership style based on contingent rewards and contingent punishment behaviours. The study reveals that there are no significant effects of tenacity, social interdependence, and behaviour-focused transformational leadership on voice. The findings have significant implications for organizations that seek to encourage employee behaviours that help improve current work practices or undo harmful situations.
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Grounded on the resource-based view of the firm, the study of this thesis investigates the effect of four internal and external factors – engineer intensity, location, affiliation with the government, government funding – on Chinese firms’ decision to either invest in internal R&D activities or external R&D and the effect of this decision on the firms’ international market success. In addition, the moderating role of the presence of foreign firms in China is examined. To understand these relationships, the thesis’ theorization focuses on the issue of how firms can combine optimally the two options – “internal R&D” and “external R&D”. In this regard I juxtapose internal R&D and external R&D and compare their advantages and disadvantages. To test my model, I apply panel data from the Annual Industrial Survey Database provided by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. My results show that three of the four investigated factors affect Chinese firms’ resource allocation decisions; and effective resource allocation decisions lead effectively to international market success, strengthened by the presence of foreign firms in China. Moreover the findings bear several theoretical and managerial contributions. First I propose the last dimension of the “VRIO framework” – “organization” – as an endogenous component of the VRIO framework, as my study investigated how firms can effectively combine resources to generate a competitive advantage in terms of international market success. Previous academic literature so far focused on examining whether internal and external R&D are complements or substitutes. My study fills a gap in the literature by investigating the determinants of the efficient combination of the two strategies and the outcome of the combination. One of the managerial implications is that Chinese firms can learn from foreign companies that are present in China.
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UANL
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Rapport de recherche
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A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.
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We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.
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In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.
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Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.
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We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”
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In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e. it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except -maybe- for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering.
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We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost function. We discuss two theories taking radically different views of the asymmetries of the cost function. In the full responsibility theory, each agent is accountable for the part of the costs that can be unambiguously separated and attributed to her own demand. In the partial responsibility theory, the asymmetries of the cost function have no bearing on individual cost shares, only the differences in demand levels matter. We describe several invariance and monotonicity properties that reflect both normative and strategic concerns. We uncover a number of logical trade-offs between our axioms, and derive axiomatic characterizations of a handful of intuitive methods: in the full responsibility approach, the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley, and subsidyfree serial methods, and in the partial responsibility approach, the cross-subsidizing serial method and the family of quasi-proportional methods.
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Dossier : In Memoriam, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006)