988 resultados para Procurement, decision aids
Resumo:
Review of Targeted Small Business (TSB) procurement activities for the period July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007
Resumo:
This preliminary exploration was limited by a number of factors. The format of the study has necessarily induced some form of selection bias of the panelists, because of the complexity of some questions, and the time required to complete the questionnaires. Several issues have not been addressed. One example could be the response to HIV infection occurring in a vaccinee. The study also did not address the difficulties related to the licensing of the vaccine. Indeed, the proposed scenario assumed that the vaccine had been registered as a starting point for the analysis. Finally, it has not been possible to conduct a sensitivity analysis, in order to evaluate how the responses would have been modified if some important characteristics of the vaccine had been modified.Very diverse evaluations were given in response to questions related with attitudes and perception of AIDS and AIDS vaccine. The possibility that vaccine availability or usage can be associated with an increased frequency in risky behaviors was spontaneously mentioned by half of the panelists. The estimation of the proportion of persons at highest risk who would choose to use this vaccine also indicated a high degree of uncertainty. This study offers important lessons. According to a broad and diverse panel of individuals, an incompletely effective AIDS vaccine would result in an additional level of complexity for the AIDS prevention strategy, rather than a simplification. The use of such a vaccine would have to be coupled with counselling. This implies a sustained emphasis on the recommendations which have been central to the STOP AIDS campaigns until now. In addition, consensual issues, as well as other issues more likely to be controversial have been identified. This should greatly help focusing the work of any committee designated to develop and implement a vaccination policy if an AIDS vaccine became available. Finally, our experience with the Policy Delphi indicates that this mode of structured communication could be usefully applied to other public health issues presenting a high visibility as well as a complex relationship with public perception.
Resumo:
Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.
Resumo:
We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.
Resumo:
We describe an original case of disseminated infection with Histoplasma capsulatum (Hc) var. duboisii in an African patient with AIDS who migrated to Switzerland. The diagnosis of histoplasmosis was suggested using direct examination of tissues and confirmed in 24 h with a panfungal polymerase chain reaction assay. The variety duboisii of Hc was established using DNA sequencing of the polymorphic genomic region OLE. Molecular tools allow diagnosis of histoplasmosis in 24 h, which is drastically shorter than culture procedures.
Resumo:
Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.
Resumo:
We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.
Resumo:
INTRODUCTION: A clinical decision rule to improve the accuracy of a diagnosis of influenza could help clinicians avoid unnecessary use of diagnostic tests and treatments. Our objective was to develop and validate a simple clinical decision rule for diagnosis of influenza. METHODS: We combined data from 2 studies of influenza diagnosis in adult outpatients with suspected influenza: one set in California and one in Switzerland. Patients in both studies underwent a structured history and physical examination and had a reference standard test for influenza (polymerase chain reaction or culture). We randomly divided the dataset into derivation and validation groups and then evaluated simple heuristics and decision rules from previous studies and 3 rules based on our own multivariate analysis. Cutpoints for stratification of risk groups in each model were determined using the derivation group before evaluating them in the validation group. For each decision rule, the positive predictive value and likelihood ratio for influenza in low-, moderate-, and high-risk groups, and the percentage of patients allocated to each risk group, were reported. RESULTS: The simple heuristics (fever and cough; fever, cough, and acute onset) were helpful when positive but not when negative. The most useful and accurate clinical rule assigned 2 points for fever plus cough, 2 points for myalgias, and 1 point each for duration <48 hours and chills or sweats. The risk of influenza was 8% for 0 to 2 points, 30% for 3 points, and 59% for 4 to 6 points; the rule performed similarly in derivation and validation groups. Approximately two-thirds of patients fell into the low- or high-risk group and would not require further diagnostic testing. CONCLUSION: A simple, valid clinical rule can be used to guide point-of-care testing and empiric therapy for patients with suspected influenza.
Resumo:
Review of targeted small business procurement activities for the year ended June 30, 2008
Resumo:
We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.
Resumo:
We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.
Resumo:
We consider an agent who has to repeatedly make choices in an uncertainand changing environment, who has full information of the past, who discountsfuture payoffs, but who has no prior. We provide a learning algorithm thatperforms almost as well as the best of a given finite number of experts orbenchmark strategies and does so at any point in time, provided the agentis sufficiently patient. The key is to find the appropriate degree of forgettingdistant past. Standard learning algorithms that treat recent and distant pastequally do not have the sequential epsilon optimality property.
Resumo:
When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.
Resumo:
Tailoring adjuvant therapy in breast cancer patients relies on prognostic and predictive factors, most of which are currently established by histopathological analysis of tumors. The quality of the assessment of the former (i.e.: tumor size, lymph node status, tumor grade, HER2 status, and lymphovascular invasion) and the latter (estrogen and progesteron receptors expression, HER2 overexpression or amplification) is an essential prerequisite for an optimal therapeutic decision. If the prognostic and predictive values of multigenes signatures are confirmed by on-going clinical studies, this approach could enter the clinical practice in the coming years and result in improved accuracy of adjuvant therapies in breast cancer patients. This approach might especially allow avoiding overtreatment in patients at low risk of recurrence.