948 resultados para Convex extendable trees
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* This paper was made according to the program of fundamental scientific research of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences «Mathematical simulation and intellectual systems», the project "Theoretical foundation of the intellectual systems based on ontologies for intellectual support of scientific researches".
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* This paper was made according to the program of fundamental scientific research of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences «Mathematical simulation and intellectual systems», the project "Theoretical foundation of the intellectual systems based on ontologies for intellectual support of scientific researches".
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* The research was supported by INTAS 00-397 and 00-626 Projects.
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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 30C45, 26A33; Secondary 33C15
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Intrusion detection is a critical component of security information systems. The intrusion detection process attempts to detect malicious attacks by examining various data collected during processes on the protected system. This paper examines the anomaly-based intrusion detection based on sequences of system calls. The point is to construct a model that describes normal or acceptable system activity using the classification trees approach. The created database is utilized as a basis for distinguishing the intrusive activity from the legal one using string metric algorithms. The major results of the implemented simulation experiments are presented and discussed as well.
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We consider the problems of finding two optimal triangulations of a convex polygon: MaxMin area and MinMax area. These are the triangulations that maximize the area of the smallest area triangle in a triangulation, and respectively minimize the area of the largest area triangle in a triangulation, over all possible triangulations. The problem was originally solved by Klincsek by dynamic programming in cubic time [2]. Later, Keil and Vassilev devised an algorithm that runs in O(n^2 log n) time [1]. In this paper we describe new geometric findings on the structure of MaxMin and MinMax Area triangulations of convex polygons in two dimensions and their algorithmic implications. We improve the algorithm’s running time to quadratic for large classes of convex polygons. We also present experimental results on MaxMin area triangulation.
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MSC 2010: 30C45, 30C55
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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90C26, 90C20, 49J52, 47H05, 47J20.
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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90C25, 68W10, 49M37.
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AMS subject classification: 52A01, 13C99.
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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 52A10.
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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 35C10, 35C20, 35P25, 47A40, 58D30, 81U40.
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It is often assumed (for analytical convenience, but also in accordance with common intuition) that consumer preferences are convex. In this paper, we consider circumstances under which such preferences are (or are not) optimal. In particular, we investigate a setting in which goods possess some hidden quality with known distribution, and the consumer chooses a bundle of goods that maximizes the probability that he receives some threshold level of this quality. We show that if the threshold is small relative to consumption levels, preferences will tend to be convex; whereas the opposite holds if the threshold is large. Our theory helps explain a broad spectrum of economic behavior (including, in particular, certain common commercial advertising strategies), suggesting that sensitivity to information about thresholds is deeply rooted in human psychology.
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We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.
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In this note we present a cardinally convex game (Sharkey, 1981) with empty core. Sharkey assumes that V (N) is convex, we do not do so, hence we do not contradict Sharkey's result.