Use of camera-traps in natural trails and shelters for the mammalian survey in the Atlantic Forest

In order to evaluate the efficiency of different mammalian survey methods, we compared traditional sampling techniques (use of camera-traps on roads and artificial trails, track censuses, and direct field visualization) with an alternative sampling design (camera-traps positioned in natural areas such as natural trails and shelters). We conducted the study in a deciduous Atlantic-Forest park in southern Brazil, and additionally compared our results with a previous intensive study carried out in the same area. Our considerably smaller sampling effort (example: 336 trap.day for our camera-traps versus 2,154 trap.day for the earlier study) registered the presence of 85% of the local known species, with camera-traps being 68% efficient. Moreover, shelter camera-traps revealed a different species composition regarding most of other sampling methods. This sampling strategy involving natural forest sites was therefore able to effectively optimize the chances of evaluating species composition in a shorter period, especially with respect to lower-density and cryptic species, as well as to detect species that avoid open, disturbed sites such as roads and man-made forest trails.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

It's what you say not what you pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Sôbre u'a modificação do meio de Monteverde

It is well known that the culture media used in the presumptive diagnosis of suspiciuous colonies from plates inoculated with stools for isolation of enteric organisms do not always correctly indicate the major groups of enterobacteria. In an effort to obtain a medium affording more exact indications, several media (1-9) have been tested. Modifications of some of these media have also been tested with the result that a satisfactory modification of Monteverde's medium was finaly selected. This proved to be most satisfactory, affording, as a result of only one inoculation, a complete series of basic indications. The modification involves changes in the formula, in the method of preparation and in the manner of storage. The formulae are: A. Thymol blue indicator: NaOH 0.1/N .............. 34.4 ml; Thymol blue .............. 1.6 g; Water .................... 65.6 ml. B. Andrade's indicator. C. Urea and sugar solution: Urea ..................... 20 g; Lactose ................... 30 g; Sucrose ................... 30 g; Water .................... 100 ml. The mixture (C.) should be warmed slightly in order to dissolve the ingredients rapidly. Sterilise by filtration (Seitz). Keep stock in refrigeratior. The modification of Monteverde's medium is prepared in two parts. Semi-solid part - Peptone (Difco) 2.0 g; NaCl 0.5 g; Agar 0.5 g; Water 100.0 ml. Boil to dissolve the ingredients. Adjust pH with NaOH to 7.3-7.4. Boil again for precipitation. Filter through cotton. Ad indicators "A" 0.3 ml and "B" 1.0 ml. Sterilise in autoclave 115ºC, 15 minutes in amounts not higher than 200 ml. Just before using, add solution "C" asseptically in amounts of 10 ml to 200 ml of the melted semi-solid medium, maintained at 48-50ºC. Solid part - Peptone (Difco) 1.5 g; Trypticase (BBL) 0.5 g; Agar 2.0 g; Water 100,00 ml. Boil to dissolve the ingredients. Adjust pH with NaOH to 7.3-7.4. Boils again. Filter through cotton. Add indicators "A" 0.3 ml and "B" 1.0 ml; ferrous ammonium sulfate 0.02 g; sodiun thiosulfate 0.02 g. Sterilise in autoclave 115ºC, 15 minutes in amounts not higher than 200 ml. Just before using, add solution "C" asseptically in amounts of 10 ml to 200 ml of the melted solid medium, maintained at 48-50ºC. Final medium - The semi-solid part is dispensed first (tubes about 12 x 120 mm) in 2.5 ml amounts and left to harden at room temperature, in vertical position. The solid part is dispensed over the hardened semi-solid one in amounts from 2.0 ml to 2.5 ml and left to harden in slant position, affording a butt of 12 to 15 mm. The tubes of medium should be subjected to a sterility test in the incubator, overnight. Tubes showing spontaneous gas bubbles (air) should then be discarded. The medium should be stored in the incubator (37ºC), for not more than 2 to 4 days. Storage of the tubes in the ice-box produces the absorption of air which is released as bubbles when the tubes are incubated at 37ºC after inoculation. This fact confirmed the observation of ARCHAMBAULT & McCRADY (10) who worked with liquid media and the aplication of their observation was found to be essential to the proper working conditions of this double-layer medium. Inoculation - The inoculation is made by means of a long straight needle, as is usually done on the triple sugar, but the needel should penetrate only to about half of the height of the semi-solid column. Indol detection - After inoculation, a strip of sterelized filter papaer previously moistened with Ehrlich's reagent, is suspended above the surface of the medium, being held between the cotton plug and the tube. Indications given - In addition to providing a mass of organisms on the slant for serological invetigations, the medium gives the following indications: 1. Acid from lactose and/or sucrose (red, of yellowsh with strains which reduce the indicators). 2. Gas from lactose and/or sucrose (bubbles). 3. H[2]S production, observed on the solid part (black). 4. Motility observed on the semi-solid part (tubidity). 5. Urease production, observed on solid and semi-solid parts (blue). 6. Indol production, observed on the strip of filter paper (red or purplish). Indol production is not observed with indol positive strains which rapidly acidify the surface o the slant, and the use of oxalic acid has proved to give less sensitive reaction (11). Reading of results - In most cases overnight incubation is enough; sometimes the reactions appear within only a few hours of incubation, affording a definitive orientation of the diagnosis. With some cultures it is necessary to observe the medium during 48 hours of incubation. A description showing typical differential reaction follows: Salmonella: Color of the medium unchanged, with blackening of the solid part when H[2]S is positive. The slant tends to alkalinity (greenish of bluish). Gas always absent. Indol negative. Motility positive or negative. Shigella: Color of the medium unchanged at the beginning of incubation period, but acquiring a red color when the strain is late lactose/sucrose positive. Slant tending to alkalinity (greenish or purplish). Indol positive or negative. Motility, gas and H[2]S always negative. Proteus: Color of the medium generally changes entirely to blue or sometimes to green (urease positive delayed), with blackening of solid part when H[2]S is positive. Motility positive of negative. Indol positive. Gas positive or negative. The strains which attack rapidly sucrose may give a yellow-greenish color to the medium. Sometimes the intense blue color of the medium renders difficult the reading of the H[2]S production. Escherichiae and Klebsiellae: Color of the medium red or yellow (acid) with great and rapid production of gas. Motility positive or negative. Indol generally impossible to observe. Paracoli: Those lactose of sucrose positive give the same reaction as Esherichia. Those lactose or sucrose negatives give the same reactions as Salmonellae. Sometimes indol positive and H[2]S negative. Pseudomonas: Color of the medium unchanged. The slant tends to alkalinity. It is impossible to observe motility because there is no growth in the bottom. Alkaligenes: Color of the medium unchanged. The slant tends to alkalinity. The medium does not alter the antigenic properties of the strains and with the mass of organisms on the slant we can make the serologic diagnosis. It is admitted that this medium is somewhat more laborious to prepare than others used for similar purposes. Nevertheless it can give informations generally obtained by two or three other media. Its use represents much saving in time, labor and material, and we suggest it for routine laboratory work in which a quick presumptive preliminary grouping of enteric organisms is needed.

Who participates in R&D subsidy programs? The case of spanish manufacturing firms.

Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies to firms has produced mixed results so far. One possible explanation is that firms and project selection rules may be quite heterogeneous both across agencies and across industries, leading to different outcomes in terms of the induced additional private effort. Here we focus on the participation stage. Using a sample of Spanish firms, we test for differences across agencies and industries. Our results suggest that firms in the same industry face different hurdles to participate in different agencies’ programs, that participation patterns may reflect a combination of agency goals, and that patterns differ across high-tech and low-tech industries.

El dret a l'educació i la igualtat d'oportunitats. Perspectiva històrica

La importància del sistema educatiu per a la formació d’una consciència democràtica és un tema ja present en el pensament il•lustrat i recollit en la Constitució de 1812 on es pretenia que, amb els plans d’instrucció, a partir de l’any 1830 sabessin llegir i escriure tots els ciutadans. L’objectiu d’aquesta recerca és analitzar com el dret a l’educació és determinant per al desplegament de la nostra personalitat i per a la igualtat d’oportunitats. Molts dels problemes i de les tensions presents en la configuració d’un model de sistema educatiu per a la nostra societat democràtica són conseqüència de plantejaments no resolts des de fa dos segles. La consolidació, per primer cop en la nostra història, d’un ordenament jurídic democràtic, exigeix un esforç per part de tots els agents implicats en el sistema educatiu per a possibilitar una societat on sigui vigent el principi d’igualtat d’oportunitats.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Treball de camp a una colònia de xatrac comú (sterna hirundo) en Alemanya

Estudio elaborado a partir de una estancia en el Institut fur Vogelforschung. El objeto de la estancia fue participar en la campaña de campo en la colonia de Charrán común (Sterna hirundo) situada en Wilhelmshaven (Alemania), entre los meses de mayo y agosto de 2005. Esta participación se llevó a cabo bajo la dirección del Prof. Dr. Peter H. Becker y junto a su equipo. Se participó en la recogida rutinaria de datos de la colonia así como en distintas técnicas relacionadas con el presente proyecto, como el marcaje de pollos, su observación directa desde escondites y la recogida de distintas muestras biológicas. El objetivo principal era continuar con la obtención de datos para el trabajo de investigación sobre la influencia de la calidad y la condición parental en la manipulación adaptativa de la razón de sexos y la asignación por sexos. La obtención de datos se basa en la implantación de transponders en pollos, que permiten la identificación de cada charrán de por vida. La combinación de esta información con la observación directa de cebas hace de la colonia un lugar excepcional, lo que permite conocer los factores que influyen en las tendencias que existan. Sin embargo, el objetivo específico de la campaña se centraba en investigar la variabilidad individual de la respuesta inmune en los pollos de charrán en relación a un número de atributos de los propios pollos (sexo, tamaño, tasa de crecimiento, proteínas en plasma, hematocrito, carga parasitaria, carotenos en plasma, isótopos de las plumas), de los padres (fecha y tamaño de puesta, calidad parental) y de las condiciones de cría (orden de eclosión, densidad de la sub-colonia). Los resultados de estos datos obtenidos durante la campaña respaldan que existe una influencia de la condición nutricional y la calidad parental en la respuesta immune de los pollos, debida probablemente a un esfuerzo reproductivo diferencial.

The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio