La investigación naturalista e interpretativa desde la actividad física y el deporte

[Es]Desde este artículo se revisan diversos estudios de investigación relativos a la sublínea de formación del profesorado de educación física y deportiva, así como a la intervención docente en esta área de conocimientos. Esta sublínea se enmarca en la línea de Actividad Física y Deportes en el área de Didáctica de la Expresión Corporal. En este caso, se incluyen estudios de carácter naturalista e interpretativo, con la intención de que las personas que investigan y sus protagonistas formen parte activa en el propio proceso investigador (Bodgan y Biklen, 1982; Colás y Buendía, 1992; Goetz y Lecompte, 1988; Vázquez y Angulo, 2003). La formación del profesorado de educación física y la actividad didáctica de dicha materia, se convierten en los contenidos que concretan el proceso de la investigación. Para ello, es preciso revisar las temáticas relacionadas con: la formación inicial y permanente, planes y programas de estudio, contenidos que se enseñan y aprenden en la actividad física escolar (dentro y fuera del horario lectivo), la presencia de los valores, los diferentes elementos que constituyen los diseños curriculares, así como todo, aquello que convierte a esta disciplina en una destacada propuesta formativa y de socialización.

The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: A classroom experiment

Paper was revised on 2009-11-11.-- Published as article in: Rationality and Society (2009), 21(2), 1-24.

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

Strategies and options for increasing and sustaining fisheries and aquaculture production to benefit poorer households in Asia

The last three decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the structure of supply and demand for fish, especially in Asia. This WorldFish research study sponsored by the Asian Development Bank focussed on nine developing countries – Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam, all active players in the transformation of global fish supply and demand. The study, broken into five components and reported here, considered: 1) the profile of key aquaculture technologies and fishing practices; 2) analysis of policies, institutions and support services; 3) socioeconomic profile of major stakeholders in the fisheries sector; 4) projections of fish demand and supply in the nine Asian countries; and 5) formulation of national action plans based on the findings and recommendations of the study.

Deportividad y violencia en el fútbol base: un programa de evaluación y de prevención de partidos de riesgo

Este trabajo ha recibido el “Primer Premio Delegación del Gobierno en Aragón a las buenas prácticas contra la delincuencia juvenil” (Convocatoria 2007).

Expected Fair Allocation in Farsighted Network Formation

I consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation rule. Players discount the future by a common factor. The pair formed by an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix is called expected fair if for every link in the network both participants gain, marginally, and in discounted, expected terms, the same from it; and it is called a pairwise network formation procedure if the probability that a link is created (or eliminated) is positive if the discounted, expected gains to its two participants are positive too. The main result is the existence, for the discount factor small enough, of an expected fair and pairwise network formation procedure where the allocation rule is component balanced, meaning it distributes the total value of any maximal connected subnetwork among its participants. This existence result holds for all discount factors when the pairwise network formation procedure is restricted. I finally provide some comparison with previous models of farsighted network formation.

Forward-looking Pairwise Stability in Networks with Externalities

We consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation rule. Players discount the future by a common factor. The pair formed by an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix is called a forward-looking network formation scheme if, first, the probability that a link is created is positive if the discounted, expected gains to its two participants are positive, and if, second, the probability that a link is eliminated is positive if the discounted, expected gains to at least one of its two participants are positive. The main result is the existence, for all discount factors and all value functions, of a forward-looking network formation scheme. Furthermore, we can always nd a forward-looking network formation scheme such that (i) the allocation rule is component balanced and (ii) the transition probabilities increase in the di erence in payo s for the corresponding players responsible for the transition. We use this dynamic solution concept to explore the tension between e ciency and stability.

Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger.

Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.

Características antropométricas, condición física y velocidad de lanzamiento en balonmano de élite y amateur

166 p.

Fiabilidad de diferentes pruebas que se utilizan para evaluar el riesgo de lesión del miembro inferior en mujeres deportistas

233 p. : il. + anexo (247 p.)

Unilateral vs. Bilateral link-formation: Bridging the gap

We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky' s model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way fl ow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In the model introduced and studied here a link can be created unilaterally. When it is only supported by one of the two players the fl ow through the link suffers a certain decay, but when it is supported by both the fl ow runs without friction. When the decay in links supported by only one player is maximal (i.e. there is no flow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky 's connections model without decay, while when flow in such links is perfect we have Bala and Goyal' s two-way flow model. We study Nash, strict Nash and pairwise stability for the intermediate models. Efficiency and dynamics are also examined.

Non-governmental organizations and multi-sited marine conservation science: A case study

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are now major players in the realm of environmental conservation. While many environmental NGOs started as national organizations focused around single-species protection, governmental advocacy, and preservation of wilderness, the largest now produce applied conservation science and work with national and international stakeholders to develop conservation solutions that work in tandem with local aspirations. Marine managed areas (MMAs) are increasingly being used as a tool to manage anthropogenic stressors on marine resources and protect marine biodiversity. However, the science of MMA is far from complete. Conservation International (CI) is concluding a 5 year, $12.5 million dollar Marine Management Area Science (MMAS) initiative. There are 45 scientific projects recently completed, with four main “nodes” of research and conservation work: Panama, Fiji, Brazil, and Belize. Research projects have included MMA ecological monitoring, socioeconomic monitoring, cultural roles monitoring, economic valuation studies, and others. MMAS has the goals of conducting marine management area research, building local capacity, and using the results of the research to promote marine conservation policy outcomes at project sites. How science is translated into policy action is a major area of interest for science and technology scholars (Cash and Clark 2001; Haas 2004; Jasanoff et al. 2002). For science to move policy there must be work across “boundaries” (Jasanoff 1987). Boundaries are defined as the “socially constructed and negotiated borders between science and policy, between disciplines, across nations, and across multiple levels” (Cash et al. 2001). Working across the science-policy boundary requires boundary organizations (Guston 1999) with accountability to both sides of the boundary, among other attributes. (Guston 1999; Clark et al. 2002). This paper provides a unique case study illustrating how there are clear advantages to collaborative science. Through the MMAS initiative, CI built accountability into both sides of the science-policy boundary primarily through having scientific projects fed through strong in-country partners and being folded into the work of ongoing conservation processes. This collaborative, boundary-spanning approach led to many advantages, including cost sharing, increased local responsiveness and input, better local capacity building, and laying a foundation for future conservation outcomes. As such, MMAS can provide strong lessons for other organizations planning to get involved in multi-site conservation science. (PDF contains 3 pages)

Markets and microstructure

This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncovering parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theoretic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.

In chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empirical evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market counterparts.

In chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven Development is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects. While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and the final player--the targeted community member--decides between whistle blowing or not. Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid process with case studies which claim otherwise.

In chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.