Presidents and parties in regional politics: Italy and Spain compared

This article examines the relationship between political parties and regional presidents in Italy and Spain, adopting a comparative case study approach based on extensive archival analysis and in-depth interviews with regional politicians. The findings confirm a strong pattern of growing presidentialism at regional level, regardless of whether there are formal mechanisms for direct election, and regardless of the partisan composition of regional government. Regional presidents tend to exert their growing power through a personalised control of regional party organisations, rather than governing past parties in a direct appeal to the electorate. Nevertheless, parties can still present a significant constraint on regional presidents, so successful regional presidents tend to maintain a mediating form of leadership and fully exploit the opportunities for party patronage to build up their support and smooth governing tensions. An autonomist drive helps presidents hold together disparate coalitions or loose parties at regional level, but their lack of internal coherence presents major problems when it comes to political succession.

Perceived competition explains regional differences in stereotype content of immigrant groups

This research investigates differences in the stereotype content of immigrant groups between linguistic regions. We expected that immigrant groups who speak the local language of a specific linguistic region would be perceived as more competitive within this region than in another linguistic region. Further, we expected these differences would underlie regional differences in stereotype content, albeit only for the warmth dimension. Predictions were tested in the two largest linguistic regions of Switzerland. As expected, in the German-speaking region, locals perceived German immigrants as more competitive and thus as less warm, whereas in the French-speaking region, locals perceived French immigrants as more competitive and, consequently, as less warm. So, paradoxically, immigrants with strong integration potential are particularly disliked because they are regarded as direct competitors.

From Opacity to Transparency? The Place of Organized Interests within the European Institutions

Regulació dels Grup d'interès en la governança europea és crucial per a una comprensió completa de com s'exerceix el poder a la Unió Europea (UE) i per a una descripció més precisa de com funciona el sistema polític de la UE (i dels seus principis subjacents). Un dels temes principals aquí és com els interessos privats o particulars comprometre amb un interès general o públic encarnat en una forma o altra per aquells que actuen per a la UE. Donada la varietat de temes sensibles en joc, no és d'estranyar que la qüestió de la regulació es troba amb una resistència considerable, sobre tot en la Comissió. No obstant això, els recents obstacles a la integració europea han tingut l'efecte de rellançar un debat que fa que l'ètica i la transparència de les peces centrals de l'agenda. Dinàmiques polítiques actuals semblen donar testimoni d'una creixent receptivitat de la UE a les reivindicacions del moviment ALTER-EU que busca un entorn molt més regulat per cabilderos i funcionaris comunitaris.

Cohesion, competition and contradiction: INTERREG and Franco-British Cross border co-operation

Aquest article resumeix el desenvolupament del programa INTERREG i la cooperació a la frontera franc-britànica en els últims vint anys. Això és seguit per una anàlisi de la forma transfronterera cooperació pot entendre recorrent a les discussions conceptuals de canviar la governança europea i les relacions de poder entre els diferents nivells de govern. Aquestes idees conceptuals proporcionen un context per a un examen en profunditat de la iniciativa INTERREG IIIA, a la frontera franc-britànica que es destaquen alguns dels principals problemes i les contradiccions de la cooperació transfronterera.

The Impact of the Electoral System on Political Campaigning : Are Candidates for the Council of States More Moderate than their Fellow Candidates for the National Council ?

It is commonly believed that majority voting enhances parties to cluster around the centre of the political space, whereas proportional systems (PR) foster great ideological divergence. The theoretical arguments for these expectations go back to the work of Downs (1957) and Duverger (1954). More recent studies, however, produced quite contradictory empirical findings. In this paper I will test whether similar arguments hold true for the positioning of candidates campaigning in different electoral systems. The elections for the two chambers of the Swiss Parliament and the data from the Swiss Electoral Studies (SELECTS) and the Swiss Voting Advice Application (VAA) smartvote offer an excellent - almost laboratory like - opportunity to do so empirically. The analyses show clearly, the theoretical claims that majority voting necessarily fosters more moderate positions find no support. The candidates for the Council of States, elected in a majority system, are not more moderate than their fellow party candidates for the National Council which are elected in a PR system.

The Impact of advice on women's and men's selection into competition

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how advice affects the gender gap in the entry into a real-effort tournament. Our experiment is motivated by the concerns raised by approaching the gender gap through affirmative action. Advice is given by subjects who have already had some experience with the participation decision. We show that advice improves the entry decision of subjects, in that forgone earnings due to wrong entry decisions go significantly down. This is mainly driven by significantly increased entry of strong performing women, who also become significantly more confident, and reduced entry of weak performing men.

Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Sales restriction, quality selection and the mode of competition

A regulator imposing “sales restrictions” on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition

Local Competition, Inbreeding, and the Evolution of Sex-Biased Dispersal.

Using game theory, we developed a kin-selection model to investigate the consequences of local competition and inbreeding depression on the evolution of natal dispersal. Mating systems have the potential to favor strong sex biases in dispersal because sex differences in potential reproductive success affect the balance between local resource competition and local mate competition. No bias is expected when local competition equally affects males and females, as happens in monogamous systems and also in polygynous or promiscuous ones as long as female fitness is limited by extrinsic factors (breeding resources). In contrast, a male-biased dispersal is predicted when local mate competition exceeds local resource competition, as happens under polygyny/promiscuity when female fitness is limited by intrinsic factors (maximal rate of processing resources rather than resources themselves). This bias is reinforced by among-sex interactions: female philopatry enhances breeding opportunities for related males, while male dispersal decreases the chances that related females will inbreed. These results meet empirical patterns in mammals: polygynous/promiscuous species usually display a male-biased dispersal, while both sexes disperse in monogamous species. A parallel is drawn with sex-ratio theory, which also predicts biases toward the sex that suffers less from local competition. Optimal sex ratios and optimal sex-specific dispersal show mutual dependence, which argues for the development of coevolution models.

Capitalism in the classroom : the impact of self-enhancement values and normative assessment on student motivation, goals and attitudes towards cheating

Abstract The neo-liberal capitalist ideology has come under heavy fire with anecdotal evidence indicating a link between these same values and unethical behavior. Academic institutions reflect social values and act as socializing agents for the young. Can this explain the high and increasing rates of cheating that currently prevail in education? Our first chapter examines the question of whether self-enhancement values of power and açhievement, the individual level equivalent of neo-liberal capitalist values, predict positive attitudes towards cheating. Furthermore, we explore the mediating role of motivational factors. Results of four studies reveal that self-enhancement value endorsement predicts the adoption of performance-approach goals, a relationship mediated by introjected regulation, namely desire for social approval and that self-enhancement value endorsement also predicts the condoning of cheating, a relationship mediated by performance-approach goal adoption. However, self-transcendence values prescribed by a normatively salient source have the potential to reduce the link between self-enhancement value endorsément and attitudes towards cheating. Normative assessment constitutes a key tool used by academic institutions to socialize young people to accept the competitive, meritocratic nature of a sociéty driven by a neo-liberal capitalist ideology. As such, the manifest function of grades is to motivate students to work hard and to buy into the competing ethos. Does normative assessment fulfill these functions? Our second chapter explores the reward-intrinsic motivation question in the context of grading, arguably a high-stakes reward. In two experiments, the relative capacity of graded high performance as compared to the task autonomy experienced in an ungraded task to predict post-task intrinsic motivation is assessed. Results show that whilst the graded task performance predicts post-task appreciation, it fails to predict ongoing motivation. However, perceived autonomy experienced in non-graded condition, predicts both post-task appreciation and ongoing motivation. Our third chapter asks whether normative assessment inspires the spirit of competition in students. Results of three experimental studies reveal that expectation of a grade for a task, compared to no grade, induces greater adoption of performance-avoidance, but not performance-approach, goals. Experiment 3 provides an explanatory mechanism for this, showing that reduced autonomous motivation experienced in previous graded tasks mediates the relationship between grading and adoption of performance avoidance goals in a subsequent task. The above results, when combined, provide evidence as to the deleterious effects of self enhancement values and the associated practice of normative assessment in school on student motivation, goals and ethics. We conclude by using value and motivation theory to explore solutions to this problem.