Preliminary Observations on Program Instability

This white paper reports emerging findings at the end of Phase I of the Lean Aircraft Initiative in the Policy focus group area. Specifically, it provides details about research on program instability. Its objective is to discuss high-level findings detailing: 1) the relative contribution of different factors to a program’s overall instability; 2) the cost impact of program instability on acquisition programs; and 3) some strategies recommended by program managers for overcoming and/or mitigating the negative effects of program instability on their programs. Because this report comes as this research is underway, this is not meant to be a definitive document on the subject. Rather, is it anticipated that this research may potentially produce a number of reports on program instability-related topics. The government managers of military acquisition programs rated annual budget or production rate changes, changes in requirements, and technical difficulties as the three top contributors, respectively, to program instability. When asked to partition actual variance in their program’s planned cost and schedule to each of these factors, it was found that the combined effects of unplanned budget and requirement changes accounted for 5.2% annual cost growth and 20% total program schedule slip. At a rate of approximately 5% annual cost growth from these factors, it is easy to see that even conservative estimates of the cost benefits to be gained from acquisition reforms and process improvements can quickly be eclipsed by the added cost associated with program instability. Program management practices involving the integration of stakeholders from throughout the value chain into the decision making process were rated the most effective at avoiding program instability. The use of advanced information technologies was rated the most effective at mitigating the negative impact of program instability.

Modeling of hybrid systems by piecewise decomposition

Piecewise linear models systems arise as mathematical models of systems in many practical applications, often from linearization for nonlinear systems. There are two main approaches of dealing with these systems according to their continuous or discrete-time aspects. We propose an approach which is based on the state transformation, more particularly the partition of the phase portrait in different regions where each subregion is modeled as a two-dimensional linear time invariant system. Then the Takagi-Sugeno model, which is a combination of local model is calculated. The simulation results show that the Alpha partition is well-suited for dealing with such a system

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Exam 99 pdf

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Lecture notes

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Lecture notes

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Exercise sheet 9

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Lecture notes pdf

Lecture notes in PDF

Exam 99

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Exercise sheet 9 pdf

Exercises and solutions in PDF

Análisis del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional como modelo de guerrilla estética, a la luz de la teoría de la resistencia planteada por Jacques Rancière

Justo ahora, cuando parece haberse agotado el entendimiento del zapatismo como movimiento revolucionario tradicional, esta monografía propone dar un doble salto mortal para destruir las barreras obsoletas de las teorías revolucionarias y aterrizar en lo que Rancière llama la Resistencia de los Sin Parte. El alarido bestial se transforma en palabra para sacudir las estructuras más íntimas del orden y actualizar la pésima partición de los lugares y las funciones comunes en la comunidad. Las partes mal contadas acceden a la palabra para reclamar una partición justa de lo común, e inscribir así las libertades como axiomas para el todo comunitario. Lo descolorido toma color, lo oculto es visto, lo incontado entra en el conteo de las partes, lo que no tiene rostro ni voz es ahora escuchado, las sombras adquieren cuerpos y los cuerpos adquieren vida. La resistencia por la incorporación cambió para siempre la política tradicional mexicana, al punto de que ésta ha dejado de llamarse como tal para quien escribió esta investigación. La palabra común, la imagen del líder Marcos, y los símbolos como el pasamontañas, hacen que la rebelión zapatista sea una rebelión desde y para los sin parte, una voz para incorporar a los sin voz: el rostro indefinido de una máscara que defiende con enjundia a los olvidados y los devuelve a la arena de los vistos. Chiapas habla, los fantasmas resucitan, las partes mal contadas reclaman una justa partición de lo visible en la comunidad. Marcos y los suyo se han salido con la suya.

Software Development: Testing

This presentation discusses the role and purpose of testing in the systems/Software Development Life Cycle. We examine the consequences of the 'cost curve' on defect removal and how agile methods can reduce its effects. We concentrate on Black Box Testing and use Equivalence Partitioning and Boundary Value Analysis to construct the smallest number of test cases, test scenarios necessary for a test plan.

A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

Labor supply, biased technological change and economic growth

Se utiliza un modelo de innovaciones sesgadas para estudiar los efectos de cambios exógenos en la oferta laboral. En un contexto de innovaciones sesgadas, a medida que las economías acumulan capital, el trabajo se hace relativamente más escaso y más caro, por este motivo, hay incentivos para adoptar tecnologías ahorradoras de trabajo. Del mismo modo un cambio en la oferta laboral afecta la abundancia de factores y sus precios relativos. En general, una reducción de la oferta laboral, hace que el trabajo sea más caro y genera incentivos para cambio tecnológico ahorrador de trabajo. Así, el efecto inicial que tiene el cambio en la oferta laboral sobre los precios de los factores es mitigado por el cambio tecnológico. Finalmente, los movimientos en la remuneración a los factores afectan las decisiones de ahorro y, por lo tanto, la dinámica del crecimiento. En este trabajo se exploran las consecuencias de una reducción de la oferta laboral en dos contextos teóricos diferentes: un modelo de agentes homogéneos y horizonte infinito y un modelo de generaciones traslapadas.

Heterogeneity and the formation of risk - sharing coalitions

We offer a new explanation of partial risk sharing based on coalition formation and segmentation of society in a risky environment, without assuming limited commitment and imperfect information. Heterogenous individuals in a society freely choose with whom they will share risk. A partition belonging to the core of the membership game obtains. Perfect risk sharing does not necessarily arise. Focusing on mutual insurance rule and assuming that individuals only differ with respect to risk, we show that the core partition is homophily-based. The distribution of risk affects the number and size of these coalitions. Individuals may pay a lower risk premium in riskier societies. A higher heterogeneity in risk leads to a lower degree of risk sharing. We discuss how the endogenous partition of society into risk-sharing coalitions may shed light on empirical evidence on partial risk sharing. The case of heterogenous risk aversion leads to similar results.