Evaluating the impact of securities regulation on venture capital markets /

"Planning Office, National Bureau of Standards."

Venture capital investment of Illinois' public pension fund and retirement system assets.

Mode of access: Internet.

Venture capital resource directory.

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ANÁLISE DA ASSOCIAÇÃO DE OPERAÇÕES DE CAPITALIZAÇÃO DE PRIVATE EQUITY E VENTURE CAPITAL NO DESEMPENHO DE EMPRESAS COM AÇÕES NA BOVESPA

A vantagem competitiva e o desempenho organizacional são conceitos administrativos estreitamente ligados à competitividade das empresas e sua permanência no mercado a longo prazo. Para que alcancem tal objetivo, de acordo com os fundamentos da RBV, as capacidades organizacionais dessas empresas devem ser dinâmicas, o que significa estar à frente das mudanças ambientais, mantendo, criando e desenvolvendo novas capacidades. Um dos caminhos para que isso se realize é a aposta na sua capitalização, que pode ocorrer com a captação de recursos de terceiros ou recursos próprios, com maior ou menor grau de risco. A captação de recursos com capital de terceiros acontece, principalmente, via instituições financeiras e factorings. A captação por meio de capital próprio pode ocorrer por retenção de lucros ou pelo underwriting. A emissão feita via mercado primário configura a oferta pública inicial de ações ou Initial Public Offering (IPO). No Brasil, a escolha dos fundos de Private Equity e Venture Capital, segmentos do mercado financeiro que consistem fundamentalmente em aporte temporário de capital, vem crescendo consideravelmente nos últimos anos. Contudo, existem poucas pesquisas a respeito da utilização e do desempenho financeiro que esses fundos trazem para as empresas. O presente estudo procura averiguar se as empresas que estavam listadas na BOVESPA no período de 2002 a 2008 e que receberam recursos via Private Equity e Venture Capital com IPO desenvolveram desempenho financeiro superior às que receberam ou não outros tipos de financiamento no mesmo período. Foram selecionados dados secundários como: balanços patrimoniais, demonstração de resultados e valores das ações, utilizando-se da base de dados da Economática. Tomando o logaritmo do Q de Tobin como variável dependente e log_Ativo, Debt to Equity, ROA, crescimento de vendas, crescimento de investimentos, crescimento investimento Fama e CrescInv_endividamento como variáveis de controle, foram aplicados testes estatísticos, comparando a média dos índices, seguidos de análise por setor econômico, subsetor e segmento. Os resultados encontrados apontam que as empresas que receberam recursos via Private Equity e Venture Capital com IPO, tornaram-se diferentes das demais empresas que estavam listadas na BOVESPA naquele período. O presente trabalho busca, dessa forma, contribuir para o enriquecimento de conhecimento acadêmico acerca do tema.(AU)

Institutional environment, innovative entrepreneurial entry and venture capital financing

We analyse the determinants of high growth expectations entrepreneurial entry (HGE) using individual data drawn on working age population, based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for the 1998-2004 period. Individual level explanatory variables are combined with country-level factors. Our results suggest that availability of venture capital and intellectual proper rights protection are strong predictors of HGE. In addition, we also find that innovative start-ups are associated with highest growth expectations in countries with extensive supply of venture capital and strongest intellectual property rights. Once we introduce venture capital, we detect no significant effects of other elements of financial systems on high-powered entry.

Speciális kockázatok és kockázatkezelés a kockázatitőke-finanszírozásban (The special risks and risk management of venture capital)

A tanulmányban a szerzők arra a kérdésre keresik a választ, hogy az aszimmetrikus információk hatására a vállalkozók és a befektetők között kialakuló megbízó-ügynök viszonynak melyek a speciális vetületei a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás vonatkozásában. A szerzők arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a hiányos információk, a megbízó-ügynök viszony, illetve az ügyletek speciális jellege miatt fokozottan jelentkező ügynökprobléma kezelésére a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás szereplői speciális kockázatkezelési technikákat alkalmaznak. Ilyenek a magas elvárt hozamok, a szigorú kiválasztási kritériumok, a speciális befektetési vagy szindikátusi szerződések, a befektetést követő monitoring tevékenység, a több lépcsőben történő finanszírozás és a portfólióvállalatok hálózatba szervezése. A speciális kockázati megközelítés következtében a befektetéseket opciós szemlélet is áthatja. _____ This paper focuses on the special aspects of imperfect information in case of venture capital financing including principal-agent relationship between entrepreneurs and investors as well as adverse selection that evolves as a result of information asymmetries. The authors’ finding is that venture capital is able to manage the problems caused by imperfect information via applying divers risk management techniques such as high profit expectations, scrutiny of portfolio-companies, the use of special contracting stipulations and syndicate agreements, the monitoring of investments, multi-staged financing of companies and the integration of portfolio-companies into networks. In addition to the risk management techniques the authors also give the interpretation of the unique attitude of venture capital toward uncertainty and its special real option-like risk valuation approach that makes venture capitalists capable of handling high uncertainty under imperfect information.

The risk of adverse selection and its management in the process of venture capital investment (The experience of Hungarian investors)

Venture capitalists can be regarded as financers of young, high-risk enterprises, seeking investments with a high growth potential and offering professional support above and beyond their capital investment. The aim of this study is to analyse the occurrence of information asymmetry between venture capital investors and entrepreneurs, with special regard to the problem of adverse selection. In the course of my empirical research, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10 venture capital investors. The aim of the research was to elicit their opinions about the situation regarding information asymmetry, how they deal with problems arising from adverse selection, and what measures they take to manage these within the investment process. In the interviews we also touched upon how investors evaluate state intervention, and how much they believe company managers are influenced by state support.

EU-s források a vállalkozások tőkeellátottságának javítására - A JEREMIE Kockázati Tőkeprogram (EU funds to improve the capitalization of the companies – JEREMIE Venture Capital Program)

A hazai kis- és középvállalkozások (kkv-k) tőkeellátottságának javítása meghatározó szerepet játszik fejlődésük előmozdításában. Jelen tanulmány az Új Széchenyi Terv (ÚSZT) keretében a vállalkozások rendelkezésére álló pénzügyi eszközök közül a kockázati tőke működését mutatja be. A fejlődésük növekedési ciklusában járó cégek mellett a korai életszakaszukban járó, innovatív tevékenységet folytató, gyors növekedésre képes, de forráshiányos vállalkozások finanszírozásában nyújthat segítséget Magyarországon a 2010-ben elindult JEREMIE Kockázati Tőkeprogram. Az állami és a privát tulajdonban levő piaci szereplők hazánkban újnak mondható együttműködése révén megvalósuló program a magyar kockázatitőke-piac kínálati oldalának bővítését szolgálja, abban az alsó (döntően az 1-1,5 millió EUR/tranzakció alatti) szegmensben, ahol a tisztán piaci alapon működő befektetők korlátozottabb szerepvállalása figyelhető meg, és így a piacon hiány jelentkezik. Az EU-s támogatások ezen új típusú felhasználási formája színesíti és kibővíti a vállalkozások számára elérhető pénzügyi eszközök körét és volumenét, fokozottabb mértékben érvényesül a piaci szemlélet, hiszen verseny van a forrásokért, és verseny van a források kihelyezését végző pénzügyi közvetítő szervezetek között is, mindezek mellett további magánforrások bevonását biztosítja, ösztönzőleg hat a cégek működésére, és a visszaforgó rendszer biztosítja a fenntarthatóságot, a források későbbi újbóli felhasználását is. _______ To improve the capitalization of the domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has a decisive role in promoting development. This study presents the operation of venture capital from the available business financial instruments of the New Széchenyi Plan. In Hungary the JEREMIE Venture Capital Program, which launched in 2010, can help in financing of the rapidly growth, innovative, early life stage companies besides the development cycle of growth companies. This program with new cooperation between the stateowned and private companies enlarge the supply-side of the Hungarian venture capital market, at that the bottom (mostly in the 1 to 1.5 million EUR / transaction below) segment, where can be observed the limited role of the purely market-based investors, and thus there is a shortage in the market. These new type application form of the EU supports enriches and expands the scope and volume of the available financial instruments for the enterprises, the market orientation prevails more broadly, because there is a competition for resources and there is a competition between the resources allocation financial intermediaries,in addition ensures further private resources.

Formalization of the informal venture capital market - Business angel networks and syndicates

Business angels are natural persons who provide equity financing for young enterprises and gain ownership in them. They are usually anonym investors and they operate in the background of the companies. Their important feature is that over the funding of the enterprises based on their business experiences they can contribute to the success of the companies with their special expertise and with strategic support. As a result of the asymmetric information between the angels and the companies their matching is difficult (Becsky-Nagy – Fazekas 2015), and the fact, that angel investors prefer anonymity makes it harder for entrepreneurs to obtain informal venture capital. The primary aim of the different type of business angel organizations and networks is to alleviate this matching process with intermediation between the two parties. The role of these organizations is increasing in the informal venture capital market compared to the individually operating angels. The recognition of their economic importance led many governments to support them. There were also public initiations that aimed the establishment of these intermediary organizations that led to the institutionalization of business angels. This study via the characterization of business angels focuses on the progress of these informational intermediaries and their ways of development with regards to the international trends and the current situation of Hungarian business angels and angel networks.

The Life Cycle of Corporate Venture Capital

This paper establishes the life-cycle dynamics of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) to explore the information acquisition role of CVC investment in the process of corporate innovation. I exploit an identification strategy that allows me to isolate exogenous shocks to a firm's ability to innovate. Using this strategy, I first find that the CVC life cycle typically begins following a period of deteriorated corporate innovation and increasingly valuable external information, lending support to the hypothesis that firms conduct CVC investment to acquire information and innovation knowledge from startups. Building on this analysis, I show that CVCs acquire information by investing in companies with similar technological focus but have a different knowledge base. Following CVC investment, parent firms internalize the newly acquired knowledge into internal R&D and external acquisition decisions. Human capital renewal, such as hiring inventors who can integrate new innovation knowledge, is integral in this step. The CVC life cycle lasts about four years, terminating as innovation in the parent firm rebounds. These findings shed new light on discussions about firm boundaries, managing innovation, and corporate information choices.

Elastic limit: The role of university-focused venture capital firms in extending knowledge and technology transfer

This paper has two main objectives. Firstly, to identify the role of the university-focused intermediaries, specifically UVCs, in order to explain how they interact at the early stage of USO creation, particularly regarding knowledge sharing. Secondly, to analyse whether they change their position once the USO is developed. This gives rise to two Research Questions: How does knowledge sharing occur in the dynamics of a university-based entrepreneurial ecosystem? And Do particular participants, such as UTTOs or UVCs, always occupy the same role and position within the university-based entrepreneurial ecosystem?

Venture Capital for University Spin-Outs Companies in the context of University-based Entrepreneurial Ecosystems: an International Comparison

The objectives are, firstly, to identify the role of the university-focused intermediaries, specifically University-focused Venture Capital Firms (UVCs), in order to explain how they interact at the early stage of University Spin-out Companies (USOs) creation, particularly regarding knowledge sharing. Secondly, to analyse whether they change their position once the USO is developed, in the context of the dynamics of a university-based entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Entrepreneurship : Evidence from Family Firms and Venture-Capital Backed Firms

The purpose of this article is to investigate how ownership structure, especially family and/or venture-capital involvement, as well as entrepreneurial activities, defined as strategic change and renewal, help explain the involvement of independent members on boards of directors. The CEOs of 2,455 small and medium-sized, private enterprises from practically all industries were contacted in a telephone survey, resulting in an exceptionally high response rate. The findings reveal that family firms are more reluctant to involve independent directors on their boards than non-family firms that presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of independent board members and that ownership has an impact on board roles. The results do not support the hypothesised relationship that independent directors enhance entrepreneurial activities. One implication of our study is that the often-argued-for strategic contribution of outsiders to the boards in family firms may be overemphasised. Another implication is that family firms that choose to acquire additional capital should be aware that this could result in a change in the board composition and the loss of control of the business. However, new and external owners’ inclusion on the board seems to be negotiable since there are also venture capitalists that do not insist on board representation.

Managing a portfolio of corporate venture units : challenges in achieving within-unit focus and between-unit coordination

Principal Topic: There is increasing recognition that the organizational configurations of corporate venture units should depend on the types of ventures the unit seeks to develop (Burgelman, 1984; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). Distinction have been made between internal and external as well as exploitative versus explorative ventures (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008; Narayan et al., 2009; Schildt et al., 2005). Assuming that firms do not want to limit themselves to a single type of venture, but rather employ a portfolio of ventures, the logical consequence is that firms should employ multiple corporate venture units. Each venture unit tailor-made for the type of venture it seeks to develop. Surprisingly, there is limited attention in the literature for the challenges of managing multiple corporate venture units in a single firm. Maintaining multiple venture units within one firm provides easier access to funding for new ideas (Hamel, 1999). It allows for freedom and flexibility to tie the organizational systems (Rice et al., 2000), autonomy (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003), and involvement of management (Day, 1994; Wadwha and Kotha, 2006) to the requirements of the individual ventures. Yet, the strategic objectives of a venture may change when uncertainty around the venture is resolved (Burgelman, 1984). For example, firms may decide to spin-in external ventures (Chesbrough, 2002) or spun-out ventures that prove strategically unimportant (Burgelman, 1984). This suggests that ventures might need to be transferred between venture units, e.g. from a more internally-driven corporate venture division to a corporate venture capital unit. Several studies suggested that ventures require different managerial skills across their phase of development (Desouza et al., 2007; O'Connor and Ayers, 2005; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990; Westerman et al., 2006). To facilitate effective transfer between venture units and manage the overall venturing process, it is important that firms set up and manage integrative linkages. Integrative linkages provide synergies and coordination between differentiated units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Prior findings pointed to the important role of senior management (Westerman et al., 2006; Gilbert, 2006) and a shared organizational vision (Burgers et al., 2009) to coordinate venture units with mainstream businesses. We will draw on these literatures to investigate the key question of how to integratively manage multiple venture units. ---------- Methodology/Key Propositions: In order to seek an answer to the research question, we employ a case study approach that provides unique insights into how firms can break up their venturing process. We selected three Fortune 500 companies that employ multiple venturing units, IBM, Royal Dutch/ Shell and Nokia, and investigated and compared their approaches. It was important that the case companies somewhat differed in the type of venture units they employed as well as the way they integrate and coordinate their venture units. The data are based on extensive interviews and a variety of internal and external company documents to triangulate our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The key proposition of the article is that firms can best manage their multiple venture units through an ambidextrous design of loosely coupled units. This provides venture units with sufficient flexibility to employ organizational configurations that best support the type of venture they seek to develop, as well as provides sufficient integration to facilitate smooth transfer of ventures between venture units. Based on the case findings, we develop a generic framework for a new way of managing the venturing process through multiple corporate venture units. ---------- Results and Implications: One of our main findings is that these firms tend to organize their venture units according to phases in the venture development process. That is, they tend to have venture units aimed at incubation of venture ideas as well as units aimed more at the commercialization of ventures into a new business unit for the firm or a start-up. The companies in our case studies tended to coordinate venture units through integrative management skills or a coordinative venture unit that spanned multiple phases. We believe this paper makes two significant contributions. First, we extend prior venturing literature by addressing how firms manage a portfolio of venture units, each achieving different strategic objectives. Second, our framework provides recommendations on how firms should manage such an approach towards venturing. This helps to increase the likelihood of success of their venturing programs.