Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Psychopathie chez les individus non incarcérés et coopération dans un dilemme du prisonnier itératif

Au niveau interpersonnel, la psychopathie implique un manque de considération d’autrui pouvant se manifester par la tromperie, la manipulation et l’exploitation. La présente thèse a investigué la relation entre les caractéristiques psychopathiques d'individus non incarcérés et la tendance à coopérer dans un jeu du dilemme du prisonnier itératif. Un total de 85 hommes ont été recrutés via une annonce qui ciblait des traits de personnalité correspondant à des caractéristiques psychopathiques exprimées de façon non péjorative. Plusieurs méthodes ont été employées pour rejoindre les participants : 46 ont participés en personne après avoir répondu à une invitation affichée dans un journal local ainsi que sur des babillards à proximité d'une université; 39 ont complété l'étude sur Internet après avoir été recrutés via un site web de petites annonces. Chaque participant a répondu à un questionnaire incluant l’Échelle Auto-rapportée de Psychopathie (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) et l’Échelle Auto-rapportée des Indicateurs de Psychopathie de l’Enfance et de l’Adolescence (Seto, Khattar, Lalumière, & Quinsey, 1997). Ils ont également complété une simulation informatique du dilemme du prisonnier itératif comprenant 90 essais. La simulation informatique utilisée pour évaluer les participants en personne ainsi que la version accessible par Internet ont été conçues et programmées spécifiquement pour la présente thèse. La simulation informatique incluait trois stratégies souvent associées au dilemme du prisonnier itératif : donnant-donnant, donnant-donnant-généreux et gagne/reste-perd/change. Les analyses préliminaires ont montré que les participants vus en personne et ceux rejoints par Internet ne différaient pas en termes de variables sociodémographiques, des caractéristiques psychopathiques, de la désirabilité sociale et des réponses au dilemme du prisonnier. Une régression multiple standard a indiqué que les mesures psychopathiques ne pouvaient pas prédire le nombre total de choix coopératifs dans le jeu. Par contre, une corrélation négative a été trouvée entre les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives de la psychopathie et la coopération dans le premier tiers du jeu. De plus, les participants qui présentaient davantage de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives avaient plus souvent réussi à exploiter l'ordinateur en dénonçant alors que la simulation informatique coopérait. Des analyses multi-niveaux ont exploré la contribution de variables au niveau de la décision et au niveau de l'individu dans la prédiction du choix de coopérer ou de dénoncer lors de chaque essai du jeu; les interactions entre ces variables ont aussi été considérées. Les résultats ont montré que les variables au niveau de la décision influençaient généralement plus fortement les chances de coopérer que les variables au niveau de l'individu. Parmi les mesures de la psychopathie, seulement les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives ont montré une association significative avec les chances de coopérer; les interactions avec le premier choix effectué dans le jeu et le premier tiers du jeu étaient significatives. Ainsi, si un participant avait coopéré au premier essai, la présence de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives était associée à une diminution de ses chances de coopérer par la suite. Aussi, durant les 30 premiers essais du jeu, la présence de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives était associée à une diminution des chances de coopérer. La stratégie adoptée par la simulation informatique n'avait pas d'influence sur le lien entre les caractéristiques psychopathiques et la probabilité de coopérer. Toutefois, le fait de jouer contre donnant-donnant était associé à de plus fortes chances de coopérer d'un essai à l'autre pour l'ensemble des participants. Globalement, les résultats suggèrent que les hommes non incarcérés présentant des caractéristiques psychopathiques ne seraient pas nécessairement portés à choisir systématiquement la non-coopération. En fait, les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives de la psychopathie ont semblé se traduire par une tendance à faire bonne impression au départ, tenter rapidement d'exploiter autrui en dénonçant, puis finir par coopérer. Cette tendance comportementale est discutée, ainsi que la pertinence d'utiliser le dilemme du prisonnier itératif et les analyses multi-niveaux pour étudier le comportement interpersonnel des psychopathes.

Una nueva visión de la seguridad hemisférica en América Latina. El caso de Brasil frente a la visión hegemónica de Estados Unidos

La seguridad de los Estados, que ha sido el eje central del desarrollo tanto de las políticas mundiales como de la actividad de los organismos internacionales y de los gobiernos, ha sido objeto de reconceptualizaciones recientes como resultado de cambios sociopolíticos generados por el fenómeno de la globalización y el surgimiento de nuevas amenazas. A pesar de los obstáculos que permanentemente han impedido a lo largo del tempo consolidar un proyecto que vincule a todos los países del hemisferio americano y particularmente a aquellos situados al sur del Río Grande, diversos enfoques de seguridad han promovido la cooperación Sur-Sur, en parte liderada por Brasil, interesado en fomentar una integración de los países suramericanos en el marco del nuevo modelo de regionalismo abierto. Este proyecto, que no pierde de vista las amenazas transnacionales y la existencia de actores no estatales, se aleja de la visión hegemónica de los Estados Unidos en la que prevalece la defensa del territorio por medios militares y coercitivos y tiene como objetivo la defensa de intereses nacionales sin recurrir a confrontaciones violentas.

Braid groups of non-orientable surfaces and the Fadell-Neuwirth short exact sequence

Let M be a compact, connected non-orientable surface without boundary and of genus g >= 3. We investigate the pure braid groups P,(M) of M, and in particular the possible splitting of the Fadell-Neuwirth short exact sequence 1 -> P(m)(M \ {x(1), ..., x(n)}) hooked right arrow P(n+m)(M) (P*) under right arrow P(n)(M) -> 1, where m, n >= 1, and p* is the homomorphism which corresponds geometrically to forgetting the last m strings. This problem is equivalent to that of the existence of a section for the associated fibration p: F(n+m)(M) -> F(n)(M) of configuration spaces, defined by p((x(1), ..., x(n), x(n+1), ..., x(n+m))) = (x(1), ..., x(n)). We show that p and p* admit a section if and only if n = 1. Together with previous results, this completes the resolution of the splitting problem for surface pure braid groups. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation: : A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Competition and cooperation between international courts: a critical approach to the new paradigms of cross-border dispute resolution model

This article examines the arising cross-border dispute resolution models (Cooperation and Competition among national Courts) from a critical perspective. Although they have been conceived to surpass the ordinary solution of a Modern paradigm (exclusive jurisdiction, choice of court, lis pendens, forum non conveniens, among others), they are insufficient to deal with problems raised with present globalization, as they do not abandon aspects of that paradigm, namely, (i) statebased Law; and (ii) standardization of cultural issues.

HIV, EBV and KSHV: Viral cooperation in the pathogenesis of human malignancies

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC): new biregional trade and investment relations in a changing world economic environment$c

Includes bibliography

Latin American South-South integration and cooperation: from a regional public goods perspective

Includes bibliography

Non-contributory pensions: Bolivia and Antigua in an international context

Includes bibliography

Non-tax revenue of subnational governments: theoretical background, experience from an international perspective and recommendations

Includes bibliography

Internal standard for amorphous pharmaceuticals products quantification and an application of Parametric Rietveld refinement using time, temperature and relative humidity as 'non-crystallographic' parameters

Pós-graduação em Química - IQ

Reciprocal cooperation between unrelated rats depends on cost to donor and benefit to recipient

Background Although evolutionary models of cooperation build on the intuition that costs of the donor and benefits to the receiver are the most general fundamental parameters, it is largely unknown how they affect the decision of animals to cooperate with an unrelated social partner. Here we test experimentally whether costs to the donor and need of the receiver decide about the amount of help provided by unrelated rats in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Results Fourteen unrelated Norway rats were alternately presented to a cooperative or defective partner for whom they could provide food via a mechanical apparatus. Direct costs for this task and the need of the receiver were manipulated in two separate experiments. Rats provided more food to cooperative partners than to defectors (direct reciprocity). The propensity to discriminate between helpful and non-helpful social partners was contingent on costs: An experimentally increased resistance in one Newton steps to pull food for the social partner reduced the help provided to defectors more strongly than the help returned to cooperators. Furthermore, test rats provided more help to hungry receivers that were light or in poor condition, which might suggest empathy, whereas this relationship was inverse when experimental partners were satiated. Conclusions In a prisoner's dilemma situation rats seem to take effect of own costs and potential benefits to a receiver when deciding about helping a social partner, which confirms the predictions of reciprocal cooperation. Thus, factors that had been believed to be largely confined to human social behaviour apparently influence the behaviour of other social animals as well, despite widespread scepticism. Therefore our results shed new light on the biological basis of reciprocity.

Potentials and limitations of coordinated spatial and non-spatial information

Information management and geoinformation systems (GIS) have become indispensable in a large majority of protected areas all over the world. These tools are used for management purposes as well as for research and in recent years have become even more important for visitor information, education and communication. This study is divided into two parts: the first part provides a general overview of GIS and information management in a selected number of national park organizations. The second part lists and evaluates the needs of evolving large protected areas in Switzerland. The results show a wide use of GIS and information management tools in well established protected areas. The more isolated use of singular GIS tools has increasingly been replaced by an integrated geoinformation management. However, interview partners pointed out that human resources for GIS in most parks are limited. The interviews also highlight uneven access to national geodata. The view of integrated geoinformation management is not yet fully developed in the park projects in Switzerland. Short-term needs, such as software and data availability, motivate a large number of responses collected within an exhaustive questionnaire. Nevertheless, the need for coordinated action has been identified and should be followed up. The park organizations in North America show how an effective coordination and cooperation might be organized.

Youth Work and Schools in ‘Full-day’ education systems: International Comparison of Links between Formal and Non-formal Education

In this article I will outline the methodological approach of a non-empirical comparative research project which I began in 2003. The project is situated in the context of the research training group “Youth Welfare in Transition” at the universities of Bielefeld and Dortmund, funded by the German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). In that context I have organised an international conference about the modes of cooperation between school and youth work agencies with colleagues from Canada, France, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, and Germany. Meeting in Bielefeld from the 9th to the 11th of October 2003, we compared the respective national arrangements of formal and non-formal education (www.uni-bielefeld.de/paedagogik/agn/ag8/Ganztagsbildung.html). This note is based on the scheme of comparison which was given to the contributors in order to help them preparing their presentations. At the moment the scheme is nearing completed with significant data prepared by the contributors/authors (see Otto/Coelen 2004), supplemented with data from research works published in German and English. The next step will be to set up an empirical project about the relationships between schools and youth work agencies in three European countries (probably France, Finland and the Netherlands).