La incidència de l’aprovació de la LO 1/2004, de mesures de protecció integral contra la violència de gènere, a nivell institucional

L’obligació a partir de la LO 1/2004 de realitzar programes formatius en cas de suspensió o substitució d’una pena imposada per un delicte de violència de gènere ha suposat que els operadors jurídics, malgrat el recolzament majoritari a aquesta mesura, es mostrin en desacord amb l’obligatorietat i demanin més discrecionalitat.

Street-Level Bureaucracy and E-Government

With the intensive use of information and communication technologies, governments are transforming into e-governments. While public management research has given increased attention to this subject lately, this article reviews the limited literature that deals with the impacts of e-government technologies on street-level bureaucracies. A twofold argument is being developed. First, what can be called the 'curtailment thesis', stressing the reduction or disappearance of frontline policy discretion, is addressed. Second, the 'enablement thesis' gets attention, highlighting how technologies provide frontline workers and citizens with additional action resources. The article concludes with propositions for a future research agenda on the topic.

Guía para el desarrollo de Programas de intercambio de Jeringuillas (PIJ) desde la consulta de triage de los Dispositivos de Cuidados Críticos y Urgencias (DCCU)

There are exceptional situations where emergency services are required Primary Care in the application of material used by drug-dependent patients, being the response to this demand is something that many of the cases, to individual discretion and the randomness and variability every situation leads to an answer. It calls for a response commensurate to public services and preventive health philosophy in most cases will be carried out by the nurse to perform assistance Devices Critical Care (DCCU), often this first contact these patients and slots at the supply of resources diminishes the possibilities of acquisition of such material to them. That is why, and in the absence in this area of patient safety and professional, a workflow model and according to the prevailing philosophy of working in primary care in terms of prevention policies and recruitment of patients concerned, this project raises guidance for the development of a needle exchange program from the triage consultations DCCU.

Leader corruption depends on power and testosterone

We used incentivized experimental games to manipulate leader power-the number of followers and the discretion leaders had to enforce their will. Leaders had complete autonomy in deciding payouts to themselves and their followers. Although leaders could make prosocial decisions to benefit the public good they could also abuse their power by invoking antisocial decisions, which reduced the total payouts to the group but increased leader's earnings. In Study 1 (N = 478), we found that both amount of followers and discretionary choices independently predicted leader corruption. In Study 2 (N = 240), we examined how power and individual differences (e.g., personality, hormones) affected leader corruption over time; power interacted with testosterone in predicting corruption, which was highest when leader power and baseline testosterone were both high. Honesty predicted initial level of leader antisocial decisions; however, honesty did not shield leaders from the corruptive effect of power.

The prosecution service function within the spanish criminal justice system

The Spanish judicial system is independent and headed by the Supreme Court. Spain has a civil law system. The criminal procedure is governed by the legality principle--by opposition to the opportunity or expediency principle--which implies that prosecution must take place in all cases in which sufficient evidence exists of guilt. Traditionally, the role of the PPS in Spain has been very limited during the investigative stage of the process. That stage is under the responsibility of the Examining Magistrate (EM). Since the end of the 1980s, a series of modifications has been introduced in order to extend the functions of the PPS. In 1988, the PPS received extended competences which allow them to receive reports of offenses. Upon knowing of an offense (reported or known to have been committed), the PPS can initiate the criminal proceeding. The PPS is also allowed to lead a sort of plea bargain under a series of restrictive conditions and only for some offenses. At the same time, the PPS received extended competences in the juvenile justice criminal proceeding in 2000. With all this said, the role of the PPS has not changed radically and, during the investigative stage of the process, their main role remains the presentation of the accusation, playing a more active role during the trial stage of the proceeding. In this article the national criminal justice system of Spain is described. Special attention is paid to the function of the PPS within this framework and its relationship to police and courts. The article refers to legal provisions and the factual handling of criminal cases.

Influence of preoperative leg pain and radiculopathy on outcomes in mono-segmental lumbar total disc replacement: results from a nationwide registry.

PURPOSE: Currently, many pre-conditions are regarded as relative or absolute contraindications for lumbar total disc replacement (TDR). Radiculopathy is one among them. In Switzerland it is left to the surgeon's discretion when to operate if he adheres to a list of pre-defined indications. Contraindications, however, are less clearly specified. We hypothesized that, the extent of pre-operative radiculopathy results in different benefits for patients treated with mono-segmental lumbar TDR. We used patient perceived leg pain and its correlation with physician recorded radiculopathy for creating the patient groups to be compared. METHODS: The present study is based on the dataset of SWISSspine, a government mandated health technology assessment registry. Between March 2005 and April 2009, 577 patients underwent either mono- or bi-segmental lumbar TDR, which was documented in a prospective observational multicenter mode. A total of 416 cases with a mono-segmental procedure were included in the study. The data collection consisted of pre-operative and follow-up data (physician based) and clinical outcomes (NASS form, EQ-5D). A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was conducted with patients' self-indicated leg pain and the surgeon-based diagnosis "radiculopathy", as marked on the case report forms. As a result, patients were divided into two groups according to the severity of leg pain. The two groups were compared with regard to the pre-operative patient characteristics and pre- and post-operative pain on Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) and quality of life using general linear modeling. RESULTS: The optimal ROC model revealed a leg pain threshold of 40 ≤ VAS > 40 for the absence or the presence of "radiculopathy". Demographics in the resulting two groups were well comparable. Applying this threshold, the mean pre-operative leg pain level was 16.5 points in group 1 and 68.1 points in group 2 (p < 0.001). Back pain levels differed less with 63.6 points in group 1 and 72.6 in group 2 (p < 0.001). Pre-operative quality of life showed considerable differences with an 0.44 EQ-5D score in group 1 and 0.29 in group 2 (p < 0.001, possible score range -0.6 to 1). At a mean follow-up time of 8 months, group 1 showed a mean leg pain improvement of 3.6 points and group 2 of 41.1 points (p < 0.001). Back pain relief was 35.6 and 39.1 points, respectively (p = 0.27). EQ-5D score improvement was 0.27 in group 1 and 0.41 in group 2 (p = 0.11). CONCLUSIONS: Patients labeled as having radiculopathy (group 2) do mostly have pre-operative leg pain levels ≥ 40. Applying this threshold, the patients with pre-operative leg pain do also have more severe back pain and a considerably lower quality of life. Their net benefit from the lumbar TDR is higher and they do have similar post-operative back and leg pain levels as well as the quality of life as patients without pre-operative leg pain. Although randomized controlled trials are required to confirm these findings, they put leg pain and radiculopathy into perspective as absolute contraindications for TDR.

Pouvoir discrétionnaire et redevabilité de la bureaucratie de guichet : les taxateurs d'une caisse de chômage comme acteurs de mise en oeuvre

Résumé en français La thèse de doctorat porte, de manière générale, sur le rôle des acteurs administratifs dans la mise en oeuvre de l'action publique. En particulier, dans le contexte de l'implémentation de la politique suisse d'assurance-chômage, la recherche se focalise sur l'étude de la bureaucratie de guichet, à savoir un type spécifique d'administrations et d'agents publics situés aux premières lignes de l'action étatique et qui sont en contact direct et quotidien avec les usagers. La thèse a pour objectif principal d'obtenir une compréhension détaillée des impacts concrets dont sont porteurs deux types de réformes majeures du secteur public : les réformes de Nouvelle Gestion Publique (NGP) et les nouvelles technologies informatiques. Le questionnement central de la recherche consiste en une étude approfondie des effets de ces réformes sur les bureaucraties de guichet, et en particulier sur deux aspects centraux les concernant : d'une part, le niveau de pouvoir discrétionnaire que les agents publics de base disposent dans l'application de la loi fédérale sur l'assurance-chômage, autrement dit leur marge de manoeuvre ; d'autre part, les manières au travers desquelles ces mêmes agents sont appelés à rendre des comptes quant à leurs actions et leurs décisions, à savoir l'enjeu plus large de la redevabilité publique des acteurs administratifs. Ces enjeux ont été analysés au niveau empirique dans le contexte organisationnel d'une caisse publique cantonale de chômage ayant expérimenté les réformes évoquées ci-dessus. L'organisation choisie a été investiguée au travers d'une étude de cas ethnographique approfondie (observation directe du travail quotidien des agents, entretiens semi-directifs, analyse de documents) pendant une période de six mois environ entre 2008 et 2009. L'analyse empirique fournit quatre résultats : a) de manière générale, les taxateurs de la caisse de chômage disposent d'un faible niveau de pouvoir discrétionnaire ; b) le degré de pouvoir discrétionnaire varie selon le type de tâche ; c) les agents sur le terrain rendent des comptes auprès d'une multiplicité d'acteurs, sur une variété d'aspects de leur travail et au travers de différents mécanismes de contrôle ; d) les outils de NGP et les nouvelles technologies informatiques ont peu d'impact sur l'étendue du pouvoir discrétionnaire des agents mais contribuent à influencer le type de redevabilité publique pratiquée à ce niveau. Summary in English This PhD dissertation deals with the role of public administration in policy implementation. In the Swiss context of unemployment insurance policy, it focuses on street-level bureaucracy, a specific type of public organisations and agents located at the frontline of public action, that is to say low-level civil servants who are in direct, daily and face-to-face contact with citizens. The dissertation aims at a deep understanding of what are the concrete impacts of two main important changes touching public sector organizations : New Public Management reforms (NPM) and Information and Communication technologies (ICT). The main research question consists in assessing the impacts of those reforms on two central issues regarding street-level bureaucrats : on the one hand, the effective degree of discretion frontline agents do have in implementing the federal law on unemployment insurance ; on the other hand, the ways through which these bureaucrats are held accountable about their action and decisions, i.e. accountability regimes at the street-level. These issues have been empirically addressed in the organisational context of a cantonal Unemployment Insurance Funds having experienced the above mentioned reforms. The organisation has been investigated through an in-depth ethnographic case-study (direct observation of daily work, semi-structured interwiews, documentary analysis) in 2008 and 2009 for approximately six months. The empirical analysis indicates that a) in general, street-level agents do exert low degree of policy discretion; b) the level of discretion is variable from one specific task to another ; c) frontline workers are held accountable to many actors, on various aspects of their work and through different mechanisms of control ; d) NPM and ICT instruments have few impact on the issue of policy discretion but more on the type of street-level accountability which is concretely practised at this level.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Judges' cognition and market order

We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.