Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Les biens communs sans tragédie : effets de la pression sociale et des convictions

Pourquoi faire un effort pour la communauté sans rien recevoir en retour? C’est habituellement par conviction ou pour répondre à une norme sociale. En s’intéressant au problème du recyclage, nous définissons un modèle de comportement qui intègre ces deux facteurs. Nous déterminons sous quelles conditions un individu décide d’agir bénévolement, puis nous étudions comment ce comportement se propage dans la population. Cela nous permet de déduire comment un gouvernement doit pondérer ses efforts entre la publicité et la consigne pour tendre vers un taux de recyclage parfait au coût minimal. Nous prouvons aussi que dans certaines circonstances, il est préférable de ne pas encourager la participation au bien public. En effet, à mesure que plus de gens y participent, des tensions sociales émergent entre ceux qui font un effort et ceux qui n’en font pas. Celles-ci peuvent être assez fortes pour contrebalancer les bénéfices attendus du bien public

New institutional economics: it's nature, potential and the future

It is generally accepted that institutional problems have severely constrained development in many countries regardless of significant achievements in technology and other reforms. Both the Old and New Institutional Economics have relevance in understanding the lack of progress in many countries in Asia and Africa. Institutions generally refer to the "framework within which human interactions take place. Two major strands of NIE are the transaction costs and the collective action approach. The NIE implies that traditional rural institutions such as user groups, rotating credit and irrigation associations, interlinked credit etc. are institutions that have emerged in place of the market due to lower transactions costs. The successful management of common property resources such as water, forests, wetlands etc using local arrangements imply that institutions need to be interpreted in broader terms and the simple dichotomy of market or the government is too limited to understand the development process. New thinking is required in developing institutions that are structurally suited for management at the local level. Such an approach will have better chance to succeed compared to a process based upon the market.

Competition and unitization in oil extraction : a tale of two tragedies

This paper compares two organizational modes for extracting oil from a common pool: unitization and competitive extraction. The analysis suggests that the general presumption that unitization is surplus enhancing relative to competitive extraction may not always be valid due to contractual incompleteness associated with unitization contracts. While competitive extraction suffers from the tragedy of the commons, unitization can be subject to the dual tragedy of the anticommons. This provides an explanation for the puzzle confronting the oil industry that firms are often reluctant to voluntarily enter unitization agreements.

Análise econômica e histórica do instituto da unitização

O presente trabalho aborda o tema “Instituto da Unitização”, ou mesmo “Individualização da Produção”, conforme nomenclatura nacional, termos que designam o que vem a ser uma operação conjunta e coordenada de um reservatório de petróleo, gás natural ou ambos por todas as partes com direitos de propriedade sobre as áreas por onde se estende o reservatório. Os conceitos de Unitização serão estudados e abordados segundo contexto da indústria do petróleo em seus elementos técnicos, jurídicos e econômicos. À luz da Teoria Econômica, serão analisados os Fundamentos do Instituto da Unitização e a evolução de sua aplicação no contexto nacional e internacional.

Venda de ativos operacionais e assimetria de informação: estudo comparativo entre o regime jurídico do contrato de trespasse e da recuperação judicial

Primeiramente, o presente trabalho se presta a demonstrar a relevância da recuperação judicial de empresas no que diz respeito à maximização de valor dos bens, considerados em conjunto (valor de going concern), quando mantidos operacionais, conforme teoria do common pool assets. Posteriormente, será verificado como deve ser a estruturação do regime legal da venda de ativos de forma a maximizar valor dos bens alienados, juntamente com uma comparação entre os regimes jurídicos do contrato de trespasse, regulado pelo Código Civil de 2002, e da recuperação judicial, estabelecido na Lei 11.101/05, especificamente no que diz respeito à venda de unidades produtivas isoladas. A diferenciação dos institutos do trespasse e da recuperação judicial será feita principalmente com base em características relacionadas à sucessão do passivo do estabelecimento comercial (ou unidade produtiva) no momento de sua alienação a terceiros, e como a assimetria de informação pode influenciar na maximização do valor, no momento da venda dos bens, em cada um dos regimes.

O tratamento dos contratos de locação comercial de devedor locatário em recuperação judicial: uma análise à luz das tensões entre o direito material e concursal

Este estudo tem o objetivo de verificar o tratamento dado aos contratos de Locação Comercial de Devedor Locatário em Recuperação Judicial. A lei 11.101/2005 determina, em seus artigos 117 e 119,VII, que os contratos bilaterais não se resolvem pela falência e que na falência do locatário, o administrador judicial pode, a qualquer tempo, denunciar o contrato. Porém, a lei é lacônica a respeito do processo de Recuperação Judicial. Então, o estudo pretende verificar a aplicabilidade dos artigos pertinentes à falência, aos contratos de Devedor submetido ao processo de Recuperação Judicial. Com o intuito de realizar interpretação congruente com a eficiência que se espera da legislação em comento, a metodologia utilizada no trabalho é a da Análise Econômica do Direito, segundo os contornos conferidos pelo autor THOMAS H. JACKSON. Assim, o trabalho aproveita os conceitos do common pool assets e dos executory contracts para auxiliar na compreensão da função dos contratos de locação no Processo de Recuperação Judicial. Nesse sentido, o estudo é importante, pois estabelece parâmetros de interpretação teleológica da legislação concursal, considerando-se as tensões entre o Direito Material e Concursal aplicáveis a hipótese aqui formulada. Então, constatou-se que o tema gera divergência de entendimentos perante a jurisprudência brasileira, no que se refere a possibilidade, ou não, de despejar locatário Devedor em Recuperação Judicial. A controvérsia ronda, principalmente, em torno de duas questões: (a) a aplicação do principio da preservação da empresa, presente no art. 47. da L.11.101/2005 (b) (i)liquidez da ação de despejo por falta de pagamento para fins do artigo 6 da mesma lei. Por fim, o estudo avalia forma pela qual a jurisprudência trata do tema e a sua compatibilidade com a metodologia de Análise Econômica Aplicável ao Direito Concursal.

Essays in applied microeconomics

Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, ``Risk Taking in Tournaments", é considerado um torneio dinâmico no qual jogadores escolhem como alocar seu tempo em atividades que envolvem risco. No segundo artigo, ``Unitização de Jazidas de Petróleo: Uma Aplicação do Modelo de Green e Porter" é analisado a factibilidade de se haver um acordo de cooperação em um ambiente de common-pool com incerteza nos custos das empresas. No terceiro artigo, ``Oilfield Unitization Under Dual Fiscal Regime: The Regulator Role over the Bargaining", por sua vez, é estudado a unitização quando existem dois regimes fiscais distintos, como os jogadores se beneficiam disso e o papel do regulador no regime de partilha.

A cooperação em crianças de rede pública de Natal/RN:uma abordagem evolucionista

Cooperation is a well known behavior and influenced by all cultures. Probably selective pressures brought advantages to individuals that cooperate, and then this behavior is current in human societies. Most of it is studied about cooperation and natural selection was understood by the game theory, a mathematical approach that helps to understand the conflict and cooperation. We believe that natural selection and game theory could facilitate understanding these behaviors and two theoretical articles were written regarding this view. It was also found that most of data about cooperation was obtained in (with) adults. Since game theory is effective to understand this phenomenon, and to be used and understood, two games were used with five and eleven year old children: the common pool and public goods games. The results are presented in four empirical articles. We found that children respond to social dilemmas of game theory like the adults do. They adjust their rounds regarding the feedback obtained of their partness; in the beginning they cooperate and reduce the degree of cooperation along (throughout) the following session; in the absence of punition the level of opportunism increased, mainly in larger groups; boys and girls behave differently when donate. This research suggest that cooperation has an evolutionary basis in human and it is since earlier in the behavioral pattern shown by adults.

Aquatic insects as the main food resource of fish the community in a Neotropical reservoir

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

A threshold hypothesis of institutional change: collective action in the Italian Alps during the 13th - 19th centuries.

This dissertation is about collective action issues in common property resources. Its focus is the “threshold hypothesis,” which posits the existence of a threshold in group size that drives the process of institutional change. This hypothesis is tested using a six-century dataset concerning the management of the commons by hundreds of communities in the Italian Alps. The analysis seeks to determine the group size threshold and the institutional changes that occur when groups cross this threshold. There are five main findings. First, the number of individuals in villages remained stable for six centuries, despite the population in the region tripling in the same period. Second, the longitudinal analysis of face-to-face assemblies and community size led to the empirical identification of a threshold size that triggered the transition from informal to more formal regimes to manage common property resources. Third, when groups increased in size, gradual organizational changes took place: large groups split into independent subgroups or structured interactions into multiple layers while maintaining a single formal organization. Fourth, resource heterogeneity seemed to have had no significant impact on various institutional characteristics. Fifth, social heterogeneity showed statistically significant impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, and the relative importance of governance rules versus resource management rules. Overall, the empirical evidence from this research supports the “threshold hypothesis.” These findings shed light on the rationale of institutional change in common property regimes, and clarify the mechanisms of collective action in traditional societies. Further research may generalize these conclusions to other domains of collective action and to present-day applications.

Expression of cartilage-related genes in bovine synovial tissue

The synovium contains mesenchymal stem cells with chondrogenic potential. Although synovial and articular cartilage tissue develop from a common pool of mesenchymal cells, little is known about their genetic commonalities. In the present study, the mRNA levels for several cartilage-related proteins, namely, cartilage oligomeric matrix protein (COMP), Sox9, aggrecan, and collagen types I, II, IX, X, and XI, were measured using the real-time polymerase chain reaction. Our data reveal the synovium of calf metacarpal joints to physiologically express not only type I collagen but also COMP, Sox9, aggrecan, and collagen types X and XI. The mRNA levels for the latter five proteins lie between 2% and 15% of those in articular cartilage. We speculate that these genes are being expressed by chondroprogenitor cells, whose presence in the synovium reflects a common ontogenetic phase in the fetal development of this tissue and of articular cartilage.

The Swiss Schools have been Governed by Local Lay Authorities

After the introduction of the liberal-democratic constitutions in the Swiss cantons in the first half of the 1830ies the grid of existing schools has been systemized and broadly expanded. The school systems have ever since been characterized by one key element: a special local authority type called „Schulkommission“ or „Schulpflege“. They take the form of committees consisting of laymen that are appointed by democratic elections like all the other executive bodies on the different federal levels in Switzerland. When it comes to their obligations and activities these community level school committees conform very much to the school boards in the American and Canadian school systems. They are accountable for the selection and supervision of the teachers. They approve decisions about the school careers of pupils and about curricular matters like the choice of school books. Normally their members are elected by the local voters for four year terms of office (reelection remains possible) and with regard to pedagogics they normally are non-professionals. The board members are responsible for classes and teachers assigned to them and they have to go to see them periodically. These visitations and the board meetings each month together with the teachers enable the board members to attain a deep insight into what happens in their schools over the course of their term of office. But they are confronted as laymen with a professional teaching staff and with educational experts in the public administration. Nevertheless this form of executive power by non-professionals is constitutive for the state governance in the Swiss as well as in other national political environments. It corresponds to the principles of subsidiarity and militia and therefore allows for a strong accentuation of liberty and the right of self-determination, two axioms at the very base of democratic federalist ideology. This governance architecture with this strong accent on local anchorage features substantial advantages for the legitimacy and acceptability of political and administrative decisions. And this is relevant especially in the educational area because the rearing of the offspring is a project of hope and, besides, quite costly. In the public opinion such supervision bodies staffed by laymen seem to have certain credibility advances in comparison with the professional administration. They are given credit to be capable of impeding the waste of common financial resources and of warranting the protection and the fostering of the community’s children at once. Especially because of their non-professional character they are trusted to be reliably immune against organizational blindness and they seem to be able to defend the interests of the local community against the standardization and centralization aspirations originating from the administrational expertocracy. In the paper these common rationales will be underpinned by results of a comprehensive historical analysis of the Session protocols of three Bernese school commissions from 1835 to 2005.

Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.

The objective of this study is to analyze the common pool resource appropriation and public good provisiondecisions in a dynamic setting, testing the differences in behavior and performance between lab and field subjects. We performeda total of 45 games in Nicaragua, including 88 villagers in rural communities and 92 undergraduate students. In order to analyze sequential decision making, we introduce a dynamic and asymmetric irrigation game that combines the typical social dilemmas associated to irrigation systems management.In addition, in 9 out of 22 villagers’ groups, we implemented a treatment that included the disclosure of subjects’ appropriation of the common pool resource. The results reveal that the provision of individuals’ appropriation level results in higher appropriation in subsequent rounds. In addition, the results show that non-treated villagers provide more public good than treated villagers but if compared with students the differences are not significant. The results also suggest that appropriation levels are below the Nash prediction of full appropriation, but above the social efficient level. This results in an efficiency loss in the game that can be explained to a large extent by individual decisions on appropriation and public good contribution and by group appropriation behavior.

Molecular control of cell type diversity in the developing spinal cord

1, During embryonic development, a diverse array of neurons and glia are generated at specific positions along the dorsoventral and rostro-caudal axes of the spinal cord from a common pool of precursor cells. 2. This cell type diversity can be distinguished by the spatially and temporally coordinated expression of several transcription factors that are also linked to cell type specification at a very early stage of spinal cord development. 3, Recent studies have started to uncover that the generation of cell type diversity in the developing spinal cord. Moreover, distinct cell types in the spinal cord appear to be determined by the spatially and temporally coordinated expression of transcription factors. 4. The expression of these factors also appears to be controlled by gradients of factors expressed by ventral and dorsal midline cells, namely Sonic hedgehog and members of the transforming growth factor-beta family. 5, Changes in the competence of precursor cells and local cell interactions may also play important roles in cell type specification within the developing spinal cord.