Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds..

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

Smooth multibidding mechanisms

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is "smoother" in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. Unlike in the study by Pérez Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to effciency as is desired.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Nine-month-olds' triangular interactive strategies with their parents' couple in low-coordination families: A descriptive study

Observing infants in triadic situations has revealed their triangular competence; namely, their ability to interact with both parents by simultaneously sharing their attention and affects with them. Infants' triangular interaction is linked with the coparenting unit's degree of coordination; in high-coordination (HC) families, parents act as a team in relation to the child, thus drawing clear and flexible boundaries with them; in low-coordination (LC) families, parents either avoid direct interaction with each other and include the child in their unit or join together against the child and exclude him or her, thus drawing inconsistent boundaries with the child. We explored the interactive strategies of LC 9-month-olds (n = 15) with those of their parents, comparing them with HC parents (n = 23) in two conditions: playing with both parents at the same time and witnessing their parents' dialogue. LC infants' affects were less positive; they addressed fewer positive triangular bids to their parents and tended to use a less triangular interactive mode. Thus, LC infants had fewer opportunities than did HC infants to acquire skills necessary for coping with triangular interaction. L'observation de nourrissons dans des situations triadiques a révélé leur compétence triangulaire, c'est-à-dire la capacité à interagir avec les deux parents en partageant simultanément leur attention et leurs affects avec eux. L'interaction triangulaire des nourrissons est liée au degré de coordination de l'unité de coparentage. Dans les familles à coordination élevée (abrégé HC en anglais, CE en français), les parents agissent en relation à l'enfant en tant qu'équipe, et établissent donc des limites claires et flexibles avec les enfants. Dans les familles à coordination faible (abrégé LC en anglais, CF en français), les parents évitent soit l'interaction directe l'un avec l'autre et incluent l'enfant dans leur unité, ou bien ils se liguent contre l'enfant et l'excluent, établissant donc des limites contradictoires avec l'enfant. Nous explorons les stratégies interactives de bébés de 9 mois CF avec celle de leurs parents, en les comparant avec des parents CE (N = 23) dans deux conditions: le jeu avec les deux parents au même moment et l'observation du dialogue des parents. Les affects des bébés CF étaient moins positifs. Les bébés se tournaient moins triangulairement vers leurs parents et avaient tendance à utiliser un mode interactif moins triangulaire. Les bébés CF avaient donc moins de chances que les bébés CE d'acquérir les compétences nécessaires pour faire face avec une interaction triangulaire.

A Typology of Identity-Related Crime

Identification is ever more important in the online world, and identity-related crime is a growing problem related to this. This new category of crime is not restricted to high-profile instances of identity 'theft' or identity fraud; it is wide-ranging and complex, ranging from identity deletion to unlawful identity creation and identity 'theft'. Commonly accepted definitions are lacking, thus blurring available statistics, and policies to combat this new crime are piecemeal at best. To assess the real nature and magnitude of identity-related crime, and to be able to discuss how it can be combated, identity-related crime should be understood in all its aspects. As a first key step, this article introduces a typology of identity-related crime, consisting of conceptual, technical and legal categories, that can be used as a comprehensive framework for future research, countermeasures and policies related to identity related crime.

Managerial incentives for mergers

We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take notonly product market but also takeover decisions. We show that the optimalcontract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under bothquantity and price competition. This result is in contrast to the previousliterature and hinges on the fact that with a more aggressive manager rivalfirms earn lower profits and are willing to sell out at a lower price. \\However, as a side--effect of such a contract, the manager might take overmore rivals than would be profitable.

English Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) ofthe good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong effect of even small toeholds, however wefind the effects are not so strong in the lab. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of thepayoff functions, which leads to relatively costless deviations from the equilibrium strategies.We find that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better than the Nash equilibrium.Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective, the cost to acquire them mightbe higher than the strategic benefit they bring. Finally our results show that in general theseller s revenues fall when the playing field is uneven.

Multinationals, technology networks and international takeovers

We formulate a knowlegde--based model of direct investment through mergers and acquisitions. M&As are realized to create comparative advantages by exploiting international synergies and appropriating local technology spillovers requiring geographical proximity, but can also represent a strategic response to the presence of a multinational rival. The takeover fee paid tends to increase with the strength of local spillovers which can thus work against multinationalization. Seller's bargaining power increases the takeover fee, but does not influence the investment decision. We characterize losers and winners from multinationalization, and show that foreign investment stimulates research but could result in a synergy trap reducing multinationals' profits.

First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. I show thatwhen the game is symmetric there is a unique Nash equilibrium thatsatisfies a regularity condition requiring that the equilibrium strategies be{\sl piecewise monotone}. Moreover, when the signals are discrete-valued, the equilibrium is unique. The central part of the proof consists of showing that at any regular equilibrium the bidders' strategies must be monotone increasing within the support of winning bids. The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Disseny i implementació d'una pàgina web de subhastes

Amb la situació econòmica actual pot ser interessant poder vendre objectes que ja no s’utilitzen i també poder-ne comprar de segona mà. Amb aquesta idea sorgeix el projecte de crear una pàgina de subhastes online on la gent pugui comerciar amb les coses que ja no necessita. Tenint en compte el concepte inicial, el propietari de la pàgina no rebrà cap retribució ni percentatge de cada subhasta, tot l’import serà pel venedor. L’objectiu principal és el de poder oferir un lloc on després de registrar-se, els usuaris puguin veure i pujar per els articles que altres persones estan subhastant i també la possibilitat de crear les seves pròpies subhastes. Cada usuari disposarà d’un espai personal on veure les subhastes amb les que ha interactuat i així no perdre-les de vista i també on poder veure en cada moment l’estat de les subhastes que ha creat. La vista d’una subhasta s’actualitzarà automàticament sense haver de recarregar la pàgina i si algú puja durant l’últim minut la subhasta s’allargarà un minut més per evitar puges a l’últim moment i així maximitzar el preu final. Hi haurà un administrador que serà l’encarregat de gestionar el bon funcionament de la pàgina amb permís per afegir, editar, consultar i eliminar tota la informació disponible. Per portar a terme el projecte s’ha utilitzat PHP per la part de programació i MySQL com a sistema gestor de bases de dades.

Use of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting to Mitigate Work Zone Traffic Impacts, 2012

Incentive/disincentive clauses (I/D) are designed to award payments to contractors if they complete work ahead of schedule and to deduct payments if they exceed the completion time. A previously unanswered question is, “Did the costs of the actual work zone impacts that were avoided justify the incentives paid?” This report answers that question affirmatively based on an evaluation of 20 I/D projects in Missouri from 2008 to 2011. Road user costs (RUC) were used to quantify work zone impacts and included travel delays, vehicle operating costs, and crash costs. These were computed using work zone traffic conditions for partial-closure projects and detour volumes and routes for full-closure projects. Conditions during construction were compared to after construction. Crash costs were computed using Highway Safety Manual methodology. Safety Performance Functions produced annual crash frequencies that were translated into crash cost savings. In considering an average project, the percentage of RUC savings was around 13% of the total contract amount, or $444,389 of $3,464,620. The net RUC savings produced was around $7.2 million after subtracting the approximately $1.7 million paid in incentives. In other words, for every dollar paid in incentives, approximately 5.3 dollars of RUC savings resulted. I/D provisions were very successful in saving RUC for projects with full-closure, projects in urban areas, and emergency projects. Rural, non-emergency projects successfully saved RUC but not at the same level as other projects. The I/D contracts were also compared to all Missouri Department of Transportation contracts for the same time period. The results show that I/D projects had a higher on-time completion percentage and a higher number of bids per call than average projects. But I/D projects resulted in 4.52% higher deviation from programmed costs and possibly more changes made after the award. A survey of state transportation departments and contractors showed that both agreed to the same issues that affect the success of I/D contracts. Legal analysis suggests that liquidated damages is preferred to disincentives, since enforceability of disincentives may be an issue. Overall, in terms of work zone impact mitigation, I/D contracts are very effective at a relatively low cost.