On the need for an international effort to capture, share and use crystallization screening data

When crystallization screening is conducted many outcomes are observed but typically the only trial recorded in the literature is the condition that yielded the crystal(s) used for subsequent diffraction studies. The initial hit that was optimized and the results of all the other trials are lost. These missing results contain information that would be useful for an improved general understanding of crystallization. This paper provides a report of a crystallization data exchange (XDX) workshop organized by several international large-scale crystallization screening laboratories to discuss how this information may be captured and utilized. A group that administers a significant fraction of the worlds crystallization screening results was convened, together with chemical and structural data informaticians and computational scientists who specialize in creating and analysing large disparate data sets. The development of a crystallization ontology for the crystallization community was proposed. This paper (by the attendees of the workshop) provides the thoughts and rationale leading to this conclusion. This is brought to the attention of the wider audience of crystallographers so that they are aware of these early efforts and can contribute to the process going forward. © 2012 International Union of Crystallography All rights reserved.

The equity and efficiency of the Australian share market with respect to director trading

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of directors breaching the reporting requirements of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Corporations Act in Australia. Further, it seeks to assess whether directors in Australia achieve abnormal returns from trades in their own companies. Design/methodology/approach – Using an event study approach on an Australian sample, abnormal returns for a range of situations were estimated. Findings – A total of 13 (seven) per cent of own‐company directors trades do not meet the ASX (Corporations Act) requirement of reporting within five (14) business days. Directors do achieve abnormal returns through trading in shares of their own companies. Ignoring transaction costs, outsiders can achieve abnormal returns by imitating directors' trades. Analysis of returns to directors after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that are not available to the market. Analysis of returns to directors subsequent to the ASX reporting requirement up to the day the trade is reported shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that should be available to the market. Research limitations/implications – Future research should investigate the linkages between late reporting by directors and disadvantages to outside shareholders and the implementation of internal policies implemented to mitigate insider trading. Practical implications – Market participants should remain vigilant regarding the potential for late/non‐reporting of directors' trades. Originality/value – Uncovering breaches of reporting regulations are particularly important given that directors tend to purchase (sell) shares when the price is low (high), thereby achieving abnormal returns.

Fusion transcript loci share many genomic features with non-fusion loci

Background Fusion transcripts are found in many tissues and have the potential to create novel functional products. Here, we investigate the genomic sequences around fusion junctions to better understand the transcriptional mechanisms mediating fusion transcription/splicing. We analyzed data from prostate (cancer) cells as previous studies have shown extensively that these cells readily undergo fusion transcription. Results We used the FusionMap program to identify high-confidence fusion transcripts from RNAseq data. The RNAseq datasets were from our (N = 8) and other (N = 14) clinical prostate tumors with adjacent non-cancer cells, and from the LNCaP prostate cancer cell line that were mock-, androgen- (DHT), and anti-androgen- (bicalutamide, enzalutamide) treated. In total, 185 fusion transcripts were identified from all RNAseq datasets. The majority (76 %) of these fusion transcripts were ‘read-through chimeras’ derived from adjacent genes in the genome. Characterization of sequences at fusion loci were carried out using a combination of the FusionMap program, custom Perl scripts, and the RNAfold program. Our computational analysis indicated that most fusion junctions (76 %) use the consensus GT-AG intron donor-acceptor splice site, and most fusion transcripts (85 %) maintained the open reading frame. We assessed whether parental genes of fusion transcripts have the potential to form complementary base pairing between parental genes which might bring them into physical proximity. Our computational analysis of sequences flanking fusion junctions at parental loci indicate that these loci have a similar propensity as non-fusion loci to hybridize. The abundance of repetitive sequences at fusion and non-fusion loci was also investigated given that SINE repeats are involved in aberrant gene transcription. We found few instances of repetitive sequences at both fusion and non-fusion junctions. Finally, RT-qPCR was performed on RNA from both clinical prostate tumors and adjacent non-cancer cells (N = 7), and LNCaP cells treated as above to validate the expression of seven fusion transcripts and their respective parental genes. We reveal that fusion transcript expression is similar to the expression of parental genes. Conclusions Fusion transcripts maintain the open reading frame, and likely use the same transcriptional machinery as non-fusion transcripts as they share many genomic features at splice/fusion junctions.

Head motion and Inattention/Hyperactivity share common genetic influences: Implications for fMRI studies of ADHD

Head motion (HM) is a well known confound in analyses of functional MRI (fMRI) data. Neuroimaging researchers therefore typically treat HM as a nuisance covariate in their analyses. Even so, it is possible that HM shares a common genetic influence with the trait of interest. Here we investigate the extent to which this relationship is due to shared genetic factors, using HM extracted from resting-state fMRI and maternal and self report measures of Inattention and Hyperactivity-Impulsivity from the Strengths and Weaknesses of ADHD Symptoms and Normal Behaviour (SWAN) scales. Our sample consisted of healthy young adult twins (N = 627 (63% females) including 95 MZ and 144 DZ twin pairs, mean age 22, who had mother-reported SWAN; N = 725 (58% females) including 101 MZ and 156 DZ pairs, mean age 25, with self reported SWAN). This design enabled us to distinguish genetic from environmental factors in the association between head movement and ADHD scales. HM was moderately correlated with maternal reports of Inattention (r = 0.17, p-value = 7.4E-5) and Hyperactivity-Impulsivity (r = 0.16, p-value = 2.9E-4), and these associations were mainly due to pleiotropic genetic factors with genetic correlations [95% CIs] of rg = 0.24 [0.02, 0.43] and rg = 0.23 [0.07, 0.39]. Correlations between self-reports and HM were not significant, due largely to increased measurement error. These results indicate that treating HM as a nuisance covariate in neuroimaging studies of ADHD will likely reduce power to detect between-group effects, as the implicit assumption of independence between HM and Inattention or Hyperactivity-Impulsivity is not warranted. The implications of this finding are problematic for fMRI studies of ADHD, as failing to apply HM correction is known to increase the likelihood of false positives. We discuss two ways to circumvent this problem: censoring the motion contaminated frames of the RS-fMRI scan or explicitly modeling the relationship between HM and Inattention or Hyperactivity-Impulsivity

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Sign and share: What influences our participation in online microvolunteering

Microvolunteering is bite-size volunteering with no commitment to repeat and minimum formality, involving short and specific actions. Online microvolunteering occurs through an internet-connected device. University students' online microvolunteering decisions were investigated using an extended theory of planned behavior (TPB) comprising attitudes and normative and control perceptions, with the additional variables of moral norm and group norm. Participants (N = 303) completed the main TPB questionnaire and 1-month follow-up survey (N = 171) assessing engagement in online microvolunteering. Results generally supported standard and additional TPB constructs predicting intention. Intention predicted behavior. The findings suggest an important role for attitudes and moral considerations in understanding what influences this increasingly popular form of online activity.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Our attention, is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent suppliers. We design elegant optimal procurement mechanisms for two different situations. In the first situation, each supplier specifies the maximum quantity that can be supplied together with a per unit price. For this situation, we design an optimal mechanism S-OPT (Optimal with Simple bids). In the more generalized case, each supplier specifies discounts based on the volume of supply. In this case, we design an optimal mechanism VD-OPT (Optimal with Volume Discount, bids). The VD-OPT mechanism uses the S-OPT mechanism as a building block. The proposed mechanisms minimize the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian, incentive compatibility and (b) interim individual rationality.

Share Repurchases, Dividends, and Executive Options

This paper reports empirical results on the determinants of the authorization decision for share repurchases and dividends in Finland. We use a data set with precise data on share repurchases as well as characteristics for the option programs. Contrary to the U.S., we use a data set where 41% of the options are dividend protected, which allows us to separate between the "option funding" and "substitution / managerial wealth" hypothesis for the choice of the distribution method. We find that foreign ownership is the main determinant for share repurchases in Finland and attribute this relationship to tax factors. We also find evidence in support of both the signaling and agency cost hypotheses for cash distributions, especially in the case of share repurchases. Finally, we find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. When options are dividend protected, the relationship between dividend distributions and the scope of the options program turns to a significantly positive one instead of the negative one documented on U.S. data. This gives some support for the substitution / managerial wealth hypothesis as a determinant for the choice of the distribution method.

Evaluating the regional and distributional impacts of forestry cost-share payments.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Searth Auctions

In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their ads. This auction is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu_ij associated with agent-slot pairs. The search engine's goal is to maximize social welfare, for example, the sum of values of the advertisers. The search engine does not know the true value of an advertiser for a click to her ad and also does not know the click probabilities mu_ij s. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these during the T rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced and would be referred to as multi-armed-bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1,characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature and it has been shown that the regret for such mechanisms will be O(T^{2/3}). In this paper, we seek to derive a characterization in the realistic but nontrivial general case when m > 1 and obtain several interesting results.

Efficient Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Volume Discounts Arising in Web Service Composition

Web services are now a key ingredient of software services offered by software enterprises. Many standardized web services are now available as commodity offerings from web service providers. An important problem for a web service requester is the web service composition problem which involves selecting the right mix of web service offerings to execute an end-to-end business process. Web service offerings are now available in bundled form as composite web services and more recently, volume discounts are also on offer, based on the number of executions of web services requested. In this paper, we develop efficient algorithms for the web service composition problem in the presence of composite web service offerings and volume discounts. We model this problem as a combinatorial auction with volume discounts. We first develop efficient polynomial time algorithms when the end-to-end service involves a linear workflow of web services. Next we develop efficient polynomial time algorithms when the end-to-end service involves a tree workflow of web services.