Career development and systems theory: Connecting theory and practice

The Systems Theory Framework was developed to produce a metatheoretical framework through which the contribution of all theories to our understanding of career behaviour could be recognised. In addition it emphasises the individual as the site for the integration of theory and practice. Its utility has become more broadly acknowledged through its application to a range of cultural groups and settings, qualitative assessment processes, career counselling, and multicultural career counselling. For these reasons, the STF is a very valuable addition to the field of career theory. In viewing the field of career theory as a system, open to changes and developments from within itself and through constantly interrelating with other systems, the STF and this book is adding to the pattern of knowledge and relationships within the career field. The contents of this book will be integrated within the field as representative of a shift in understanding existing relationships within and between theories. In the same way, each reader will integrate the contents of the book within their existing views about the current state of career theory and within their current theory-practice relationship. This book should be required reading for anyone involved in career theory. It is also highly suitable as a text for an advanced career counselling or theory course.

Participation and older people: Meaning, theory and practice

Increasing older people's participation in society is important in ageing policies worldwide. There is a need to understand the challenges for health professionals of transforming policy on participation into liberating social change practices on the ground. This paper explores the meaning, theory and practice of participation. It uses the example of a work in progress project that has attempted to address structural barriers to older people's participation within an Australian aged care facility, to illustrate theoretical and practice principles surrounding participation.

Between theory and practice – teaching maths to elementary school students in Poland

The development of children's school achievements in mathematics is one of the most important aims of education in Poland. The results of research concerning monitoring of school achievements in maths is not optimistic. We can observe low levels of children’s understanding of the merits of maths, self-developed strategies in solving problems and practical usage of maths skills. This article frames the discussion of this problem in its psychological and didactic context and analyses the causes as they relate to school practice in teaching maths

An implicit GTS allocation mechanism in IEEE 802.15.4 for time-sensitive wireless sensor networks: theory and practice

Timeliness guarantee is an important feature of the recently standardized IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, turning it quite appealing for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications under timing constraints. When operating in beacon-enabled mode, this protocol allows nodes with real-time requirements to allocate Guaranteed Time Slots (GTS) in the contention-free period. The protocol natively supports explicit GTS allocation, i.e. a node allocates a number of time slots in each superframe for exclusive use. The limitation of this explicit GTS allocation is that GTS resources may quickly disappear, since a maximum of seven GTSs can be allocated in each superframe, preventing other nodes to benefit from guaranteed service. Moreover, the GTS may be underutilized, resulting in wasted bandwidth. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes i-GAME, an implicit GTS Allocation Mechanism in beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 networks. The allocation is based on implicit GTS allocation requests, taking into account the traffic specifications and the delay requirements of the flows. The i-GAME approach enables the use of one GTS by multiple nodes, still guaranteeing that all their (delay, bandwidth) requirements are satisfied. For that purpose, we propose an admission control algorithm that enables to decide whether to accept a new GTS allocation request or not, based not only on the remaining time slots, but also on the traffic specifications of the flows, their delay requirements and the available bandwidth resources. We show that our approach improves the bandwidth utilization as compared to the native explicit allocation mechanism defined in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We also present some practical considerations for the implementation of i-GAME, ensuring backward compatibility with the IEEE 801.5.4 standard with only minor add-ons. Finally, an experimental evaluation on a real system that validates our theoretical analysis and demonstrates the implementation of i-GAME is also presented

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Caught Between Theory and Practice: Government, Market, and Regulatory Failure in Electricity Sector Reforms

The world-wide electricity sector reforms of the early 1990s have revealed the considerable complexities of making market driven reforms in network and infrastructure industries. This paper reflects on the experiences to date with the process and outcomes of marketbased electricity reforms across less-developed, transition and developed economies. The reforms outcomes suggest similar problems facing the electricity sector of these countries though their contexts vary significantly. Many developing and developed economies continue to have investment inadequacy concerns and the need to balance economy efficiency, sustainability and social equity after more than two decades of experience with reforms. We also use a case study of selected countries that in many respects represent the current state of the reform though they are rarely examined. Nepal, Belarus and Ireland are chosen as country-specific case studies for this purpose. We conclude that the changing dynamics of the electricity supply industry (ESI) and policy objectives imply that analysing the success and failure of reforms will indeed remain a complex process.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).