Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract

This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

An ultimatum bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.

Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort

We report experimental results on ultimatum salary bargaining with a real task performed by employee subjects. Compared to the baseline treatment with a hypothetical task, the introduction of a real task raises offers, accepted wages and rejection rates.

Collective bargaining in Brazilian manufacturing, 1978-95

Collective bargaining, it is widely claimed, has been on the increase in Brazil since the late 1970s. This is seen as part of a broader change in Brazilian industrial relations towards a hybrid system of interest representation, in which elements of both the old state corporatism and pluralism now coexist. However, there is little or no systematic empirical evidence available to support this conclusion. This thesis addresses the question of the strengthening of collective bargaining as a method of job regulation in Brazil by providing a detailed empirical study. The questions of this study are: (a) how important has collective bargaining become in establishing provisions on the terms and conditions of the employment relationship which are not simply reproducing rules established via state regulation?; and (b) what factors accounted for changes in the content of these provisions? An analysis of 10,734 provisions in 287 collective agreements in manufacturing industries in the Metropolitan Area of Porto Alegre, the capital of the southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul, was carried out for the period of 1978-95. This analysis offers support for the thesis that the significance of collective bargaining has increased. It shows that: (a) most substantive provisions created rules that were not established in other forms of regulation; (b) provisions that replicate the contents of regulatory legislation accounted for one out of seven substantive provisions, but in spite of being a copy of the law, these provisions are not entirely neutral for job regulation; (c) collective agreements also laid down substantive provisions benefiting employers, and not simply employees; and (d) the pace of change in bargaining outcomes oscillated with changes in the economic, legal and judicial contexts. This pace of change was mostly affected by (i) the rate of unemployment, (ii) the degree of openness of the economy to foreign competition, (iii) the capacity of employers to pass on costs to costumers, (iv) stabilisation policies aimed at curbing inflation, (v) the Federal Constitution made in 1988, (vi) the official rate of minimum wages, and (vii) the conduct of the labour judicial system in settling collective disputes.

Resultados uniformemente seguros e equilíbrio de Nash em jogos compactos

Nós introduzimos uma condição, resultados uniformemente seguros, para jogos compactos e resultados (“payoffs”) limitados e mensur´aveis nas estrat´egias. Demonstramos que se um jogo compacto tem resultados uniformemente seguros, ent˜ao sua extens˜ao mista tem resultados seguros.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.