China. Handels-statistik der vertrags-häfen. Für die periode 1863-1872. Zusammengestellt für die Österreichisch-ungarische welt-ausstellung, Wien, 1873. Zur erläuterung des internationalen austausches der producte. Veröffentlicht auf veranlassung des General-inspectors der chinesischen see-zollverwaltung.

Tables include: 1. Tonnage (tonnegehalt)--2. Valuta (waarenwerthe)--3. Handels-artikel.--4. Zoll-einnahme.--5. Bevölkerung.

Increased pay for property and disbursing officers, National Guard : hearings before a special subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-first Congress, third session. January 20, 1931 & January 22, 1931. Statements by Maj. William M. Dixon, General Staff, War Department & Maj. E.J. O'Hara, Finance Department Militia Bureau.

Mode of access: Internet.

Life of General U.S. Grant : together with his military services /

Mode of access: Internet.

Bays, Sounds, and Lakes Other than the Great Lakes; General Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Board of Supervising Inspectors, as Amended at Board Meeting

Title Varies: Lakes Other Than the Great Lakes, Bays, and Sounds; General Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Board of Supervising Inspectors as Amended at Board Meeting

Great Lakes; General Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Board of Supervising Inspectors, as Amended at Board Meeting

Mode of access: Internet.

General Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Board of Supervising Inspectors

Mode of access: Internet.

Rivers; General Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Board of Supervising Inspectors, as Amended at Board Meeting

Mode of access: Internet.

Ocean and Coastwise; General Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Board of Supervising Inspectors, as Amended at Board Meeting

Mode of access: Internet.

General reports of H.M. inspectors on science & art schools & classes & evening schools, and of examiners in science & art.

Mode of access: Internet.

General Butler in New Orleans. History of the administration of the Department of the Gulf in the year 1862: with an account of the capture of New Orleans, and a sketch of the previous career of the General, civil and military.

Mode of access: Internet.

Enforcing upstream: Australian health and safety inspectors and upstream duty holders

The ‘new style’ occupational health and safety legislation implemented in Australia from the late 1970s changed the character of OHS legal obligations, establishing general duties supported by process, performance and, more rarely, specification standards,1 and extending obligations to those who propagate risks as designers, manufacturers, importers or suppliers — the ‘upstream duty holders’. This article examines how OHS agencies inspect and enforce OHS legislation upstream, drawing on empirical research in four Australian states and relevant case law. We argue that upstream duty holders are an increasing area of attention for OHS inspectorates but these inspectorates have not yet risen to the challenge of harnessing these parties to help stem, at the source, the flow of risks into workplaces.

OHS inspectors and psychosocial risk factors: Evidence from Australia

Legislation giving prominence to psychosocial risk factors at work has changed the role of government occupational health and safety (OHS) inspectors in many countries. Yet little is known about how inspectorates have responded to these changes. Between 2003 and 2007 an Australian study was undertaken on OHS standards, entailing detailed documentary analysis, interviews with 36 inspectorate managers and 89 inspectors, and observations made when researchers accompanied inspectors on 120 typical workplace visits. Our study found that general duty provisions in OHS legislation clearly incorporated psychosocial hazards and inspectorates had introduced guidance material, pursued campaigns and increased interventions in this area. However, the regulatory framework remained narrow (focused on bullying/harassment, occupational violence and work stress) and workplace visits revealed psychosocial hazards as a marginal area of inspectorate activity. These findings were reinforced in interviews. While aware of psychosocial hazards inspectors often saw the issue as problematic due to limited training, resourcing constraints, deficiencies in regulation and fears of victimisation amongst workers. In order to address these problems a number of changes are required that recognize the distinctiveness of psychosocial hazards including their ‘invisibility’. Notable here are revisions to regulation (both general duty provisions and specific codes), the development of comprehensive guidance and assessment tools to be used by inspectors, greater use of procedural enforcement, and enhanced inspectorate resourcing and training. There is also a need to recognize complex inter-linkages between psychosocial hazards and the industrial relations context.

Submission to the External Independent Review of the United Nations Response to Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Other Serious Crimes by Members of Foreign Military Forces Not Under United Nations Command in the Central African Republic

In 2015 the UN Secretary-General established an External Independent Review to review how the United Nations has responded to allegations of child sexual exploitation and child sexual abuse, and to make recommendations concerning how the United Nations should respond to allegations in the future. This submission to the Review Panel draws on literature regarding children's rights, the nature of child sexual abuse, international instruments and policy, the nature of institutional child sexual abuse, and the CAR case itself. It makes recommendations for reform of UN protocols and procedures to better prevent child sexual abuse, and to improve responses to future occurrences.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.