Memory retrieval as temporal discrimination

Temporal distinctiveness models of memory retrieval claim that memories are organised partly in terms of their positions along a temporal dimension, and suggest that memory retrieval involves temporal discrimination. According to such models the retrievability of memories should be related to the discriminability of their temporal distances at the time of retrieval. This prediction is tested directly in three pairs of experiments that examine (a) memory retrieval and (b) identification of temporal durations that correspond to the temporal distances of the memories. Qualitative similarities between memory retrieval and temporal discrimination are found in probed serial recall (Experiments 1 and 2), immediate and delayed free recall (Experiments 3 and 4) and probed serial recall of grouped lists (Experiments 5 and 6). The results are interpreted as consistent with the suggestion that memory retrieval is indeed akin to temporal discrimination. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

When some is actually all: Scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts

Accounts of the scalar inference from 'some X-ed' to 'not all X-ed' are central to the debate between contemporary theories of conversational pragmatics. An important contribution to this debate is to identify contexts that decrease the endorsement rate of the inference. We suggest that the inference is endorsed less often in face-threatening contexts, i.e., when X implies a loss of face for the listener. This claim is successfully tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 rules out a possible confound between face-threatening contexts and lower-bound contexts. Experiment 3 shows that whilst saying 'some X-ed' when one knew for a fact that all X-ed is always perceived as an underinformative utterance, it is also seen as a nice and polite thing to do when X threatens the face of the listener. These findings are considered from the perspective of Relevance Theory as well as that of the Generalized Conversational Inference approach. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Regret as autobiographical memory

We apply all autobiographical memory framework to the Study of regret. Focusing oil the distinction between regrets for specific and general events we argue that the temporal profile of regret, usually explained in terms of the action-inaction distinction, is predicted by models of autobiographical memory. In two studies involving Participants in their sixties we demonstrate a reminiscence bump for general, but not for specific regrets. Recent regrets were more likely to be specific than general in nature. Coding regrets as actions/inactions revealed that general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to inaction while specific regrets were as likely to be clue to action as to inaction. In Study 2 we also generalised all of these findings to a group of participants in their 40s. We re-interpret existing accounts of the temporal profile of regret within the autobiographical memory framework, and Outline the practical and theoretical advantages Of Our memory-based distinction over traditional decision-making approaches to the Study of regret. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Deciding between theories of how reasoning develops is hard

Although Sloutsky agrees with our interpretation of our data, he argues that the totality of the evidence supports his claim that children make inductive generalisations on the basis of similarity. Here we take issue with his characterisation of the alternative hypotheses in his informal analysis of the data, and suggest that a thorough Bayesian analysis, although practically very difficult, is likely to result in a more finely balanced outcome than he suggests. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Do development and learning really decrease memory? On similarity and category-based induction in adults and children

In a recently published study, Sloutsky and Fisher [Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A.V. (2004a). When development and learning decrease memory: Evidence against category-based induction in children. Psychological Science, 15, 553-558; Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (2004b). Induction and categorization in young children: A similarity-based model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 166-188.] demonstrated that children have better memory for the items that they generalise to than do adults. On the basis of this finding, they claim that children and adults use different mechanisms for inductive generalisations;whereas adults focus on shared category membership, children project properties on the basis of perceptual similarity. Sloutsky & Fisher attribute children's enhanced recognition memory to the more detailed processing required by this similarity-based mechanism. In Experiment I we show that children look at the stimulus items for longer than adults. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that although when given just 250 ms to inspect the items children remain capable of making accurate inferences, their subsequent memory for those items decreases significantly. These findings suggest that there are no necessary conclusions to be drawn from Sloutsky & Fisher's results about developmental differences in generalisation strategy. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Who is susceptible to conjunction fallacies in category-based induction?

Recent evidence suggests that the conjunction fallacy observed in people's probabilistic reasoning is also to be found in their evaluations of inductive argument strength. We presented 130 participants with materials likely to produce a conjunction fallacy either by virtue of a shared categorical or a causal relationship between the categories in the argument. We also took a measure of participants' cognitive ability. We observed conjunction fallacies overall with both sets of materials but found an association with ability for the categorical materials only. Our results have implications for accounts of individual differences in reasoning, for the relevance theory of induction, and for the recent claim that causal knowledge is important in inductive reasoning.

Young children's reasoning about the order of past events

Four studies are reported that employed an object location task to assess temporal-causal reasoning. In Experiments 1-3, successfully locating the object required a retrospective consideration of the order in which two events had occurred. In Experiment 1, 5- but not 4-year-olds were successful; 4-year-olds also failed to perform at above-chance levels in modified versions of the task in Experiments 2 and 3. However, in Experiment 4, 3-year-olds were successful when they were able to see the object being placed first in one location and then in the other, rather than having to consider retrospectively the sequence in which two events had happened. The results suggest that reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of events may not be fully developed before 5 years. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A timing-specific memory distortion effect in young children

It has been suggested that there are systematic distortions in children's memory for temporal durations, such that children's memory is not just less accurate than that of adults but qualitatively different. Experiment I replicated the memory distortion effect by demonstrating developmental change in the tendency to confuse a reference duration with one that is shorter rather than longer than it. When the long-term memory demands of the task were reduced by providing reminders of the reference duration on every trial, there were no such qualitative changes in error patterns (Experiment 2). Further evidence for developmental changes in memory distortion was found in the temporal generalization task of Experiment 3, in which stimuli were spaced logarithmically rather than linearly. In Experiment 4, a similar distortion pattern was absent in a task in which children made judgments about the pitch rather than the duration of stimuli, suggesting the effect may be specific to time estimation. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.

Temporal concepts and episodic memory: A response to Hoerl

Hoerl claims that episodic memory is necessary for a concept of the past, and that we should consider some severely amnesic patients as lacking such a concept. I question whether this description of such patients is plausible, and whether it helps us understand lack of insight in amnesia. I finish by arguing that Hoerl's analysis of what constitutes a concept of the past raises interesting developmental issues.

Is regret for inaction relatively self-enhancing?

Previous accounts of regret suggest that people report greater regret for inaction than for action because the former is longer lasting and more painful than the latter. We suggest instead that the tendency for people's greatest regrets to concern inaction more than action may be due to the relatively self-enhancing nature of regrets for inaction. In Study I we asked people to think about their greatest recent regret and to code it as being due to action or inaction. In Study 2 participants described their greatest regret from across their entire life. In both studies we observed an inaction effect only amongst individuals high in self-esteem (HSE). In Study 2 we found that the inaction effect was confined to HSE people whose greatest regret was personal in nature. These results support the claim that regret for inaction is relatively self-enhancing and suggest that the inaction effect found in real-life regrets may be due, in part at least, to the self-enhancement goals of HSE individuals. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength

According to the diversity principle, diverse evidence is strong evidence. There has been considerable evidence that people respect this principle in inductive reasoning. However, exceptions may be particularly informative. Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) introduced a relevance theory of inductive reasoning and used this theory to predict exceptions, including the nondiversity-by-property-reinforcement effect. A new experiment in which this phenomenon was investigated is reported here. Subjects made inductive strength judgments and similarity judgments for stimuli from Medin et al. (2003). The inductive strength judgments showed the same pattern as that in Medin et al. (2003); however, the similarity judgments suggested that the pattern should be interpreted as a diversity effect, rather than as a nondiversity effect. It is concluded that the evidence regarding the predicted nondiversity-by-property-reinforcement effect does not give distinctive support for relevance theory, although this theory does address other results.

The story of some: Everyday pragmatic inference by children and adults

The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whilst some is logically consistent with all, it is often pragmatically interpreted as precluding all. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that with pragmatically impoverished materials, sensitivity to the pragmatic implicature associated with some is apparent earlier in development than has previously been found. Amongst 8-year-old children, we observed much greater sensitivity to the implicature in pragmatically enriched contexts. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that amongst adults, logical responses to infelicitous some statements take longer to produce than do logical responses to felicitous some statements, and that working memory capacity predicts the tendency to give logical responses to the former kind of statement. These results suggest that some adults develop the ability to inhibit a pragmatic response in favour of a logical answer. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of pragmatic inference.

Deciding between accounts of the selection task: A reply to Oaksford (2002)

In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) to the selection task data reported in Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper (2002). Although Oaksford (2002b) reports good fits to the data described in Feeney and Handley (2000), the model does not adequately capture the data described in Handley et al. (2002). Furthermore, across all six of the experiments modelled here, the ODS model does not predict participants' behaviour at the level of selection rates for individual cards. Finally, when people's probability estimates are used in the modelling exercise, the model adequately captures only I out of 18 conditions described in Handley et al. We discuss the implications of these results for models of the selection task and claim that they support deductive, rather than probabilistic, accounts of the task.

Alternative antecedents, probabilities, and the suppression of fallacies in Wason's selection task

Three experiments examined the influence of a second rule on the pattern of card selections on Wason's selection task. In Experiment 1 participants received a version of the task with a single test rule or one of two versions of the task with the same original test rule together with a second rule. The probability of q was manipulated in the two-rules conditions by varying the size of the antecedent set in the second rule. The results showed a significant suppression of q card and not-p card selections in the alternative-rule conditions, but no difference as a function of antecedent set size. In Experiment 2 the size of the antecendent set in the two-rules conditions was manipulated using the context of a computer printing double-sided cards. The results showed a significant reduction of q card selections in the two-rules conditions, but no effect of p set size. In Experiment 3 the scenario accompanying the rule was manipulated, and it specified a single alternative antecedent or a number of alternative antecedents. The q card selection rates were not affected by the scenario manipulation but again were suppressed by the presence of a second rule. Our results suggest that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the task and that these inferences are systematically influenced by the presence of a second rule, but are not influenced by the probabilistic characteristics of this rule. These findings are discussed in the context of decision theoretic views of selection task performance (Oaksford Chater, 1994).