Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength


Autoria(s): Heit, E.; Feeney, Aidan
Data(s)

01/04/2005

Resumo

According to the diversity principle, diverse evidence is strong evidence. There has been considerable evidence that people respect this principle in inductive reasoning. However, exceptions may be particularly informative. Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) introduced a relevance theory of inductive reasoning and used this theory to predict exceptions, including the nondiversity-by-property-reinforcement effect. A new experiment in which this phenomenon was investigated is reported here. Subjects made inductive strength judgments and similarity judgments for stimuli from Medin et al. (2003). The inductive strength judgments showed the same pattern as that in Medin et al. (2003); however, the similarity judgments suggested that the pattern should be interpreted as a diversity effect, rather than as a nondiversity effect. It is concluded that the evidence regarding the predicted nondiversity-by-property-reinforcement effect does not give distinctive support for relevance theory, although this theory does address other results.

Identificador

http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/relations-between-premise-similarity-and-inductive-strength(e4795aa3-70f5-482c-b5d0-824d99cac18c).html

http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=23744445118&partnerID=8YFLogxK

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

Heit , E & Feeney , A 2005 , ' Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength ' PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW , vol 12 , no. 2 , pp. 340-344 .

Palavras-Chave #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3200 #Psychology(all) #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3200/3201 #Psychology (miscellaneous) #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3200/3205 #Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Tipo

article