La utopía interior: superación del dualismo en los ensayos de Ernesto Sábato

My research attempts to demonstrate how Sábato’s essays have pursued a progressive path that reflects the evolving process of his vision. In light of his essays, I will delineate the themes of solitude, death, desperation, robotization of man, and finally, hope as the antithesis. In my analysis I examine the model created in Sartre’s Existentialism. I also visit the model followed by Nicholas Berdyaeff, who at least offers the possibility of salvation in a world conceived by and for Nothingness. I investigate how these and other tendencies had an initial influence on the essays studied in my research. I concentrate on those essays whose discourse is conditioned by the philosophical foundations of a being that inquires and discerns, discovers and denounces, and finally struggles with the impossibility of reaching the absolute. This foresight, at times apocalyptic, at times utopian, is already present in Sábato’s early works. In my study I attempt to establish how Sábato, in oscillating between the demonic and the romantic, the infernal and utopian, constructs his vision of the world through the symbiotic intertwining of both the fictional and essayistic genres. I focus on an author compromised by a constant debate with the paradoxes and dichotomies that, according to Sábato himself, define Modernity.

Education and Self-Cultivation: Foundational Changes for Existential Flourishing

The strained relationship between pedagogy and self-cultivation is often overlooked in favour of more pressing and profitable concerns within educational institutions. However, the end of education is not a well-paying job. It is often thought that education will produce a certain type of learned individual. Students are entered into educational institutions from a very young age and spend most of their youth within them, subsequently forming a part of themselves, their self-identify and agency, through these institutions. A significant amount of trust is placed in the hands of educators not only to impart information about various subject matters but to teach students how to think. This, however, is a difficult task which cannot be completely accomplished; thinking is a skill which an educator can promote but only the individual can cultivate. If self-cultivation is not the end of pedagogical practice and education, there is something deeply contradictory between the theoretical and practical values and aims of educational institutions.This thesis will address the problems caused by the neglect of self-cultivation within the pedagogical practices of contemporary educational institutions. I argue that self-cultivation, existential learning and flourishing should be the focus of these institutions. Educational institutions can make alternative efforts not only to improve the learning environment for these students but to prepare them to cope with existential questions. By acknowledging and focusing on the significance of self-cultivation, educational institutions can and should make efforts not only to teach useful, marketable skills and information but to also nurture the agency and mental well-being of the student him- or herself. My hope is that this thesis will be the first step towards answering a larger concern: How can educational institutions alleviate the struggles of students, particularly the seemingly growing number who are suffering from depression, by appealing to notions of self-cultivation?

Livsfrågor och religionskunskap : En belysning av ett centralt begrepp i svensk religionsdidaktik

This thesis focuses on “livsfrågor” (questions of life) a typical Swedish concept introduced in the RE syllabus in the curriculum for compulsory schools in 1969. The study poses three questions: what can qualify as a “livsfråga”, why are they regarded important, and how do they fit into teaching? The main purpose is to study differences of the concept in two materials. Primarily interviews with Teacher educators all over Sweden and, secondly in the R.E. syllabus for compulsory and secondary schools from 1962 until today. Finally, the two materials used, will be brought together, and foci are recognized with the help of a tool for thought.  The study is using the concept dialogicity from Bachtin. Syllabus are viewed as compromises in accordance with a German tradition. In the syllabus, “livsfrågor” is one within many different words used with none what so ever stringency. It is not necessarily the most important term, as “livsåskådningsfrågor” (questions within philosophies of life)  is often dominating in objectivities. Also “existential questions” etc is used. The relation between the words are never made clear.  The syllabus are in one sense monologial as different meanings of the word are not made explicit, and other utterances are not invoked. In the interviews the dialogicity is more obvious. Philosophy is mentioned, eg.. Martin Buber, Viktor Frankl, theology (Paul Thillich), but also literature (Lars Gyllensten) and existentialism in a general sence. Other words are not as frequent – but “livsåskådningsfrågor” are of course mentioned, eg. Faith vs. knowledge. In the last chapter “livsfrågor” is problematized with the help of Andrew Wright and his three metanarrativies within the modern R.E. And the assumption, especially in the syllabus, of “livsfrågor”, as common between cultures and over time is problematized with the help of . feministic theory of knowledge.

“Spiegel im Spiegel” Uma análise psicanalítica da trilogia de Samuel Beckett, pela teoria de Wilfred Bion

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada para obtenção de grau de Mestre na especialidade de Psicologia Clínica.

Existentialist methodology and perspective: writing the first-person

Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary literature, before providing some neo-existentialist rejoinders. We will suggest that the dilemma that contemporary philosophy poses to existentialism, vis-à-vis methodology, is that it is: a) committed to lived experience as some sort of given that might be accessed either introspectively or retrospectively (with empirical science posing prima facie obstacles to the veridicality of each); and/or b) it advocates transformative experiences, and the power of philosophy in connection with such experiences, to radically revise our doxastic and inter-connected web of beliefs. In short, the charge is conservatism on the one hand, radicalism on the other. Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn, utilizing ideas from Kierkegaard (as the source for many existentialist themes, methodological concerns, and formal practices) and from the German and French twentieth century versions of existentialism

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.