Department of Administrative Services, Information Technology Enterprise, A Review of Selected Service Contracts, April 1, 1998 - June 30, 2003

Other Audit Reports - Special Report

Determinants of Decentralization within the Firm: Some Empirical Evidence from Spanish Small and Medium- Sized Enterprise

This paper examines empirically the determinants of decentralization of decision- making in the firm for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that tend to be highly centralized. By decentralization of decisions we mean the delegation of decision rights from the owner or manager to the plant supervisor or even to floor workers. Our findings show that the allocation of authority to basic workers or a team of workers depends on firm characteristics such as firm size, the use of internal networks or the number of workplaces, and workers characteristics, in particular, the composition of the laborforce in terms of education and seniority and whether or not workers receive pay incentives. External factors such as the intensity of competition and the firm s export intensity are also important determinants of the allocation of authority.

From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

A Review of the State's Leased Space and the Leasing Process, General Services Enterprise of the Department of Administrative Services, July 1, 1998 through June 30, 2003

Other Audit Reports - State Leasing

Parental investments in children: how bargaining and educational homogamy affect time allocation

This study examines parental time investment in their children, distinguishing between developmental and non-developmental care. Our analyses centre on three influential determinants: educational background, marital homogamy, and spouses' relative bargaining power. We find that the emphasis on quality care time is correlated with parents' education, and that marital homogamy reduces couple specialization, but only among the highly educated. In line with earlier research, we identify gendered parental behaviour. The presence of boys is an important condition for fathers' time dedication, but primarly among lower educated fathers. To the extent that parental stimulation is decisive for child outcomes, our findings suggest the persistence of important inequalities. This emerges through our special attention to behavioural differences across the educational distribution among households.

Enterprise Zone Program Report, 2007

This report on the Iowa Enterprise Zone Program was prepared by the Iowa Department of Economic Development in accordance with 2006 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2183, Section 9.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Equity considerations in health care: An axiomatic bargaining approach

The general issues of equity and efficiency are placed at the center of the analysis of resource allocation problems in health care. We examine them using axiomatic bargaining theory. We study different solutions that have been proposed and relate them to previous literature on health care allocation. In particular, we focus on the solutions based on axiomatic bargaining with claims and suggest that they may be particularly appealing as distributive criteria in health policy. Finally, we present the results of a survey that tries to elicit moral intuitions of people about resource allocation problems and their different solutions.

SPOC Collective Bargaining Agreement 2007-2009, July 2007

This Agreement made and entered into this 1st day of July 2007 at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Iowa Code, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and the State Police Officers Council, and its appropriate affiliated sub-organizations (hereinafter referred to as the Council), as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in the Recognition Clause.

AFSCME Collective Bargaining Agreement 2007-2009, July 2007

This Agreement made and entered into this 1st day of July 2007, at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Code of Iowa, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Iowa Public Employees Council 61, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as the Union), and its appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in Appendix A.

IUP Social Services Collective Bargaining Agreement, July 2007

This agreement made and entered in to this 1st day of July 2007, at Des Moines, Iowa pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Iowa code, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and UE Local 893/Iowa United Professionals, and it's appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in appendix A (hereinafter referred to as the Union).