975 resultados para Edifici judicial
Resumo:
Other Audit Reports - Iowa Judicial Branch
Resumo:
Other Audit Reports - Judicial
Resumo:
State Audit Reports
Resumo:
El presente trabajo pretende ser un reflejo de la realidad del intérprete judicial en los juzgados de Barcelona. En el primer bloque hemos realizado un breve repaso bibliográfico. En el segundo, un estudio de campo que muestra cómo es el intérprete de la Ciutat de la Justícia y cómo trabaja.
Resumo:
This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.
Resumo:
Other Audit Reports - Judicial
Resumo:
Other Audit Reports - Judicial
Resumo:
This guide is a informaitonal guide for judicial voters. Frist PDF verison is condensed, the second PDF verison is full text with biographies of judges.
Resumo:
Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2006
Resumo:
Arran de les exposicions de la jornada de treball desenvolupada el passat 30 de novembre de 2007 es va veure que hi havia una preocupació comuna dels tècnics entorn dels dilemes ètics que es generen en el nostre entorn professional. De les dotze dimensions que es recollien en el qüestionari sobre com pensem que hauria de ser un bon professional, hi destacàvem: responsable, honest, coherent, competent, veraç i rigorós. D’altra banda, sobre com pensem que actuem els mateixos professionals, hi trobàvem prioritzats els valors: actitud crítica, veracitat, competència, comunicació i competències socials. El manual de bones pràctiques, que tot seguit us presentem, és el resultat de l’experiència de la pràctica professional i de l’anàlisi, discussió i revisió de documentació pel grup de tècnics que ha integrat aquest grup, com també, de totes les aportacions recollides abans i durant la jornada esmentada, esperant poder continuar-ne recollint dins el marc del Programa Compartim. Pretenem doncs, garantir-ne el seu compliment i supervisió, mitjançant el seguiment, amb els mecanismes i eines per a compartir inquietuds i objectius.
Resumo:
Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Branch for the year ended June 30, 2006
Resumo:
L'objecte del treball és conèixer la realitat de la intal·lació luminotècnica actual de l'edifici PII de l'EPS per proposar alguna millora, buscant l'estalvi energètic i per tant la menor emissió de gassos contaminants a l'atmosfera
Resumo:
Combined audit report on the eight Judicial District Departments of Correctional Services for the year ended June 30, 2006
Resumo:
Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Branch – County Clerks of District Courts, a part of the State of Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2006
Resumo:
We estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments.We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors.Our unique dataset at the level of individual inspections allows us to separately examine extensiveand intensive margins of rent extraction. The identification strategy is based on an institutionalrule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned tothe most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research designexploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identicalpopulation size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. IVestimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularitiesrelated to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In contrast, we findno effect on the intensive margin of rent extraction. Finally, our estimates suggest that judicialpresence reduces rent extraction only for first-term mayors.