A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game

We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (Q J Econ 119(3):861-898, 2004)-where players have different levels of reasoning-to Huck et al. (Games Econ Behav 38:240-264, 2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2:29-46, 1990) action commitment game-a duopoly with endogenous timing of entry. We show that, for an empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, the model rules out Stackelberg equilibria, generates Cournot outcomes including delay, and outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. We show that a cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can explain the most important features of the experimental data on the action commitment game in (2002). In order to gauge the success of the model in fitting the data, we compare it to a noisy Nash model. We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses fits the data better than the noisy Nash model.

Export subsidies, countervailing duties, and welfare

Using a simple Cournot duopoly model, this paper provides an important policy implication for trade disputes involving export subsidies. In this paper, the possibility that a foreign export subsidy could benefit the domestic country as well as the foreign country by appropriately using countervailing duties is identified.

Essays in partial identification and applications to treatment effects and policy evaluation.

Dans cette thèse, je me suis interessé à l’identification partielle des effets de traitements dans différents modèles de choix discrets avec traitements endogènes. Les modèles d’effets de traitement ont pour but de mesurer l’impact de certaines interventions sur certaines variables d’intérêt. Le type de traitement et la variable d’intérêt peuvent être défini de manière générale afin de pouvoir être appliqué à plusieurs différents contextes. Il y a plusieurs exemples de traitement en économie du travail, de la santé, de l’éducation, ou en organisation industrielle telle que les programmes de formation à l’emploi, les techniques médicales, l’investissement en recherche et développement, ou l’appartenance à un syndicat. La décision d’être traité ou pas n’est généralement pas aléatoire mais est basée sur des choix et des préférences individuelles. Dans un tel contexte, mesurer l’effet du traitement devient problématique car il faut tenir compte du biais de sélection. Plusieurs versions paramétriques de ces modèles ont été largement étudiées dans la littérature, cependant dans les modèles à variation discrète, la paramétrisation est une source importante d’identification. Dans un tel contexte, il est donc difficile de savoir si les résultats empiriques obtenus sont guidés par les données ou par la paramétrisation imposée au modèle. Etant donné, que les formes paramétriques proposées pour ces types de modèles n’ont généralement pas de fondement économique, je propose dans cette thèse de regarder la version nonparamétrique de ces modèles. Ceci permettra donc de proposer des politiques économiques plus robustes. La principale difficulté dans l’identification nonparamétrique de fonctions structurelles, est le fait que la structure suggérée ne permet pas d’identifier un unique processus générateur des données et ceci peut être du soit à la présence d’équilibres multiples ou soit à des contraintes sur les observables. Dans de telles situations, les méthodes d’identifications traditionnelles deviennent inapplicable d’où le récent développement de la littérature sur l’identification dans les modèles incomplets. Cette littérature porte une attention particuliere à l’identification de l’ensemble des fonctions structurelles d’intérêt qui sont compatibles avec la vraie distribution des données, cet ensemble est appelé : l’ensemble identifié. Par conséquent, dans le premier chapitre de la thèse, je caractérise l’ensemble identifié pour les effets de traitements dans le modèle triangulaire binaire. Dans le second chapitre, je considère le modèle de Roy discret. Je caractérise l’ensemble identifié pour les effets de traitements dans un modèle de choix de secteur lorsque la variable d’intérêt est discrète. Les hypothèses de sélection du secteur comprennent le choix de sélection simple, étendu et généralisé de Roy. Dans le dernier chapitre, je considère un modèle à variable dépendante binaire avec plusieurs dimensions d’hétérogéneité, tels que les jeux d’entrées ou de participation. je caractérise l’ensemble identifié pour les fonctions de profits des firmes dans un jeux avec deux firmes et à information complète. Dans tout les chapitres, l’ensemble identifié des fonctions d’intérêt sont écrites sous formes de bornes et assez simple pour être estimées à partir des méthodes d’inférence existantes.

Efecto de la competencia en la escogencia de estándares educativos

En la literatura económica no se ha estudiado como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afecta específicamente la escogencia de estándares educativos y el valor de matrícula. Usando un modelo teórico analizo como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afectan la escogencia de estándares académicos, comparando la solución en competencia con la solución eficiente y la solución de monopolio. Los individuos son heterogéneos y se diferencian en su habilidad, las instituciones educativas compiten estableciendo en una primera etapa el estándar educativo, y en una segunda etapa el valor de matrícula. Una vez definidos los estándares y los valores de matrícula, estos son información pública, permitiendo a los individuos escoger entre ingresar o no a una institución educativa o a que institución educativa ingresar de acuerdo a la habilidad innata y al costo asociado al esfuerzo. En los resultados se muestra que el bienestar social aumenta cuando en la economía existe más de una institución educativa con estándares diferentes, y la solución de mercado, en monopolio o en competencia, obliga a los estudiantes a ejercer un mayor esfuerzo para alcanzar el título. Independiente a la relación de costos, el valor de matrícula es siempre mayor para la institución con estándar educativo más alto, y mayor en la solución de mercado. Cuando el costo unitario de la institución con estándar más alto es mayor o igual al costo de la institución con menor estándar, los estándares educativos escogidos por el planificador son mayores y el esfuerzo requerido por los individuos es menor respecto a la solución de mercado.

Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.

Asymmetric oligopoly and foreign direct investment: implications for host-country tax-setting

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.

How do markets manage water resources? An experiment

We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly.

Experimental duopolies under price guarantees

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type.

Market effects of changes in consumers' social responsibility

In a duopoly model of vertical differentiation, we study market equilibrium and the resulting social welfare following an increase in the consumer's willingness to pay (WTP) for products sold by socially responsible manufacturers. Different types of such changes emerge depending on their effects on consumer heterogeneity. We show that, in most cases, increases in the consumers' social consciousness yield higher profits to socially responsible firms and may lead to higher levels of social welfare, provided that the market structure is left unchanged. However, when an increase in the consumer's social consciousness changes the market structure, welfare may fall, while the duopolists' profits rise. The resulting tension between private and social interest calls for a cautious attitude toward information campaigns aimed at increasing the consumer's social consciousness.

Cooperative R&D with endogenous technology differentiation

We study a nontournament R&D duopoly. Before the standard R&D investment and quantity-setting stages, we consider a stage in which firms choose their R&D technologies. Spillovers negatively depend on R&D technology differentiation. We show that, in equilibrium, firms will choose identical or very similar R&D processes. Such equilibria may entail less differentiation than would be dictated by social welfare maximization.

Pro-competitive price beating guarantees: experimental evidence

We report experimental results on duopoly pricing with and without price beating guarantees (PBG). In two control treatments, price beating is either imposed as an industry-wide rule or offered as a business strategy. Our major finding is that when price beating guarantees are imposed as a rule or offered as an option, effective prices are equal to or lower than those in a baseline treatment in which price beating is forbidden. Also, when price beating is treated as a business strategy, less than 50% of subjects adopted the guarantee, suggesting that, subjects realize the pro-competitive effects of the guarantee.

Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.

El papel de los rendimientos y la diferenciacion de productos como determinantes de la estabilidad del cartel

We study cartel stability in a differentiated quantity-setting duopoly with decreasing returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is higher. Furthermore, we show that, above a given discount rate, a cartel may be stable for any degree of product differentiation.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).

Um estudo sobre a percepção do cliente pré-pago quanto ao serviço de roaming de chamadas terminadas

o serviço móvel celular apresentou, nos últimos anos, mudanças significativas em termos de evolução tecnológica e dos produtos e serviços oferecidos ao cliente. O ambiente de prestação do serviço evoluiu a partir de um monopólio estatal para um regime de duopólio regional privado. A introdução da competição trouxe benefícios aos clientes, dentre os quais podem ser citados a redução dos preços de aquisição e das tarifas de uso do serviço e o aumento da oferta de linhas celulares, antes em falta no mercado. A introdução do serviço pré-pago, em 1999, representou um marco na história do Serviço Móvel Celular no Brasil. O produto, adequado para usuários que querem controlar seus gastos com telefonia celular, permitiu o acesso das classes econômicas C e D ao serviço. O pré-pago trouxe vantagens e desvantagens para clientes e prestadores de serviço. Uma de suas limitações, quando lançado, era a impossibilidade de utilização do servIço fora da área de atuação da operadora ("roaming"). O problema técnico que impedia o oferecimento de roammg para chamadas terminadas foi resolvido e as empresas prestadoras adotaram estratégias distintas em relação a isso. Algumas ofereceram o serviço para todos os clientes pré-pago, indistintamente; outras segmentaram o mercado pré-pago, criando produtos novos com a facilidade de roaming e mantendo os produtos já lançados no mercado sem a facilidade de roaming. A Americel, empresa operadora do Serviço Móvel Celular na região Centro Oeste e parte da região Norte, possui dois produtos pré-pago: o primeiro, chamado Legal, não permite o roaming de chamadas terminadas. Foi criado também o Legal Pacas que oferecia, entre outras novas funcionalidades, a possibilidade de roaming de chamadas terminadas. Os dois produtos possuem outras características diferentes e planos de tarifa próprios. O objetivo da pesquisa é avaliar como o cliente pré-pago da Americel percebe a funcionalidade de roaming de chamadas terminadas. A pesquisa pretende avaliar a importância do serviço para o cliente, como ele avalia o serviço prestado pela empresa e como essa funcionalidade é classificada (básica, de desempenho ou de encantamento). A partir da compreensão da percepção do cliente quanto ao roaming, será avaliada a estratégia de marketing de segmentar o mercado pré-pago por meio dessa funcionalidade. VI A metodologia empregada utiliza-se de ferramentas de medição da satisfação dos clientes. A Americel realiza mensalmente uma pesquisa de satisfação com uma amostra de 400 clientes que são entrevistados por telefone. O questionário de pesquisa possui 50 perguntas sobre vários aspectos relacionados à prestação do serviço. Os resultados anteriores dessa pesquisa apontam a cobertura como sendo a característica mais importante do serviço do ponto de vista do cliente e, ao mesmo tempo, uma característica mal avaliada por ele. A pesquisa também demonstra uma confusão do cliente que, quando questionado sobre onde necessita de cobertura, indica regiões onde a empresa não atua e, portanto, não poderia oferecer cobertura, mas roaming. Para uma parte dos clientes, roaming e cobertura são o mesmo atributo. Foram acrescentadas ao questionário padrão perguntas relacionadas ao roaming. As perguntas foram elaboradas para avaliar a freqüência com que os clientes viajam, a importância atribuída ao roaming, a avaliação do serviço de roaming e a avaliação geral da Americel. Os resultados permitem concluir que, apesar do usuário do serviço pré-pago não viajar freqüentemente, ele considera a funcionalidade de roaming como importante ou muito importante. A avaliação do serviço é ruim, o que implica na necessidade de priorizar ações no sentido de melhorar o serviço de roaming para os clientes pré-pago. Isso pode ser feito através da extensão do oferecimento do roaming a todos os clientes pré-pago. O resultado da análise penalidade-recompensa foi de que a funcionalidade de roaming é uma funcionalidade de desempenho do Serviço Móvel Celular. Isso significa que sua ausência causa insatisfação do cliente, enquanto sua presença aumenta a sua satisfação. Sendo assim, mais uma vez é confirmada a necessidade de oferecimento dessa facilidade a toda a base de clientes pré-pago. A pesquisa permite, então, concluir que a estratégia de marketing de segmentar o mercado de clientes pré-pago por meio do uso da facilidade de roaming tem como conseqüência final a insatisfação do cliente, uma vez que, de acordo com sua percepção, o roaming é uma funcionalidade importante do serviço móvel celular, que deve ser oferecido para toda a base de clientes. As características do serviço que devem ser usadas para segmentação devem ser aquelas que, quando ausentes, não causam insatisfação nos clientes, mas, quando presentes, o encantam.