Modellizzazione bioeconomica per la gestione dei piccoli pelagici nel Mar Adriatico

Stocks’ overexploitation and socio-economic sustainability are two major issues currently at stake in European fisheries. In this view the European Commission is considering the implementation of management plans as a means to move towards a longer-term perspective on fisheries management, to consider regional differences and to increase stakeholder involvement. Adriatic small pelagic species (anchovies and sardines) are some of the most studied species in the world from a biologic perspective; several economic analysis have also been realised on Italian pelagic fishery; despite that, no complete bioeconomic modelization has been carried out yet considering all biologic, technical and economic issues. Bioeconomic models cannot be considered foolproof tools but are important implements to help decision makers and can supply a fundamental scientific basis for management plans. This research gathers all available information (from biologic, technologic and economic perspectives) in order to carry out a bioeconomic model of the Adriatic pelagic fishery. Different approaches are analyzed and some of them developed to highlight potential divergences in results, characteristics and implications. Growth, production and demand functions are estimated. A formal analysis about interaction and competition between Italian and Croatian fleet is examined proposing different equilibriums for open access, duopoly and a form of cooperative solution. Anyway normative judgments are limited because of poor knowledge of population dynamics and data related to the Croatian fleet.

Three Essays in Spatial Economics

This work contributes to the field of spatial economics by embracing three distinct modelling approaches, belonging to different strands of the theoretical literature. In the first chapter I present a theoretical model in which the changes in urban system’s degree of functional specialisation are linked to (i) firms’ organisational choices and firms’ location decisions. The interplay between firms’ internal communication/managing costs (between headquarters and production plants) and the cost of communicating with distant business services providers leads the transition process from an “integrated” urban system where each city hosts every different functions to a “functionally specialised” urban system where each city is either a primary business center (hosting advanced business services providers, a secondary business center or a pure manufacturing city and all this city-types coexist in equilibrium.The second chapter investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the smaller country. Countries’ relative sizes as well as the intensity of negative environmental externality affect potential welfare gains of trade liberalisation. The third chapter focuses on the paradox, by which, contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical evidence shows that a decrease in international transport costs causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting an approach which delivers a continuum of Bertrand- Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing. In our setting, two Bertrand firms, supplying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the market of a foreign country. We show that allowing for a softer price competition may indeed more than offset the standard effect generated by a decrease in trade costs, thereby restoring FDI incentives.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Emissions Control and the Regulation of Product Markets: The Case of Automobiles

The paper investigates alternative policies to regulate emissions from polluting product markets, specifically considering the case of the automobiles market. The two policies we consider are: a quota that limits the quantity produced of the polluting model and a more flexible average efficiency standard that requires a minimum energy efficiency across all models produced by a firm, similar to the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. We use a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where firms produce both an economy (i.e., low polluting) version and a luxury (i.e., high polluting) version of a given product. We show that while a quota can raise firm profit over a certain range, CAFE always reduces firm profit relative to the pre-regulation. We also show that while the quota reduces emissions, it is possible that emissions increase under CAFE. The optimal policy choice will depend on the magnitude of unit damages. We show that when unit damages are sufficiently high, the quota policy is more efficient than the average efficiency standard. This suggests that instead of tightening CAFE to limit damages from emissions, policy makers can shift to a quota policy which is both welfare enhancing and more profitable for firms.

Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Political representation in France: a crisis of democracy?

The past two decades have witnessed growing political disaffection and a widening mass/elite disjuncture in France, reflected in opinion polls, rising abstentionism, electoral volatility and fragmentation, with sustained voting against incumbent governments. Though the electoral system has preserved the duopoly of the mainstream coalitions, they have suffered loss of public confidence and swings in electoral support. Stable parliamentary majorities conceal a political landscape of assorted anti-system parties and growing support for far right and far left. The picture is paradoxical: the French express alienation from political parties yet relate positively to their political institutions; they berate national politicians but retain strong bonds with those elected locally; they appear increasingly disengaged from politics yet forms of ‘direct democracy’ are finding new vigour. While the electoral, attitudinal and systemic factors reviewed here may not signal a crisis of democracy, they point to serious problems of political representation in contemporary France.

Production in advance versus production to order

We use a theoretical framework to compare production-in-advance type and production-to-order type environments. Carrying out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game, we prove that the equilibrium prots are the same in case of production in advance and production to order. In addition, advance production results in higher prices than production to order if both games have an equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed strategies.

A Two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth Game

In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which during the first stage the firms can select their rationing rule. We will show that under certain conditions the efficient rationing rule is an equilibrium action of the first stage.

Mixed duopolies with advance production

Production to order and production in advance has been compared in many frameworks. In this paper we investigate a mixed production in advance version of the capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game and determine the solution of the respective timing game. We show that a pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash-equilibrium point exists for all possible orderings of moves. It is pointed out that unlike the production-to-order case, the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves. An analysis of the public firm's impact on social welfare is also carried out. All the results are compared to those of the production-to order version of the respective game.

A Kreps-Scheinkman-állítás érvényessége lineáris keresletű vegyes duopóliumok esetén (The Kreps and Scheinkman result remains valid for mixed duopolies with linear demand)

Vegyes oligopóliumoknak nevezzük az olyan piacszerkezeteket, amelyek esetében a magánvállalatok mellett állami vállalatok is tevékenykednek. A vegyes oligopóliumokban az állami vállalatok részben vagy egészében a társadalmi többletet kívánják maximalizálni. Olyan vegyes duopóliumot vizsgálunk, amelyben a vállalatok előbb kiépítik kapacitásaikat, majd meghatározzák termékük kínálati árát. Kreps-Scheinkman [1983] tisztán magánvállalatos duopóliumokra vizsgált ilyen két időszakos modellt, és megállapította, hogy az első időszaki egyensúlyi kapacitások megegyeznek az azonos költségszerkezetű és kínálati viszonyú Cournot-duopólium egyensúlyi kibocsátásaival. Tanulmányunkban Kreps-Scheinkman [1983] eredményét kiterjesztjük a vegyes duopóliumok - lineáris keresleti görbe és konstans egységköltségek melletti - esetére. _____ In mixed oligopolies, private firms compete with a public firm, which at least partially aims to maximize social surplus. The authors investigate mixed duopolies in which the firms first build capacities simultaneously and then set their prices simultaneously as well. For the same two-stage game with purely private firms Kreps and Scheinkman demonstrated in 1983 that the first-stage equilibrium capacities of the two-stage game are identical with the equilibrium outputs of the Cournot duopoly. This paper extends Kreps and Scheinkman's results to mixed duopolies with linear demands and constant unit costs. It is shown that quantity pre-commitment and Bertrand competition also yield to Cournot outcomes when a public firm is involved, not only in the case of private firms.

Quota bonuses as localized sales bonuses

Managerial bonus schemes and their effects on firm strategies and market outcomes are extensively discussed in the literature. Though quota bonuses are not uncommon in practice, they have not been analysed so far. In this article we compare quota bonuses to profit-based evaluation and sales (quantity) bonuses. In a duopoly setting with independent demand shocks we find that under certain circumstances choosing quota bonuses is a dominant strategy. This may explain the widespread use of quota bonuses in situations where incentive problems are relevant.

Serviço de nuvem pública e sua relação com os arranjos de governança de TI e o alinhamento estratégico

Increasingly, the Information Technology (IT) has been used to sustain the business strategies, causing increased its relevance. Therefore IT governance is seen as one of the priorities of organizations at the time. The search for strategic alignment between business and IT is debated as a factor for business success, but even with that importance, usually the main business managers are reluctant to take responsibility for decisions involving IT, mainly due to the complexity of your infrastructure. Since cloud computing is being seen as an element capable of assisting in the implementation of organizational strategies, because their characteristics enable greater efficiency and agility in IT, and is considered as a new computing paradigm. The main objective of the analyze the relationship between IT governance arrangements and strategic alignment with the infrastructure as a service (IaaS) of public cloud computing. Therefore, an exploratory, descriptive and inferential was developed, with approach to the problem of quantitatively research, with descriptive survey method and cross section. An electronic questionnaire that was applied to the ISACA chapters Associates of São Paulo and the Distrito Federal, totaling 164 respondents was used. The instrument used based on the theories of Weill and Ross (2006) for array of IT governance arrangement; Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) and Luftman (2000), for maturity of the strategic alignment model; and NIST (2011 b), ITGI (2007) and CSA (2010) for infrastructure maturity as a service (IaaS) public in its essential characteristics. As regards the main results, this research proved that with public IaaS decision-making structures have changed, with a greater participation of senior executives in all five key IT decisions (IT governance arrangement array) including more technical decisions as architecture and IT infrastructure. With increased participation of senior executives the decrease was also observed in the share of IT specialists, characterizing the decision process with the duopoly archetype (shared decision). With regard to strategic alignment, it was observed that it changes with cloud computing, and organizations with public IaaS, a maturity of strategic alignment with statistically significant and greater difference when compared to organizations without IaaS. The maturity of public IaaS is at the intermediate level (level 3 - "defined process"), with the elasticity and measurement achieved level 4 - "managed and measurable" It was also possible to infer in organizations with public IaaS, there are positive correlations between the key decisions and the maturity of IaaS, especially at the beginning, architecture and infrastructure, and the archetypes involving senior executives and IT specialists. In the correlation between the maturity and mature strategic alignment of public IaaS therefore the higher the strategic alignment, the greater the maturity of the public IaaS and vice versa.

Tributos indiretos na cadeia produtiva do camarão

The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO´s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps

Tributos indiretos na cadeia produtiva do camarão

The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO´s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps

Essays on Financial Constraints, R&D Investments, and Competition

This dissertation consists of two chapters of theoretical studies that investigate the effect of financial constraints and market competition on research and development (R&D) investments. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of financial constraints on two different types of R&D investments. In the second chapter, I examine the impact of market competition on the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investments. In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic monopoly model to study a firm’s R&D strategy. Contrary to intuition, I show that a financially constrained firm may invest more aggressively in R&D projects than an unconstrained firm. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money before its project bears fruit, which leads to involuntary termination on an otherwise positive-NPV project. For a company that relies on cash flow from assets in place to keep its R&D project alive, early success can be relatively important. I find that when the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“accelerable” projects), a financially constrained company may find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise the probability of project survival. The over-investment will not happen if the project is only “scalable” (investment scales up payoffs). The model generates several testable implications regarding over-investment and project values. In the second chapter, I study the effects of competition on R&D investments in a duopoly framework. Using a homogeneous duopoly model where two unconstrained firms compete head to head in an R&D race, I find that competition has no effect on R&D investment if the project is not accelerable, and the competing firms are not constrained. In a heterogeneous duopoly model where a financially constrained firm competes against an unconstrained firm, I discover interesting strategic interactions that lead to preemption by the constrained firm in equilibrium. The unconstrained competitor responds to its constrained rival’s investment in an inverted-U shape fashion. When the constrained competitor has high cash flow risk, it accelerates the innovation in equilibrium, while the unconstrained firm invests less aggressively and waits for its rival to quit the race due to shortage of funds.